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Cover
Vice Admiral Stockdale (1923–2005) left
his mark on the Naval War College not
only as president of the institution, from
October 1977 to August 1979, but as a
thinker on and writer about—and as an
exemplar of—leadership. His contribu-
tions in the latter respect are remembered
today in the school’s College of Opera-
tional and Strategic Leadership, particu-
larly in the Stockdale Group, a team of
students carefully selected each year for
directed study. This issue offers a prime
example of that group’s recent work, in
“Developing the Navy’s Operational
Leaders: A Critical Look,” by Com-
mander Christopher D. Hayes, U.S.
Navy, who graduated (with distinction,
as a lieutenant commander) in 2007.
Vice Admiral Stockdale’s observation re-
produced on the cover is drawn from his
essay “Moral Leadership” in the U.S. Na-
val Institute Proceedings 106, no. 931
(September 1980), a contribution to the
Leadership Forum department of that
journal—of course, set conventionally, as
prose. The work was reprinted as
“Machiavelli, Management, and Moral
Leadership” in Military Ethics: Reflec-
tions on Principles, edited by Malham
Wakin et al. (Washington, D.C.: Na-
tional Defense Univ. Press, 1987).
Cover design by the Naval War College
Visual Communications Branch.
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FROM THE EDITORS
On 22 March, in an exemplary display of democracy in action that seems to have
been little noticed in this country, the people of Taiwan voted by an unexpect-
edly large margin to reject the presidential candidate of the governing Demo-
cratic Progressive Party in favor of the leader of the main opposition party, the
Kuomintang. President-elect Ma Ying-jeou promises to be a more predictable
and reliable interlocutor for the United States than outgoing President Chen
Shui-bian, who has antagonized both Beijing and Washington in recent years by
pressing in various ways the envelope of Taiwanese independence. His election
therefore opens a major window of opportunity to reduce tensions across the
Taiwan Strait as well as in U.S.-Chinese relations generally. But it also may open
the way to a new approach on the part of both Taiwan and the United States to
the military defense of Taiwan against actual or threatened invasion of the island
by the People’s Republic. The exponential growth in Chinese military forces ar-
rayed against Taiwan, particularly in the area of short-range ballistic missiles,
has been well publicized, but its dire implications do not seem to have been fully
digested either in Taipei or in Washington. In a timely and (we believe)
pathbreaking and important article, “Rethinking Taiwan’s Defense Policy,” Wil-
liam Murray, a former naval officer and now an analyst associated with the
China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College, provides a compre-
hensive and detailed survey of Taiwan’s current strategic predicament, together
with a cogent analysis of the inadequate and—as he argues—deeply misguided
efforts undertaken by Taiwan’s current government to address this situation.
Moreover, he faults the United States for promoting an arms assistance package
for the Taiwanese that is at the same time costly, provocative, and strategically
ineffective. Murray’s own recommendations, it may be added, track in impor-
tant ways with recent statements on defense policy offered by President-elect Ma
himself.
If anyone doubts the significance of China’s buildup of short-range ballistic
missiles, it is enlightening to listen to the Chinese themselves on this subject.
PRC military analyst Wang Wei, in a piece entitled “The Effect of Tactical Ballis-
tic Missiles on the Maritime Strategy System of China,” shows that the Chinese
are increasingly confident in their ability to hold at risk with these weapons not
9
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only Taiwan but deployed U.S. naval assets in the western Pacific. Other articles
in this issue touching on China include that of Toshi Yoshihara and James
Holmes on the U.S.-Chinese-Indian triangular relationship in the Indian Ocean
and Mackubin Owens’s “Reflections on Future War.” Owens reminds us that
America’s preoccupation with Iraq and “the Long War” should not cause us to
lose sight of the implications of the rise of China as a near-peer competitor in
the coming years, especially since we can very probably expect from the Chinese
an approach to major-power warfare involving unconventional or irregular fea-
tures that we have been unaccustomed to dealing with in the past.
This issue also offers two articles under the rubric “Leadership and Decision.”
Commander Christopher Hayes, USN, a recent Naval War College graduate,
provides an authoritative analysis of the limitations of existing institutional ar-
rangements and procedures within the Navy for cultivating operational leader-
ship. This study is an outgrowth of ongoing research on leadership being done
by a select group of students (the “Stockdale Group”) under the auspices of the
Naval War College’s newly established College of Operational and Strategic
Leadership, currently headed by Rear Admiral Thomas Zelibor, USN (Ret.). Fi-
nally, we have asked Professor John Hattendorf to allow us to republish in re-
vised form an article on the career of Admiral Richard G. Colbert, not only
because of its interest for the history of the Naval War College (whose pan-
oramic Colbert Plaza memorializes him) in the immediate postwar years but
even more for its relevance to the Navy today as it rethinks maritime security co-
operation under the impetus of its new maritime strategy.
EDWARD S. MILLER RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP IN NAVAL HISTORY
The Naval War College Foundation intends to award one grant of $1,000 to the
researcher who has the greatest need and who can make the optimal use of the
research materials for naval history located in the Naval War College’s Archives,
Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College Museum, and Henry E. Eccles
Library. Further information on the manuscript and archival collections and
copies of the registers for specific collections are available on request from the
Head, Naval Historical Collection (evelyn.cherpak@nwc.navy.mil).
The recipient will be a research fellow in the College’s Maritime History De-
partment, which will provide administrative support during the research visit.
Submit a detailed research proposal—a full statement of financial need, a com-
prehensive research plan for use of Naval War College materials, curriculum vi-
tae, at least two letters of recommendation, and relevant background
information—to Miller Naval History Fellowship Committee, Naval War Col-
lege Foundation, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I. 02841-1207, by 1 August
2008. For further information, contact the chair of the selection committee, at
4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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john.hattendorf@nwc.navy.mil. Employees of the U.S. Naval War College or any
other agency of the U.S. Department of Defense are not eligible for consider-
ation; EEO/AA regulations apply.
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Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in
1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
program at the University of South Carolina. His initial
assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979, fol-
lowing a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for Com-
mander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an
Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the
Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds mas-
ter’s degrees in public administration (finance) from
Harvard and in national security and strategic studies
from the Naval War College, where he graduated with
highest distinction.
After completing department head tours in USS Deyo
(DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he com-
manded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washing-
ton included assignments to the staff of the Chief of
Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and per-
sonal aide to the Secretary.
Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to com-
mand USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed
command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998,
deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet oper-
ating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the
USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the
Battle Efficiency “E” for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.
Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he di-
rected the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Fol-
lowing this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy
Division as chief of staff of the Navy’s Roles and
Missions Organization. He finished his most recent Pen-
tagon tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure,
Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint
Staff—primarily in the theater air and missile defense
mission area. His most recent Washington assignment
was to the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of Sen-
ate Liaison.
In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Com-
mander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution. Rear
Admiral Shuford assumed command of the Abraham
Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in August 2003. He be-
came the fifty-first President of the Naval War College
on 12 August 2004.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
Strategic Investment and Title X War Gaming
THIS AUGUST THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE will host a very significant
event—Global War Game 2008. This game marks the Navy’s re-
turn to “Title X” war gaming, a strategic-level analytic activity that was discon-
tinued in 2001.* The College originated this type of gaming in 1979, when the
Navy decided to explore conflict with the Soviet Union on a worldwide scale. Its
purpose was to help rebuild the Navy’s operational and strategic perspective, a
perspective many felt had become too narrowly tactical. With similar intent, the
new Global series is meant to reestablish a truly worldwide perspective and fu-
ture orientation in a service whose recent focus has been regional contingencies
and the near term. The game is also a necessary step to implementing the new
maritime strategy (“President’s Forum,” Winter 2008), a sweeping, top-level
document that requires follow-up work to flesh out the operational concepts,
capabilities, and forces needed to meet both its expressed and implied
objectives.
Global Gaming: Catalyst for Concept Generation and Development
For a number of reasons, a gap has developed in the Navy’s innovation architec-
ture. A great deal of very innovative work is done by the fleet and various labs,
and “Fleet Readiness Enterprises” have emerged as efficiency drivers to field
product improvements and improve processes around specific platforms in cur-
rent programs. For the very distant horizon, the Chief of Naval Operations Stra-
tegic Studies Group faithfully explores, as an education function, each year’s
new crop of technologies and studies their potential relevance to the Navy.
* Title X, U.S. Code, concerns federal law for the organization and operation of the armed forces of
the United States. It constitutes the legal basis for the roles and missions of each of the services and
responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping them.
13
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However, the Navy lacks a coordinated process that knits together, deliberately
and comprehensively, the work of various enterprises on future concepts eight
to twenty years out, a period for which strategic investment decisions must be
made today. Although various analytical processes within the Navy Staff neces-
sarily focus on this time frame, these analyses are—also by necessity—oriented
to the current program of record.
Understanding the Navy’s innovation architecture gap requires a more pre-
cise definition for “concept development,” which is actually the middle element
of a three-step process. Implementation follows an extensive set of activities that
must be led by the fleet to refine a concept; to develop associated concepts of op-
erations, tactics, techniques, and procedures; to demonstrate, experiment with,
and validate the concept; and to evolve doctrine. But before a concept can be de-
veloped, it must be generated. This is not just an ad hoc process but rather a com-
plex set of tasks that include identifying a problem, developing solutions and
elaborating them into concepts, determining strategic value and risks associated
with a concept, and discerning the broad implications for force design and pol-
icy. Concept generation requires whole warfighting analysis and forcewide per-
spective, it must relate to a strategic- and operational-level context, and it must
enjoy wide and diverse stakeholder participation. In short, concept generation is
the fundamental, horizontal element of the innovation architecture.* This is
where the warfighting analysis done here at the College, along with strategic-
and operational-level gaming and research, begins to address the innovation
gap and inform strategic investment.
The Navy has begun to take some significant steps that should address this
gap and put in place a sustained, disciplined approach to generating and evalu-
ating alternative naval concepts and force-design options. One of them is re-
instituting the Navy Title X war game.
We Are Not Starting from Scratch
For several years now, the College has been conducting a set of highly focused
and detailed operational studies of various current and future warfare scenarios
via its Halsey groups, which I have previously discussed in this space (“Presi-
dent’s Forum,” Summer 2005). Continuous, highly collaborative gaming and re-
search on key warfighting scenarios have produced a wealth of analytically
sound data and insights that provide credible, threat-based assessments neces-
sary to calibrate key assumptions for the Title X games. The College also did
seminal research for the new maritime strategy and gained important insights
8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* Concept development translates, through its various functions, from the strategic and operational
horizon into the vertical output necessary to plan, program, and budget for systems, people, and
platforms.
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into strategic futures and collaborative processes that can be brought to bear in
the new gaming series. Further, regionally oriented research and analysis efforts,
as well as our new China Maritime Studies Institute, will provide current and
detailed regional knowledge that will make the Title X games more relevant and
valid.
The College is also making internal adjustments in order to leverage its
unique strengths to provide a better strategic and analytic context to support in-
tegrated assessments for future force design. We are restructuring the Center for
Naval Warfare Studies. Among other things, this restructuring includes evolving
the Warfare Analysis and Research Department into a new Advanced Concepts
Department that will support expanded Halsey Group operations and also con-
duct workshops and other activities necessary for the Title X gaming process
and for Navy concept generation and development. All departments within the
Center for Naval Warfare Studies will collaborate with the Navy Staff, fleet
forces, and others to establish a “campaign plan” that, according to the missions,
functions, and tasks assigned to the College, will provide “a program of focused,
forward-thinking and timely research, analysis, and gaming that anticipates fu-
ture operational and strategic challenges; develops and assesses strategic and op-
erational concepts to overcome those challenges; assesses the risk associated
with these concepts; and provides analytical products that inform the Navy’s
leadership and help shape key decisions.”
Global 2008
The new maritime strategy establishes strategic imperatives and six core capa-
bilities for the nation’s maritime forces. Further, it commits them concurrently to
provide regionally concentrated, credible combat power and mission-tailored
forces, distributed globally. Understanding the implications of these commit-
ments—how we define “sufficiency” in terms of core capability—is key to im-
plementing the strategy. This will be the focus of our 2008 Global War Game.
Insights from the game should help shape the Navy’s contribution to the
Quadrennial Defense Review, which occurs at the beginning of each new
administration.
The insights we produce regarding the capabilities, capacities, and risks asso-
ciated with implementation of the maritime strategy will focus follow-on capa-
bilities analysis and inform force design. A second, equally important objective
is to connect the tenets of the maritime strategy to future concept development
and the Navy Strategic Planning Process.*
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 9
* The Navy Staff (specifically N3N5, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and
Strategy) has developed a process for a structured examination of strategic trends and translates
that analysis into guidance for the Navy via the Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) and the Naval Opera-
tional Concept (NOC).
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The mechanism for this year’s game will be a series of discussions across four
alternative futures in which the strategy must operate. This will allow the partic-
ipants to identify concepts and capabilities required—from both global and re-
gional perspectives—to gain a better understanding of the capabilities and
capacity issues associated with the strategy. In an effort to gather a wide range of
expert, informed perspectives and insights, we will invite players from all the
U.S. military services, other federal agencies, partner nations, international or-
ganizations, and leaders in the financial, energy, and maritime industries. The
game cannot be structured to validate specific force-structure options but
should provide a sound basis for developing these options and associated con-
cepts. Subsequent “Force Design Workshops” will be conducted to build on the
collaborative, expert perspectives introduced during Global ’08 and to
strengthen strategy-to-force alignment in Navy planning.
Back to the Future
Many Review readers are familiar with, and may have even played in, the old
“Global” series. The game had many successes and excellent qualities, but by
2001 it had become very large, very expensive, and narrowly focused on net-
worked operational command-and-control issues. The new Global games will
return to their roots, taking a truly global perspective, as established by the new
maritime strategy. They will provide the strategic context for examining a range
of warfighting, homeland defense, and maritime security issues. Each game will
be developed over the course of the entire year, and its size and objectives will be
developed to ensure relevant and analytically sound results. We will carefully se-
lect game players who can bring specific expertise and perspective and who can
think beyond current doctrines and programs. Players will also have to be famil-
iar with the future concepts featured in the game. We also understand the value
of a Title X game as an outreach and integration opportunity, and so we look
forward to bringing in not only other service and joint representatives but also
representatives from defense industry and other government agencies, as well as,
when appropriate, other nations. In short, we will bring forward those traditions
and approaches that were successful in the previous Global games, while tailor-
ing the new series to meet the challenges we face today.
Global ’08 will be a first step toward reestablishing Navy Title X gaming and
improving strategy-to-force alignment. It will resemble the first such game we
held, in 1979. That game was an experiment to see what was possible in terms of
using war gaming to provide strategic insights to Navy leadership. Once its util-
ity was demonstrated, resources flowed into it. Today the College’s War Gaming
Department is less than half the size it was in 2001, and so the initial game must
be bounded in scope and methodology. I expect that its utility and value will be
1 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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manifest and that greater expectations and resources will follow to support a
more robust role for the College in the Navy’s innovation process. These invest-
ments will yield huge returns in terms of more confident and efficient program-
ming and better arguments for the national investment in sea power.
Specifically, the Navy’s return to Global and to Title X war gaming will be a pow-
erful stimulus for Navy innovation across the board, catalyzing new thinking
and creating avenues for collaboration among different organizations. It will
yield new synergies and efficiencies in research and technology development. In
the end, the main return on investment—in Global and in the College—will be
the enhanced ability of the Navy to pace global strategic developments.
The original Global games had a significant impact on the Navy, leading as
they did to the development and implementation of the Maritime Strategy of
the 1980s. In this, they were a continuation of a tradition at the College. Our
games here in the 1920s and 1930s are legendary: they led to the development of
naval aviation and to the logistical triumphs of War Plan ORANGE in World War
II. These games were themselves offspring of earlier games in the late nineteenth
century that led to the development of a strong and concentrated U.S. Fleet. War
gaming is a powerful tool in the hands of a mission-funded institution dedicated
to professional military education and objective research, a fact clearly grasped
by a current leadership intent on revitalizing future-oriented, strategic thinking.
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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REVISITING TAIWAN’S DEFENSE STRATEGY
William S. Murray
China’s recent military modernization has fundamentally altered Taiwan’ssecurity options. New Chinese submarines, advanced surface-to-air mis-
siles, and, especially, short-range ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles have
greatly reduced Taiwan’s geographic advantage. Taipei can no longer expect to
counter Chinese military strengths in a symmetrical manner, with Patriot inter-
ceptors, diesel submarines, surface warships, F-16 fighters, and P-3 maritime pa-
trol aircraft. Taiwan must therefore rethink and redesign its defense strategy,
emphasizing the asymmetrical advantage of being the defender, seeking to deny
the People’s Republic its strategic objectives rather than attempting to destroy its
weapons systems. This would enable Taipei to deter more effectively Beijing’s
use of coercive force, would provide better means for Taiwan to resist Chinese
attacks should deterrence fail, and would provide the United States additional
time to determine whether intervening in a cross-strait conflict was in its own
national interest. The strategy would also place the responsibility for Taiwan’s
defense squarely on its own military. Finally, it would restore the United States to
unambiguous compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been increasingly explicit about its
military modernization objectives. China’s 2004 white paper on national
defense stated that “the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] will . . . enhance the de-
velopment of its operational strength with priority given to the Navy, Air Force
and Second Artillery Force, and strengthen its comprehensive deterrence and
warfighting capabilities.”1 The introduction of new classes of advanced surface
warships; the unveiling of new nuclear-powered submarines, tactical fighter air-
craft, and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with advanced warheads;
and an antisatellite demonstration—all attest to the determined pursuit of these
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goals.2 Many analysts believe that China’s near-term purposes are to deter Tai-
wan from declaring independence, to provide leverage by which to coerce a re-
unification with Taiwan if deterrence fails, and to inhibit or delay U.S.
intervention in such a conflict.3
Chinese employment strategies for these new weapons systems and potential
capabilities remain unknown, though statements from senior leaders provide
important hints. For example, President Hu Jintao is said to have stated in Au-
gust 2007 that China had five major military priorities relative to Taiwan: estab-
lishing military readiness, conducting demonstrative exercises, “imposing a
blockade on the Taiwan Strait,” “carrying out combined firepower attacks,” and
“[conducting a] cross-sea landing.”4 Guo Boxiong, vice chairman of the Central
Military Commission, boasted in March 2008, “We have the resolve and capabil-
ity to deal with a major ‘Taiwan independence’ incident at any time.”5 The likely
use of force would encompass three components: long-range precision bom-
bardment, invasion, and blockade. These attack mechanisms would also likely
be conducted in close coordination, not independently.6 Taiwan faces the daunt-
ing challenge of how best to deny China the fulfillment of these objectives.
Previous studies of potential China-Taiwan conflict scenarios have con-
cluded that Taiwan (either acting alone or with the assistance of the U.S. mili-
tary) could defeat PRC coercion, thus presumably ensuring reliable deterrence.7
Several of these studies have asserted that the Second Artillery (the PRC’s strate-
gic rocket force) possessed only a limited inventory of relatively inaccurate
short-range missiles with which to attack Taiwan, restricting its role to what
Robert Pape calls “coercion by punishment,” terrorizing or inflicting pain on the
population—a strategy that observers like Pape argue is rarely successful.8 These
circumstances, however, have now changed profoundly. Over the past decade
China has greatly enhanced its capacity to “reach” Taiwan with far more accurate
and decisive capabilities, and recent analyses question Taiwan’s near-term abil-
ity to resist coercive force.9
For example, the PRC’s expanding arsenal of increasingly accurate ballistic
missiles can quickly, and with complete surprise, cripple or destroy high-value
military assets, including aircraft on the ground and ships at piers. This emer-
gent capability, plus the acquisition of long-range surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs), suggests that the PRC has shifted its anti-Taiwan military strategy away
from coercion by punishment toward denying Taiwan the use of its air force and
navy.10 Taiwan therefore faces a threat against which it has not adequately pre-
pared and that offers the PRC a real prospect of achieving success before the
United States could intervene. This is a very worrisome development.
Taiwan’s responses to China’s enhanced capabilities remain highly conflicted,
a situation that reflects the deep political disagreements that shape Taipei’s
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military policies. Taipei decreased its defense budgets in absolute and relative
terms from 1993 until 2003, with only meager improvements thereafter.11 These
diminished efforts hardly seem commensurate with the increased threat that
Taiwan confronts. They suggest either a state of denial about the threat, a
gridlocked political system, misplaced faith in current systems and geographic
advantages, or perhaps most disturbingly, a belief that the United States is cer-
tain to provide timely military assistance. Despite this ambivalence and its ane-
mic defense budget, Taiwan has sought costly weapons systems from the United
States, including PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability, third version) missile sys-
tems, P-3 maritime patrol and F-16 fighter aircraft, Kidd-class destroyers, and
diesel submarines. Taiwan is also reportedly attempting to develop offensive
counterstrike capabilities indigenously, including the 360-mile-range
Hsung-Feng IIE cruise missile.
Both approaches represent serious misperceptions of the threats posed to
Taiwan and a misallocation of budgetary resources. The PAC-3s and other po-
tential purchases are expensive, and they concentrate Taiwan’s defense dollars
on a limited range of capabilities that China is increasingly able to defeat. Offen-
sive counterstrike weapons, furthermore, are potentially destabilizing, since
China would have difficulty determining if such strikes originated from Ameri-
can or Taiwanese platforms. They are also unlikely to be acquired in numbers
sufficient to deter China.12
More affordable, more effective, and less destabilizing means of defense
against precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade are nonetheless avail-
able, but to take advantage of them, Taiwan must rethink its defense strategies.
Rather than trying to destroy incoming ballistic missiles with costly PAC-3
SAMs, Taiwan should harden key facilities and build redundancies into critical
infrastructure and processes so that it could absorb and survive a long-range
precision bombardment.13 Rather than relying on its navy and air force (neither
of which is likely to survive such an attack) to destroy an invasion force, Taiwan
should concentrate on development of a professional standing army armed with
mobile, short-range, defensive weapons. To withstand a prolonged blockade,
Taiwan should stockpile critical supplies and build infrastructure that would al-
low it to attend to the needs of its citizens unassisted for an extended period. Fi-
nally, Taiwan should eschew destabilizing offensive capabilities, which could
include, in their extreme form, tactical nuclear weapons employed in a
countervalue manner, or less alarmingly, long-range conventional weapons
aimed against such iconic targets as the Three Gorges Dam.
Such shifts constitute a “porcupine strategy.” They would offer Taiwan a way
to resist PRC military coercion for weeks or months without presuming imme-
diate U.S. intervention.14 This shift in strategy might also be less provocative to
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the PRC than Taiwan’s current policy of offensive defense. A porcupine strategy
would enhance deterrence, in that a Taipei truly prepared to defend itself would
be able to thwart a decapitation attempt—thereby discouraging Beijing from
acting militarily. Perhaps most important, such a policy would allow the United
States time to deliberate whether intervention was warranted. Washington
could avoid a reflexive decision that would draw it into a war against a major
power that had systematically prepared for just such a contingency for more
than a decade.
This article has five principal parts. The first summarizes the history and ra-
tionale of the 2001 U.S. arms offer to Taiwan and explains why the weapons sales
proposed are unsuited to the effective defense of the island. The second section
outlines how China would probably attempt to destroy or neutralize the Taiwan
air force and navy, and it proposes an alternative strategy for countering China’s
increasingly precise short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), cruise missiles, and
manned tactical aircraft. The third part explores how Beijing’s invasion options
would change if Taipei lost its navy and the use of its air force. The fourth section
examines PRC blockade options against Taiwan and suggests how Taiwan could
more effectively deny China its blockade objectives. The concluding section
considers the impediments to, and repercussions of, adoption by Taiwan of a
“porcupine defense.”
WHATEVER IT TAKES: THE 2001 U.S. ARMS SALE OFFER
In April 2001, reversing twenty years of American policy, the George W. Bush
administration offered to provide to Taiwan eight diesel submarines for U.S.
$12.3 billion.15 This was part of a larger offer that also included six batteries of
PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles for an additional $4.3 billion and twelve P-3C
maritime patrol and antisubmarine aircraft at $1.6 billion.16 This potential sale
evoked predictably strong opposition from the mainland, stirred extensive in-
ternal Taiwanese debate, and brought significant American pressure on Taiwan
to assent to these purchases.17 For example, Richard Lawless, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated that “the passage of this
budget is a litmus test of Taiwan’s commitment to its self-defense”;18 he also
warned Taipei of “repercussions” if it failed to approve the arms purchase.19
One early version of the proposal also envisioned Taiwan buying new P-3Cs.20
This would have required restarting a production line that had closed in 1990, at a
cost of some $300 million per plane.21 Many in Taiwan viewed the totality of this
package as exorbitant.22 Indeed, the leader of Taiwan’s People First Party likened it to
extortion by American mafiosi in exchange for protection from Chinese thugs.23
The combination of high cost and intense divisiveness produced political theater
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and gridlock;24 proposals to fund the package were defeated some sixty times be-
tween 2004 and 2007.25 Six bitter years of stonewalling, stalemate, and wrangling
finally ended in June 2007 with passage of watered-down legislation allocating a
billion dollars to purchase rebuilt P-3 aircraft and upgrade Taiwan’s existing SAM
systems of the less advanced PAC-2 type, probably to PAC-3 standards.26 The Leg-
islative Yuan, however, allocated only about six million dollars to fund contin-
ued feasibility studies on the U.S. diesel submarine deal, thereby postponing or
even killing it.27
The military rationale underlying the original arms package was one of a clas-
sic symmetrical response to perceived threats. Thus the P-3C Orion aircraft,
which specialize in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and open-ocean surveillance,
could defend Taiwan from China’s modernizing fleet of diesel and nuclear sub-
marines. Similarly, eight modern diesel submarines would presumably defend
against the PRC’s increasingly impressive and capable surface forces and subma-
rines. Finally, the PAC-3 would seemingly offer a viable defense for critical tar-
gets against Beijing’s expanding inventory of short-range ballistic missiles,
attack aircraft, and highly accurate land-attack cruise missiles.28 Yet closer analy-
sis suggests that none of these three weapons systems serve Taiwan’s current or
immediate future defense needs, that each would be acutely vulnerable to exist-
ing Chinese weapons and for Taipei would therefore be a major misallocation of
resources. To support this conclusion I will review the presumed role of various
potential capabilities in relation to the likely employment of Chinese
capabilities.
PAC-2 and PAC-3 SAMs versus China’s SRBMs
Taiwan clearly faces a major challenge in defending against Chinese short-range
ballistic missiles. In 2005 Taiwan had an inventory of approximately two hun-
dred earlier PAC-2 interceptors in three batteries.29 Each PAC battery consists of
a multifunction phased-array radar, an engagement control station, communi-
cations gear, and eight launchers with four missiles per launcher, plus one reload
each. In theory, these three batteries of PAC-2 missiles could destroy up to 192
(that is, 3 × 8 × 4 × 2) Chinese SRBMs. SAM firing doctrine, however, mandates
shooting two missiles against each target to increase the odds of success.30 The
downside of this enhanced kill probability is that it effectively halves the in-
ventory of interceptors and doubles the cost of each attempted intercept. Un-
less Taiwan were to increase its inventory of PAC missiles hugely, it can
expect to shoot down with the PAC-2 interceptors already in inventory at
most ninety-six of the SRBMs targeted against it, or as many as 192 if Taipei
upgrades all its current PAC-2 batteries to PAC-3 capabilities (which have
sixteen missiles per launcher). Even this would allow over nine hundred of
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China’s 2007 inventory of a thousand SRBMs to arrive unchallenged at their
targets.
Patriot interceptors are useless unless guided by the PAC radar. China could
target these radars with SRBMs, cruise missiles, homing antiradiation missiles
fired from tactical aircraft, or even Harpy antiradar drones launched from the
mainland. Taiwan would then have to devote SAMs to defending the PAC radar,
thus reducing the number available for defending airfields, leadership sites, crit-
ical infrastructure, or other key facilities.
Additionally, a PAC-3 installation protecting a particularly valuable target
(e.g., Tsoying naval base) could be saturated and overwhelmed by large numbers
of SRBMs. China could also initially fire older, less precise weapons to deplete
Taiwan’s inventory of interceptors, following them closely with unimpeded pre-
cision attacks using more accurate missiles. Mark Stokes, a close observer of
China’s Second Artillery, also notes that Beijing may have “a terminal guidance
system that could preclude engagement by terminal missile defenses,” such as
Patriot interceptors.31
One argument commonly used to dismiss the threat posed by SRBMs is that
the ballistic warheads lack the accuracy necessary for precision targeting. In a
2000 publication, for example, Michael O’Hanlon observed that the reported in-
accuracy—a three-hundred-meter circular error probable (CEP)—of China’s
SRBMs made them little more than terror weapons.32 However, O’Hanlon de-
rived that estimate from 1999 and earlier sources; since then China has greatly
improved the accuracy of its missiles, as well as the number in its inventory. Au-
thoritative judgments are classified, but Thomas Christensen noted in 2001 that
internal PLA sources assumed that the Second Artillery would be able to support
accurate, concentrated attacks on enemy military assets.33 Jane’s in 2005 esti-
mated China was producing ballistic missiles with CEPs of forty meters.34 Mark
Stokes wrote in 2006 that “at least 10 years ago, PRC missile engineers had been
tasked to meet an accuracy requirement of below 50 meters circular error proba-
bility (CEP).”35 Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported in September
2007 that China’s SRBMs could strike within forty meters of their intended tar-
gets.36 The Global Positioning System (GPS), which provides accuracy to within
a few meters over most of the earth’s surface, would be available to Beijing’s
weapons during all phases of launch and flight.37 Further, the U.S. Navy’s Office
of Naval Intelligence also reported in 2004 that China is building ballistic mis-
siles that can target large ships at sea; in 2006 it stated that these maneuvering
warheads were guided by either infrared or radar seekers.38 These reports reflect
a growing consensus that China has mastered the engineering and manufactur-
ing challenges involved in fielding highly accurate ballistic-missile warheads.
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China’s ballistic missiles are therefore no longer weapons for frightening popu-
lations but precision munitions. The Second Artillery’s SRBMs provide the PLA
the capability to destroy very large numbers of fixed targets with little or no
warning.39
P-3s versus China’s Submarines
Taiwan’s purchase of P-3 Orion antisubmarine aircraft appears to make more
sense. P-3s have a proven capability to find submarines; China has a large sub-
marine fleet, over fifty diesel and nine or more nuclear submarines; and Taiwan’s
1960s-vintage S-2 Tracker ASW aircraft is hopelessly obsolete.40 Japan, another
island state facing similar strategic imperatives, has up to 110 P-3s.41 In reality,
however, twelve P-3C aircraft will make little or no difference against China’s
submarine fleet. The reason is straightforward: P-3 aircraft require secure air-
fields from which to fly, but Taiwan will probably lose its airfields in the opening
salvos of any all-out war with China. Air superiority will be doubtful. Further, a
dozen P-3s can patrol only a fraction of the waters in which China’s submarines
could operate against Taiwan, and this fraction would be very likely reduced by
combat losses. Twelve P-3s will have meaningful reconnaissance and maritime
patrol roles to play during peacetime and scenarios of limited conflict, through
their ability to conduct wide-area searches, but they will have little wartime
utility.
Taiwan’s Diesel Submarines versus the People’s Liberation Army Navy
Diesel submarines can conduct effective operations against an opposing navy
and merchant fleet, but only when they are used offensively. Admittedly, there
are examples of diesel submarines effectively defending home or nearby waters.
One is the Argentine Type 209 diesel submarine that operated against the Royal
Navy during the 1982 Falklands War. Although making a number of attacks
against surface and submarine contacts, it failed to damage any British ships.
The Royal Navy, meanwhile, expended nearly its entire inventory of ASW weap-
ons against the boat without sinking or disabling it.42
Conversely, there are many examples of effective employment of diesel sub-
marines in offensive operations. The U.S., German, and British submarine
forces have all excelled offensively. Yet technological developments after World
War II dramatically altered the operational role of diesel submarines—they can
no longer prowl for targets at relatively high speeds on the surface, submerging
only to attack. Diesel submarines must now remain submerged, where their bat-
tery capacity forces them to hunt at low speeds—approximately four knots.
They must also transit slowly to locations where enemy vessels might eventually
deploy—geographic choke points, sea-lanes, and the waters around enemy har-
bors and naval bases being the most likely.
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It is also erroneous to view diesel submarines as effective antisubmarine sys-
tems. A diesel submarine can, if equipped with appropriate torpedoes, attack
another submarine, but modern submarines are very quiet and exceedingly dif-
ficult to detect. The Congressional Research Service, for example, reports that
some Kilo-class diesel submarines are quieter than improved Los Angeles–class
nuclear submarines.43 This suggests that properly maintained, modern diesel
submarines can be detected at ranges varying from two hundred yards to four
nautical miles.44 By maritime standards, these are very short distances. Diesel
submarines, therefore, cannot reasonably expect to find other quiet submarines
at long ranges.
Thus the importance of the low speeds of diesel submarines. If they can de-
tect opponents only at ranges of a few miles, they will take a considerable
amount of time to search large areas effectively. Furthermore, the hunting diesel
submarine might well be itself detected and attacked by the hunted boat. Having
no marked advantages in detection range, search speed, or quietness over oppo-
nents, diesel submarines cannot hope to become effective ASW platforms. Die-
sel submarines are therefore really specialists in antisurface warfare, mining, and
intelligence gathering. These are all offensively oriented missions.
During a conflict, Taiwan would likely maximize the effectiveness of its sub-
marines by either laying mines against Chinese ports or by attacking with torpe-
does or cruise missiles warships leaving their bases. This would provide a much
higher probability of success against People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
vessels than would the defensive tactic of waiting in or around Taiwanese waters
for them. But China would have difficulty determining the origin of any result-
ing attacks and could attribute them to the United States, particularly any by
Mark 48 torpedoes, which were included in the 2001 arms sale offer and a vari-
ant of which is carried by American submarines.45 Such a contingency seems un-
necessarily escalatory, especially since there are other, purely defensive and
nonescalatory, alternatives that could more quickly offer Taiwan equal or better
deterrence and at lesser cost.
TAIWAN’S VULNERABLE NAVY AND AIR FORCE
Taiwan’s navy could probably fight the PLAN effectively. It possesses highly ad-
vanced equipment, including four Kidd-class destroyers and Harpoon antiship
and SM-2 antiair missiles; its officers and men have a reputation for compe-
tence.46 In consequence, China can be expected to look for a way to defeat this
force decisively without a campaign of symmetrical, force-on-force attrition. A
surprise, long-range, precision bombardment on Taipei’s navy while it is in port
seems a clear choice. Beijing would need sufficient weapon accuracy, availability,
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and reliability, as well as targeting information, but all of these are now within
the PRC’s technical ability.
As mentioned above, problems of accuracy that used to characterize Beijing’s
long-range weapons have likely been solved. Accurate weaponry is useless with-
out knowledge of the precise location of targets, but targeting Taiwan’s surface
combatants in port is increasingly easy. In the age of Google Earth, the latitude
and longitude of naval piers at Tsoying, Suau, and Taiwan’s other naval bases are
easy to determine exactly, and these piers are finite in number. Moreover, many
of Taiwan’s naval bases are also commercial ports, suggesting that direct obser-
vation of surface ships within them would be a simple matter. Ships in port
rarely shift berths, so Beijing could readily monitor the location of most, if not
all, of Taiwan’s surface combatants in port on a day-to-day basis.47
If Beijing knew that Taipei’s destroyers were tied up to a given pier, it could
readily program cruise or ballistic missiles to strike the appropriate aim points.
Even if jamming denies GPS and similar signals, technology like laser radar
guidance allows automatic target recognition.48 Deficiencies in accuracy can
also be compensated for by submunitions, which can damage targets within a
larger area. China has developed ballistic-missile-deployed submunitions since
at least 2000.49 Submunitions designed to penetrate and damage runways, which
China has almost certainly developed for its SRBMs, would also be highly effec-
tive against moored naval vessels.50
Unclassified information regarding China’s weapons-system reliability is not
available. But technological shortfalls no longer plague China’s space program
or significantly retard its ability to manufacture dependable high-technology
consumer products such as memory chips, digital processors, digital cameras,
cell phones, or personal computers. China thus seems increasingly capable of
achieving adequate weapons-system reliability. Producing sufficient numbers of
weapons is also well within the PRC’s technical and budgetary capacities. Devot-
ing, say, a hundred SRBMs to the destruction or crippling of Taiwan’s navy
would likely be a fruitful allocation of China’s inventory of precision weapons.
Taiwan’s air force is also threatened by long-range precision bombardment,
but by different means.51 The Taiwan air force has nine air bases, from which ap-
proximately 145 F-16, fifty-six Mirage 2000, and 131 F-CK-1A Indigenous De-
fense Fighters operate.52 An examination of the air bases using Google Earth
shows upward of four hundred protected revetments at these nine bases, ap-
proximately half of them covered and perhaps hardened.53 This gives credence to
the reports of underground hangars at Ta-Shan Air Base in Hualien that report-
edly can protect over half of Taiwan’s tactical fighter aircraft. Other under-
ground shelters exist at Taitung Air Base and perhaps elsewhere.54 The table
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describes results of open-source satellite imagery examination of Taiwan’s air
bases.
Any Chinese attempt to destroy individual aircraft in hardened shelters
would be hindered by the large number of targets. The Second Artillery might
have to devote at least one highly accurate unitary warhead to each covered air-
craft revetment. This allocation of over two hundred missiles could be wasted,
however, if Taiwan did not place any aircraft in these revetments but instead
parked them in the open to defeat such targeting. Such dispersed aircraft, how-
ever, would be vulnerable to SRBM-delivered fragmenting submunitions. This
too would be an inefficient use of a potentially large percentage of the Second
Artillery’s short-range ballistic missiles, and neither method would threaten any
aircraft protected in underground shelters.
A better option for the Chinese would be to target the runways with warheads de-
signed to crater them and so prevent Taiwan’s aircraft from taking off.55 For example,a

































































1 (1) 9,843 × 148 8 4 8 0
Total 14 (14) 89 252 178 20
* Nearly all runway data in this table are taken from posted airport information on Google Earth. Information not provided was determined using Google Earth.
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loaded F-16 apparently requires approximately 2,500 feet of uninterrupted run-
way to take off; U.S. doctrine, however, demands a fifty-by-five-thousand-foot
minimum operating strip for tactical aircraft operations.56 Taiwan’s air bases
have fourteen runways ranging from 5,307 to 11,995 feet long, and these strips
are on average approximately 150 feet wide. If China’s SRBMs are sufficiently ac-
curate and reliable, six unitary warheads each creating a fifty-foot crater could
cut a 12,000-by-148-foot runway into six segments, each smaller than a U.S.
minimum operating strip.57 Where taxiways could also serve as runways, they
would also have to be cratered. Using this logic, China would have to devote at
least eighty-nine perfectly accurate warheads (see the “warheads” column of the
table) to Taiwan’s runways and taxiways to prevent their use by tactical aircraft.
The PRC cannot rely on 100 percent SRBM reliability and accuracy, but some-
thing between a hundred and two hundred unitary warheads could deny Taiwan
the use of its air bases for a while. This number would be greater if accuracy and
reliability were poor and ballistic missile defenses were effective; conversely, it
could be smaller if China has runway-penetrating submunitions, tactical air-
craft or cruise missiles can reliably deliver antirunway munitions, or fighter air-
craft require longer takeoff or landing distances than assumed.58
China has reportedly acquired runway-penetrating bombs from Russian
sources.59 It also seems likely that the Second Artillery has developed
rocket-delivered warheads. A Google Earth image at 40°29'20" north lati-
tude, 93°30'02" east longitude, depicts what is likely Chinese testing of a
concrete-penetrating submunition warhead. Mark Stokes asserts that in fact
the Second Artillery already has runway-penetrating submunitions, termi-
nally guided.60 In any case, there is little reason to doubt that China has developed
suitably accurate antirunway weapons to support such a campaign as envisioned
here. As a point in evidence, Taiwan recognizes that its runways present a critical
vulnerability and has acquired the ability to repair them rapidly under combat
conditions.61 Disturbingly, however, as late as 2007 at least one Taiwan airfield’s
runway repair capabilities consisted of “a pile of gravel and pile of sand at the
apex of the runways. Both piles were uncovered, exposed to the elements, and
obviously had been very long in place; furthermore, there was no earthmoving
equipment stored anywhere near the piles.”62 Effective rapid runway repair dur-
ing sustained ballistic missile strikes requires highly trained and motivated
teams. If Taiwan has established and maintained such teams, it should be able to
keep some of its airfields operable. Observers might be forgiven doubts, however,
given other manning problems that afflict Taiwan’s military.63
Among those problems is a shortage of pilots. For nearly a decade Taiwan has
struggled to maintain a ratio of one pilot to one modern fighter aircraft. Bernard
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Cole relates that Taiwan’s minister of defense has seriously considered mothball-
ing some of its Mirage 2000s in an effort to increase the pilot-to-plane ratio.64
Attrition among pilots by any means would be a very serious matter.
Finally, Taiwan has on at least two occasions conducted exercises in which
tactical aircraft flew from highways.65 Yet this expedient incurs a host of logistics
problems, very low sortie rates, and increased vulnerabilities to traditional,
fifth-column, or PRC special operations forces attacks.66
The key point is simple and sobering: the Second Artillery’s expanding inven-
tory of increasingly accurate SRBMs probably allows Beijing to incapacitate
much of Taiwan’s navy and to ground or destroy large portions of the air force in
a surprise missile assault and follow-on barrages.
An Invitation to Invasion?
Hypothetical Chinese invasion fleets have always been presumed to risk devasta-
tion by Taipei’s highly regarded air force. Yet even if Taiwan’s fighters could take
to the air and conduct coordinated defensive operations after suffering a
long-range precision bombardment, they would still have to prevail against the
Chinese air force and navy’s growing inventory of fourth-generation Su-27,
Su-30, J-10, and J-11 aircraft, all with impressive antiair capabilities. Other mor-
tal threats include Beijing’s four (soon to be eight) batteries firing the
land-based S-300 PMU2 surface-to-air missile, which with its 120-mile range
can reach nearly across the Strait of Taiwan and make penetration of China’s air-
space “difficult if not impossible” with F-16s and F-15s.67 This difficulty could
be exacerbated by the ninety-mile SA-20, which China is sending to sea on its
pair of Luzhou-class destroyers, and by the fifty-four-mile HHQ-9 SAMs on
both of its Luyang II destroyers.68 Combined, these weapons systems could ef-
fectively defend an invasion fleet against any tactical aircraft that got airborne.
It is also widely assessed that Beijing lacks the amphibious lift required to
conduct a successful invasion. A spate of recent mainland amphibious-ship con-
struction, however, suggests that Beijing continues to pursue that option. The
launching and outfitting of the Yazhou-class landing ship (LPD) in 2006 and
2007 at Shanghai’s Hudong shipyard means that shortly an invasion fleet would
have helicopter and air-cushion-vehicle support.69 An additional invasion capa-
bility will be gained if China acquires from Russia the sixty-knot Zubr-class am-
phibious hovercraft, which can carry three main battle tanks, ten armored
personnel carriers, or 140 troops. Long-swirling rumors of the impending sale
of six or more are gaining credibility.70 Further, the ten Yuting-II tank landing
ships built during 2003 and 2004 increased China’s inventory of that type by ap-
proximately 50 percent.71 The total number of amphibious vessels required to
support a Taiwan invasion is debated; it depends on attrition rates, weather,
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loading and unloading times, the use of civilian shipping, availability of
off-loading infrastructure in Taiwan, Taiwan’s will to resist, and other factors
both physical and subjective.72 Regardless, it is apparent that China has not for-
saken an invasion option and has the ability to develop rapidly additional am-
phibious forces.
Rethinking Taiwan’s Defenses
Taiwan can do little to prevent a Chinese bombardment by many hundreds, even
thousands, of precision-guided munitions. Taipei might have a better payoff,
therefore, in seeking not to defeat the incoming warheads but to prevent the at-
tack from achieving its objectives. For instance, one technologically unsophisti-
cated and relatively affordable measure would be to harden key civil and military
facilities—burying them or constructing concrete shelters that can withstand
multiple direct hits.73 This would be especially important for civilian leadership
facilities, military command posts, and communications systems. It could even
be done for Taiwan’s three Patriot interceptor sites, which, Google Earth reveals,
are in the open. Keeping the launchers and radars in caves or hardened bunkers
would cause Beijing to devote more warheads to them. Also, having survived
the initial bombardment, the launchers could be rolled out to protect against
follow-on harassment strikes by SRBMs, cruise missiles, and tactical aircraft.
The same logic would further suggest redundancy of critical infrastruc-
ture—such as food and water distribution systems, medical services, wartime
command and control, warning radars, or civil defense information networks.
However, Taiwan’s electrical grid is particularly vulnerable. For example, the
magnitude 7.6 earthquake that struck central Taiwan on 21 September 1999 re-
sulted in a complete loss of electricity in the northern half of the island. A major
cause was heavy damage to the Chungliao electrical substation, “a major hub in
the island’s high voltage transmission network that directs 45% of the north’s
power demand.”74 Attacks on this attractive target could be resisted either by
distribution redundancy or emergency generators (with fuel) to supply vital
networks and facilities during and after a bombardment. Tax incentives or
building-code revisions could help create such capacity.75
As a further example, Taiwan could complicate China’s targeting. Decoys
are an excellent and affordable way to do so. In 1999 Serbia reportedly misled
many NATO precision-guided munitions with such primitive ruses as simu-
lated tanks made of wood and tarpaulins.76 Taiwan could complicate Beijing’s
targeting options with radar emitters that seduce homing antiradiation mis-
siles, inflatable “missile launchers,” and the like. Properly done, these measures
could cause the Second Artillery to waste a large percentage of its warheads on
false targets.
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Another worthwhile alternative to trying to shoot down ballistic warheads
would be making critical targets mobile. Fixed targets are relatively easy to lo-
cate and destroy with precision weaponry (unless buried or hardened), but
mobile targets are not, as the United States discovered in its unsuccessful hunt
for Scuds in the Iraqi western desert during the first Gulf War.77 An option
would be for Taiwan to move its Patriot radars frequently between several sites.
For its part, the navy could consider frequently shifting its ships’ berths, increas-
ing the time they spend at sea, or even anchoring them in its ports, especially in
time of heightened tensions.78 Another option would be hardened pens for mis-
sile patrol craft, in which they might survive an initial SRBM attack.79 Taipei
could also rotate its fighters between airfields or between hardened shelters, in a
high-stakes analogy to three-card monte. Future weapons acquisitions could
emphasize mobility and concealment.
Beijing’s short-range ballistic missiles are highly accurate, but they are not in-
finite in either destructive power or number.80 In the face of such passive de-
fenses they might well fail, however many struck targets, to achieve the true
purpose for which they were fired—destruction of Taiwan’s ability, or willing-
ness, to resist “regime change.”
Under existing conditions, however, a surprise long-range precision bom-
bardment would likely cost Taiwan its ability to fly useful numbers of tactical
aircraft in a coordinated manner or to sortie its navy. This prospect has impor-
tant implications. For one, it suggests that additional tactical fixed-wing aircraft
requiring long runways would not be a wise investment. If their mission would
be countering invasion and (more important) preventing the PRC from using
its own aircraft in a bombardment, invasion, or blockade, Taiwan would do
better to invest more in mobile SAM systems. For instance, Taiwan reportedly
has 162 medium-range Improved Hawk missiles but as few as five launchers.81
The surface-launched advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (SLAMRAAM),
a truck-mounted version of the highly capable AIM-120 AMRAAM, if acquired
and integrated with existing systems, would significantly enhance Taiwan’s
antiair capability.82 Taiwan could enhance its short-range man-portable and
truck-mounted air-defense systems, such as the Stinger, Avenger (a truck-borne
Stinger), and Chaparral; they might be stored in hardened or disguised shelters
and frequently moved between them. These steps would greatly complicate tar-
geting and help deny China air superiority in the aftermath of a major bombard-
ment. On this view, further investments in fixed-site surface-to-air missiles, such
as Taiwan’s silo-based Sky Bow 1, would seem unwise due to their vulnerability to
precision-guided munitions, unless they can withstand multiple direct hits.
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REPELLING AN INVASION
An all-out Chinese campaign to topple the Taiwan government might combine
bombardment with invasion. If Taiwan’s navy and air force were neutralized or
destroyed by the bombardment, the army would have to repulse or defeat an in-
vasion alone. There are several weapons—all affordable and unambiguously
defensive in nature—that, if purchased, could greatly improve its chances of
doing so.
At the top of this list are mobile coastal-defense cruise missiles (CDCMs),
such as truck-mounted Harpoons. A fairly small number of these missiles
would likely devastate China’s armor-carrying amphibious shipping, which
would have to come well within range, and then stop, to disembark the vehi-
cles. Recent naval history strongly suggests that a vessel loaded with tanks or
armored personnel carriers could be sunk or put out of action by a single
five-hundred-pound (or lighter) high-explosive warhead, such as cruise mis-
siles deliver.83 Thus far, no Chinese amphibious vessel has a robust anti–cruise
missile capability.84 Cruise missiles’ targets could be acquired by mobile ra-
dars.85 Best of all, CDCMs could greatly enhance Taiwan’s ability to destroy an
invasion force without third-party assistance.86
A second class of weaponry that would be highly effective in repelling an in-
vasion comprises attack helicopters, such as the Apache AH-64D. Taiwan, recog-
nizing the utility of helicopters, has sixty-three AH-1A Super Cobras and has set
in motion an initiative to buy thirty Apaches in 2008 from the United States for
an estimated U.S. $2.26 billion.87 These aircraft would be highly effective against
armor that approached in landing craft or got ashore, if adequately protected
during the preparatory bombardment. Additionally, helicopters’ ability to fly
low affords a degree of immunity to long-range surface-to-air missiles.
The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is another truck-mounted
weapon that might be appropriate for Taiwan. These mobile launchers could be
readily hidden or sheltered. Equipped with appropriate rockets, their long-range
precision fire could greatly weaken any PLA toeholds.88 They might do so even if
key bridges or roads were impassable; a handful of MLRS sites could cover the
entire island. Advanced tanks, artillery, and antitank weapons should not be left
off this list of effective hardware, but Taiwan already has sizable stocks of most of
them.
Another hardware recommendation, less strictly associated with ground war-
fare, involves surf-zone sea mines. These weapons, designed for waters less than
ten feet deep, are extraordinarily difficult to counter and would bedevil the plan-
ning or execution of any Chinese invasion of Taiwan. A former commandant of
the U.S. Marine Corps, General James L. Jones, stated in 2002 that “the inability
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to clear mines from the surf zone is the ‘Achilles’ heel of our maneuver force.’”89
U.S. Navy mine warfare officers also attest to their effectiveness and to the speed
and ease of deploying them.90 Since they are lightweight and portable, shallow-
water mines can be quickly and easily moved from secure bunkers to where they
are needed. They are also quite inexpensive, relative to many of the other weap-
ons systems Taiwan might choose.
None of these weapons would be effective if Taiwan’s army were not highly
trained or motivated. Unfortunately, however, its conscript ground forces re-
portedly “suffer from low morale, a poor NCO [noncommissioned officer] pro-
gram and poorly maintained equipment.”91 Also, Taiwan’s reserve forces are very
weak; conscripts serve only fourteen months before entering the reserves.92 In
any case, conscript-based armies are poorly suited to the high-technology com-
bat that would characterize an invasion attempt by the PRC. These problems are
no doubt rooted in structural, social, and political issues beyond the scope of
this article. However, it should be pointed out briefly that the aim of thwarting
the ultimate objectives of a PRC attack (or better, thereby discouraging Beijing
from the attempt) would be best served by an all-volunteer, highly professional
and highly trained army. An all-volunteer army, though consistent with the
stated desires of many elected officials, could not be developed quickly.93 It
would increase personnel costs, but it would also increase the ground force’s de-
terrent value, since it would reduce the likelihood of total collapse at the begin-
ning of hostilities, which numerous informed observers believe is a real
possibility.94
WITHSTANDING A BLOCKADE
If Taiwan’s military and leadership were to ride out a bombardment and repel an
invasion, China might then consider an extended blockade designed to prevent
Taiwan from importing energy.95 The Republic of China would be acutely vul-
nerable to such an action, since it imports over 98 percent of its energy require-
ments. All these fuels pass through easily identifiable bottlenecks, including
off-loading terminals and processing locations that would be susceptible to de-
struction or mining.96 Imported energy is also carried on easily identifiable ship
types, which could be isolated, diverted, or even sunk. Additionally, Taiwan’s re-
finers are required only to maintain crude oil stocks equivalent to thirty days’
demand.97 This all suggests that an energy blockade’s effects would be felt very
quickly throughout Taiwan, and could be severe.
One wonders how long Taipei could resist Beijing’s demands under such con-
ditions. It is equally unclear how a blockade that was preceded by a long-range
precision bombardment could be countered, whatever defensive military
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options Taiwan pursues. A partial solution might lie in the civil, rather than mil-
itary, sphere. Specifically, Taiwan could prepare for a blockade by stockpiling
critical energy, food, and medical supplies and planning for rationing and finan-
cial contingencies.98 Such preparations would reassure Taiwan’s leadership and
citizenry that they could withstand a blockade, thus reducing the likelihood of
panic and early capitulation. A second objective of comprehensive preparations
and plans would be to delay significantly the point when shortages would force
Taipei to concede.99
Perhaps most important, the United States could use the interim to deliberate
how best to respond. For instance, Washington could withhold the possibility of
intervention as leverage to induce Taipei to behave within acceptable parame-
ters, both before and during crises. With the luxury of time, the United States
might find ways to assist that avoided direct military conflict with China—for
example, supplying critical military material via airlift, much as the Nixon ad-
ministration did for Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, or by shipping oil
to Taiwan on reflagged, escorted tankers. The United States might, conversely, de-
cide to intervene with conventional force in an overwhelming but carefully phased
manner that took advantage of asymmetrical American advantages. A standing
realization by China that it could well be defeated in such a contingency would
significantly contribute to deterrence.
THE PORCUPINE REPUBLIC
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that China either already has or shortly
will have the ability to ground or destroy Taiwan’s air force and eliminate the
navy at a time of its own choosing. This prospect fundamentally alters Taiwan’s
defense needs and makes the intended acquisition from the United States of die-
sel submarines, P-3 aircraft, and PAC-3 interceptors ill advised.
Diesel submarines are poor antisubmarine platforms, since with their low
speed and limited underwater endurance they simply cannot search quickly
large volumes of ocean for quiet submarines. These physical restrictions also
limit their versatility as antisurface platforms. They are, for all practical pur-
poses, four-knot minefields. At a cost of over U.S. $1.5 billion each and with in-
determinate delivery dates, conventional submarines also carry significant
opportunity costs, as some in Taipei clearly recognize. Finally, submarines are
no more likely than other naval ships tied up at exposed piers to survive the
opening salvo of a war with China.
Taiwan’s apparent decision to purchase up to twelve submarine-hunting
P-3C aircraft is similarly brought into question. Although these planes can col-
lect valuable information during peacetime and in crisis, in wartime they would
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be sitting ducks while on the ground (though hardened shelters might protect
P-3s) and aloft would require uncontested air superiority to have any chance of
accomplishing their mission.100 In any case, Taipei cannot protect its runways.
Patriot surface-to-air missiles have some utility against short-range ballistic
missiles, but China already has the means to defeat this expensive air-defense
system.
The implication is that Taiwan would be far better served by hardening, and
building redundancy into, its civil and military infrastructure and systems. In
that way the island could reasonably hope to survive an initial precision bom-
bardment, deny the PRC the uncontested use of the air, repel an invasion, and
defy the effects of a blockade for an extended period. Many of these actions, in
fact, would be consistent with recent efforts by Taiwan to improve its defenses.
Others, however, would entail substantial shifts that some in Taiwan’s navy and
air force would doubtless oppose. Air force leaders would be understandably
loath to admit that their fighters cannot defend Taiwan’s skies; their navy coun-
terparts might similarly resist suggestions that their fleet is acutely vulnerable in
port. Both services’ political champions would certainly challenge the implica-
tions of this article’s analysis. So too would the arms manufacturers who stand to
benefit from the sale of aircraft, ships, and supporting systems to Taiwan.
Yet under present conditions it is doubtful that the people and government of
Taiwan could withstand a determined PRC assault for long. A hasty American
military intervention would be Taiwan’s only hope, but only at the risk of strate-
gic miscalculation and nuclear escalation. A “porcupine” strategy—a Taiwan
that was patently useless to attack—would obviate the need; it would also make a
determined Taipei conspicuously able to deny the objective of a bombardment
or defeat an invasion, thus deterring either scenario. Ability to resist a full-scale
campaign—long-range precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade—for a
substantial amount of time would allow its potential allies to shape their re-
sponses carefully. Above all, demonstrable Taiwanese resilience would diminish
Beijing’s prior confidence in success, strengthen cross-strait deterrence, and re-
duce the risk of the United States being dragged into a conflict with China.101
Meanwhile, a porcupine strategy would restore the United States to unequiv-
ocal adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act, since Taiwan would be in the market
only for defensive systems. Taiwan would find itself with a better defense for
fewer dollars, and the United States would abide by the 17 August 1982 joint
communiqué declaring that it would “not exceed, either in qualitative or in
quantitative terms, the level of those [arms] supplied in recent years . . . and that
it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of
time, to a final resolution.”102
3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
36
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 18
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/18
Finally, and most important, a porcupine approach would shift the responsi-
bility for Taiwan’s defense to Taiwan, rendering U.S. intervention in a
cross-strait battle a last resort instead of the first response. Many observers be-
lieve that Taiwan today relies unduly on a perceived American security guaran-
tee and does not do enough to provide for its own defense. Yet since 2000 the
Kuomintang and the Democratic People’s Party have not framed a defense de-
bate that could produce the open, honest appraisal that is desperately needed if
domestic consensus on a viable defense is to be achieved. A Taiwan that China
perceived could be attacked and damaged but not defeated, at least without un-
acceptably high costs and risks, would enjoy better relations with the United
States and neutralize the threat posed by many of China’s recently acquired mili-
tary capabilities. Unfortunately, political gridlock in Taipei stands in the way of
any such hopes. It is not that Taiwan does not do enough to construct a viable
defense but that it is not doing the right things.
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James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara
he Asian seas today are witnessing an intriguing historical anomaly—the si-
multaneous rises of two homegrown maritime powers against the backdrop 
of U.S. dominion over the global commons. The drivers behind this apparent ir-
regularity in the Asian regional order are, of course, China and India. Their aspi-
rations for great-power status and, above all, their quests for energy security have 
compelled both Beijing and New Delhi to redirect their gazes from land to the 
seas. While Chinese and Indian maritime interests are a natural outgrowth of im-
pressive economic growth and the attendant appetite for energy resources, their 
simultaneous entries into the nautical realm also portend worrisome trends.
PROSPECTS FOR A STRATEGIC TRIANGLE 
At present, some strategists in both capitals speak and write in terms that an-
ticipate rivalry with each other. Given that commercial shipping must traverse 
the same oceanic routes to reach Indian and Chinese ports, mutual fears persist 
that the bodies of water stretching from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea 
could be held hostage in the event of crisis or confl ict.1 Such insecurities simi-
larly animated naval competition in the past when major powers depended on 
a common nautical space. Moreover, lingering questions over the sustainability 
of American primacy on the high seas have heightened concerns about the U.S. 
Navy’s ability to guarantee maritime stability, a state of affairs that has long been 
taken for granted. 
It is within this more fl uid context that the Indian Ocean has assumed greater 
prominence. Unfortunately, much of the recent discourse has focused on future 
Chinese naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean and on potential U.S. responses 
CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN
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to such a new presence. In other words, the novelty, as it currently stands, of 
the Indian Ocean stems from expected encounters between extraregional pow-
ers. But such a narrow analytical approach assumes that the region will remain 
an inanimate object perpetually vulnerable to outside manipulation. Also, more 
importantly, it overlooks the possible interactions arising from the intervention 
of India, the dominant regional power. Indeed, omitting the potential role that 
India might play in any capacity would risk misreading the future of the Indian 
Ocean region.
There is, therefore, an urgent need to bring India more completely into the 
picture as a full participant, if not a major arbiter, in the region’s maritime future. 
In order to add depth to the existing literature, this article assesses the longer-
term maritime trajectory of the Indian Ocean region by examining the triangular 
dynamics among the United States, China, and India. To be sure, the aspirational 
nature of Chinese and Indian nautical ambitions and capabilities at the moment 
precludes attempts at discerning potential outcomes or supplying concrete policy 
prescriptions. Nevertheless, exploring the basic foundations for cooperation or 
competition among the three powers could provide hints at how Beijing, Wash-
ington, and New Delhi can actively preclude rivalry and promote collaboration 
in the Indian Ocean.
As a fi rst step in this endeavor, this article examines a key ingredient in the 
expected emergence of a “strategic triangle”—the prospects of Indian sea power. 
While no one has rigorously defi ned this international-relations metaphor, schol-
ars typically use it to convey a strategic interplay of interests among three nation-
states. In this initial foray, we employ the term fairly loosely, using it to describe 
a pattern of cooperation and competition among the United States, China, and 
India. It is our contention that Indian Ocean stability will hinge largely on how 
India manages its maritime rise. On the one hand, if a robust Indian maritime 
presence were to fail to materialize, New Delhi would essentially be forced to sur-
render its interests in regional waters, leaving a strategic vacuum to the United 
States and China. On the other hand, if powerful Indian naval forces were one day 
to be used for exclusionary purposes, the region would almost certainly become 
an arena for naval competition. Either undesirable outcome would be shaped in 
part by how India views its own maritime prerogatives and by how Washington 
and Beijing weigh the probabilities of India’s nautical success or failure in the 
Indian Ocean. 
If all three parties foresee a muscular Indian naval policy, then, a more martial 
environment in the Indian Ocean will likely take shape. But if the three powers 
view India and each other with equanimity, the prospects for cooperation will 
brighten considerably. Capturing the perspectives of the three powers on India’s 
maritime ambitions is thus a critical analytical starting point. 
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To provide a comprehensive overview of each capital’s estimate of future In-
dian maritime power, this article gauges the current literature and forecasts in 
India, the United States, and China on Indian maritime strategy, doctrine, and 
capabilities. It then concludes with an analysis of how certain changes in the mar-
itime geometry in the Indian Ocean might be conducive to either cooperation or 
competition. 
INDIA’S SELF-ASSESSMENT
While Indian maritime strategists are not ardent followers of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, they do use him to underscore the importance of the Indian Ocean. A 
Mahan quotation (albeit of doubtful provenance) commonly appears in offi cial 
and academic discussions of Indian naval power, including the newly published 
Maritime Military Strategy.2 That is, as an offi cial Indian press release declared 
in 2002, “Mahan, the renowned naval strategist and scholar[,] had said over a 
century ago[,] ‘whosoever controls the Indian Ocean, dominates Asia. In the 21st 
century, the destiny of the world will be decided upon its waters.’”3 Rear Admiral 
R. Chopra, then the head of sea training for the Indian Navy, offered a somewhat 
less bellicose-sounding but equally evocative version of the quotation at a semi-
nar on maritime history: “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean controls Asia. This 
ocean is the key to the Seven Seas.”4 
Quibbles over history aside, India clearly sees certain diplomatic, economic, 
and military interests at stake in Indian Ocean waters. In particular, shipments of 
Middle East oil, natural gas, and raw materials are crucial to India’s effort to build 
up economic strength commensurate with the needs and geopolitical aspirations 
of the Indian people. Some 90 percent of world trade, measured by bulk, travels 
by sea. A sizable share of that total must traverse narrow seas in India’s geographic 
neighborhood, notably the straits at Hormuz, Malacca, and Bab el Mandeb. Ship-
ping is at its most vulnerable in such confi ned waterways.
Strategists in New Delhi couch their appraisals of India’s maritime surround-
ings in intensely geopolitical terms—jarringly so for Westerners accustomed to 
the notion that economic globalization has rendered power politics and armed 
confl ict passé. The Indian economy has grown at a rapid clip—albeit not as rap-
idly as China’s—allowing an increasingly confi dent Indian government to yoke 
hard power, measured in ships, aircraft, and weapons systems, to a foreign policy 
aimed at primacy in the Indian Ocean region.5 If intervention in regional dis-
putes or the internal affairs of South Asian states is necessary, imply Indian lead-
ers, India should do the intervening rather than allow outsiders any pretext for 
doing so.
Any doctrine aimed at regional preeminence will have a strong seafaring com-
ponent. In 2004, accordingly, New Delhi issued its fi rst public analysis of the 
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nation’s oceanic environs and of how to cope with challenges there. Straightfor-
wardly titled Indian Maritime Doctrine, the document describes India’s maritime 
strategy largely as a function of economic development and prosperity:
India’s primary maritime interest is to assure national security. This is not 
restricted to just guarding the coastline and island territories, but also extends 
to safeguarding our interests in the [exclusive economic zone] as well as protect-
ing our trade. This creates an environment that is conducive to rapid economic 
growth of the country. Since trade is the lifeblood of India, keeping our SLOCs 
[sea lines of communication] open in times of peace, tension or hostilities is a 
primary national maritime interest.6 
The trade conveyed by the sea-lanes traversing the Indian Ocean ranks fi rst 
among the “strategic realities” that the framers of the Indian Maritime Doctrine 
discern. Roughly forty merchantmen pass through India’s “waters of interest” 
every day. An estimated $200 billion worth of oil transits the Strait of Hormuz 
annually, while some $60 billion transits the Strait of Malacca en route to China, 
Japan, and other East Asian countries reliant on energy imports.7
India’s geographic location and conformation rank next in New Delhi’s hierar-
chy of strategic realities. Notes the Indian Maritime Doctrine, “India sits astride . . .
major commercial routes and energy lifelines” crisscrossing the Indian Ocean 
region. Outlying Indian possessions such as the Andaman and Nicobar islands 
sit athwart the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, while the Persian Gulf is near 
India’s western coastline, conferring a measure of infl uence over vital sea com-
munications to and from what amounts to a bay in the Indian Ocean. While 
geography may not be destiny, the document states bluntly that “by virtue of our 
geography, we are . . . in a position to greatly infl uence the movement/security 
of shipping along the SLOCs in the [Indian Ocean Region] provided we have 
the maritime power to do so. Control of the choke points could be useful as a 
bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of military 
power remains a stark reality.”8 
The Indian Maritime Doctrine prophesies a depletion of world energy resources 
that will make the prospect of outside military involvement in India’s geographic 
environs even more acute than it already is. The dependence of modern econo-
mies on the Gulf region and Central Asia “has already invited the presence of 
extra-regional powers and the accompanying Command, Control, Surveillance 
and Intelligence network. The security implications for us are all too obvious.” 
Sizable deposits of other resources—uranium, tin, gold, diamonds—around the 
Indian Ocean littoral only accentuate the factors beckoning the attention of out-
side maritime powers to the region.9
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Indian leaders, then, take a somber view of the international security environ-
ment. In the “polycentric world order” New Delhi sees taking shape, economics is 
“the major determinant of a nation’s power.” While “India holds great promise,” 
owing to its size, location, and economic acumen, its “emergence as an economic 
power will undoubtedly be resisted by the existing economic powers, leading to 
confl icts based on economic factors.” The likelihood that competitors will “deny 
access to technology and other industrial inputs,” combined with “the shift in 
global maritime focus from the Atlantic-Pacifi c combine to the Pacifi c–Indian 
Ocean region,” will only heighten the attention major powers pay to the seas.10
A buildup of Indian maritime power represents the only prudent response 
to strategic conditions that are at once promising and worrisome in economic 
terms. Maritime threats fall into two broad categories, in the Indians’ reckoning. 
First, judging from offi cial pronouncements such as the maritime doctrine and 
the newly published Maritime Military Strategy, New Delhi is acutely conscious 
that such nontraditional threats as seagoing terrorism, weapons proliferation, 
or piracy could disrupt vital sea-lanes. Cleansing Asian waters of these universal 
scourges has become a matter of real and growing concern.11
Second, Indians are wary not only of banditry and unlawful traffi cking but 
also of rival navies. While Indian strategists exude growing confi dence, increas-
ingly looking beyond perennial nemesis Pakistan, they remain mindful of the 
Pakistani naval challenge, a permanent feature of Indian Ocean strategic affairs. 
Over the longer term, a Chinese naval buildup in the Indian Ocean, perhaps cen-
tered on Beijing’s much-discussed “string of pearls,” would represent cause for 
concern.12 This is the most likely quarter from which a threat to Indian maritime 
security could emanate over the long term, once China resolves the Taiwan ques-
tion to its satisfaction and is free to redirect its attention to important interests in 
other regions—such as free passage for commercial shipping through the Indian 
Ocean region.
But Indians remain acutely conscious that the U.S. Navy rules the waves in 
Asia, as it has since World War II. Despite closer maritime ties with the United 
States, Indian offi cials bridle at memories of the Seventh Fleet’s intervention in 
the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. They also remain ambiva-
lent about the American military presence on Diego Garcia, which they see as an 
American beachhead in the Indian Ocean region. Observes one Indian scholar, 
Diego Garcia and the Bengal naval deployment have “seeped into Indians’ cul-
tural memory—even among those who know nothing about the sea.”13 Whatever 
the prospects for a U.S.-Indian strategic partnership, such memories will give rise 
to a measure of wariness in bilateral ties. On balance, the factors impinging on 
Indian and U.S. strategic calculations will make for some form of partnership—
but perhaps not the grand alliance American leaders seem to assume. Even 
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partnership is not a sure thing, however, and sustaining it will require painstaking 
work on both sides.
HISTORICAL MODELS FOR INDIAN SEA POWER
The challenges it perceives as it surveys India’s surroundings and the novelty of 
Indian pursuit of sea power have induced New Delhi to consult Western history. 
That Indians would look to American rather than European history for guid-
ance, however, may come as a surprise. Given their skepticism toward American 
maritime supremacy—the residue of Cold War ideological competition, as well 
as a product of geopolitical calculations—nineteenth-century American history 
represents an unlikely source for lessons to inform the efforts of Indians to amass 
maritime power.
There is a theoretical dimension to India’s maritime turn as well. Many schol-
ars of “realist” leanings assume that the sort of balance-of-power politics prac-
ticed in nineteenth-century Europe will prevail in Asia as the rises of China and 
India reorder regional politics.14 If so, the coming years will see Asian statesmen 
jockeying for geopolitical advantage in the manner of a Bismarck or Talleyrand. 
There is merit to objections to the notion that strategic triangles and similar met-
aphors are artifacts of nineteenth-century thinking, and many Indians and Chi-
nese think in geopolitical terms reminiscent of that age. Other scholars deny that 
European-style realpolitik is universal, predicting instead a revival of Asia’s hier-
archical, China-centric past.15 Chinese diplomats have skillfully encouraged such 
notions, hinting that a maritime order presided over by a capable, benevolent 
China—and excluding predatory Western sea powers such as America—would 
benefi t all Asian peoples, now as in bygone centuries.16
Indians more commonly look for insight to a third model—the Monroe Doc-
trine, the nineteenth-century American policy declaration that purported to 
place the New World off limits to new European territorial acquisitions or to any 
extension of the European political system to American states not already under 
Europe’s control. James Monroe and John Quincy Adams (the architects of the 
Monroe Doctrine), Grover Cleveland and Richard Olney (who viewed the doc-
trine as a virtual warrant for U.S. rule of the Americas), and Theodore Roosevelt 
(who gave the doctrine a forceful twist of his own) may exercise as much infl u-
ence in Asia—particularly South Asia—as any fi gure from European or Asian 
history.
Soon after independence, Indian statesmen and pundits took to citing the 
Monroe Doctrine as a model for Indian foreign policy. It is not entirely clear why 
Indians adopted a Western paradigm for their pursuit of regional preeminence 
rather than some indigenous model suited to South Asian conditions. India’s tra-
dition of nonalignment surely played some role in this, however. For one thing, 
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Monroe and Adams announced their doctrine in an era when American nations 
were throwing off colonial rule, while India’s security doctrine had its origins in 
the post–World War II era of decolonization. Thus the United States of Mon-
roe’s day, like newly independent India, positioned itself as the leader of a bloc of 
nations within a geographically circumscribed region, resisting undue political 
infl uence—or worse—from external great powers. This imparts some resonance 
to Monroe’s principles despite the passage of time and the obvious dissimilarities 
between American and Indian histories and traditions. 
Thus the diplomatic context was apt—especially since Indian statesmen intent 
on effective “strategic communications” designed their policy pronouncements 
to appeal to not only domestic but also Western audiences. Prime Minister Jawa-
harlal Nehru’s speech justifying the use of force to evict Portugal from the coastal 
enclave of Goa is worth quoting at length:
Even some time after the United States had established itself as a strong power, 
there was the fear of interference by European powers in the American continents, 
and this led to the famous declaration by President Monroe of the United States 
[that] any interference by a European country would be an interference with the 
American political system. I submit that . . . the Portuguese retention of Goa is a 
continuing interference with the political system established in India today. I shall 
go a step further and say that any interference by any other power would also be 
an interference with the political system of India today. . . . It may be that we are 
weak and we cannot prevent that interference. But the fact is that any attempt by a 
foreign power to interfere in any way with India is a thing which India cannot toler-
ate, and which, subject to her strength, she will oppose. That is the broad doctrine I 
lay down.17
Parsing Nehru’s bracing words, the following themes emerge. First, while a Eu-
ropean power’s presence in South Asia precipitated his foreign-policy doctrine, 
he forbade any outside power to take any action in the region that New Delhi 
might construe as imperiling the Indian political system. This was a sweeping 
injunction indeed. Second, he acknowledged the realities of power but seeming-
ly contemplated enforcing his doctrine with new vigor as Indian power waxed, 
making new means and options available. Third, Nehru asked no one’s permis-
sion to pursue such a doctrine. While this doctrine would not qualify as interna-
tional law, then, it was a policy statement to which New Delhi would give effect as 
national means permitted. India did expel Portugal from Goa in 1961—affi xing 
an exclamation point to Nehru’s words.
Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi were especially assertive 
about enforcing India’s security doctrine.18 From 1983 to 1990, for example, New 
Delhi applied political and military pressure in an effort to bring about an end 
to the Sri Lankan civil war. It deployed Indian troops to the embattled island, 
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waging a bitter counterinsurgent campaign—in large part because Indian lead-
ers feared that the United States would involve itself in the dispute, in the pro-
cess obtaining a new geostrategic foothold at Trincomalee, along India’s southern 
fl ank. One commentator in India Today interpreted New Delhi’s politico-military 
efforts as “a repetition of the Monroe Doctrine, a forcible statement that any ex-
ternal forces prejudicial to India’s interests cannot be allowed to swim in regional 
waters.”19
India’s security doctrine also manifested itself in 1988, when Indian forces in-
tervened in a coup in the Maldives, and in an 1989–90 trade dispute with Nepal. 
A Western scholar, Devin Hagerty, sums up Indian security doctrine thus:
The essence of this formulation is that India strongly opposes outside intervention 
in the domestic affairs of other South Asian nations, especially by outside powers 
whose goals are perceived to be inimical to Indian interests. Therefore, no South 
Asian government should ask for outside assistance from any country; rather, if 
a South Asian nation genuinely needs external assistance, it should seek it from 
India. A failure to do so will be considered anti-Indian.20 
This fl urry of activity subsided after the Cold War, as the strategic environ-
ment appeared to improve and New Delhi embarked on an ambitious program 
of economic liberalization and reform. Even so, infl uential pundits—even those 
who dispute the notion of a consistent Indian security doctrine—continue to 
speak in these terms.
Indeed, they seemingly take the concept of an Indian Monroe Doctrine for 
granted. C. Raja Mohan, to name one leading pundit, routinely uses this ter-
minology, matter-of-factly titling one op-ed column “Beyond India’s Monroe 
Doctrine” and in another exclaiming that “China just tore up India’s Monroe 
Doctrine.”21 Speaking at the U.S. Naval War College in November 2007, Rear 
Admiral Chopra vouchsafed that India should “emulate America’s nineteenth-
century rise” to sea power. As India’s naval capabilities mature, matching ambi-
tious ends with vibrant means, its need to cooperate with outside sea powers will 
diminish. Declared Chopra, New Delhi might then see fi t to enforce “its own 
Monroe Doctrine” in the region.22 The doctrine has entered into India’s vocabu-
lary of foreign relations and maritime strategy. Again, using nineteenth-century 
American history as a proxy, we can discern three possible maritime futures for 
India:
“Monroe.” Indian statesmen animated by Monroe’s principles as originally un-
derstood would take advantage of the maritime security furnished by a domi-
nant navy (Great Britain’s Royal Navy then, the U.S. Navy now), dedicating most 
of their nation’s resources and energies to internal development. Limited ef-
forts at suppressing piracy, terrorism, and weapons traffi cking—the latter-day 
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equivalents to the slave trade, a scourge the U.S. and Royal navies worked togeth-
er to suppress—would be admissible under these principles, as would disaster 
relief and other humanitarian operations intended to amass goodwill and lay the 
groundwork for more assertive diplomatic ventures in the future. This modest 
reading of the Monroe Doctrine would not forbid informal cooperation with the 
U.S. Navy, today’s equivalent to the Royal Navy of Monroe’s day.
“Cleveland/Olney.” In 1895, President Grover Cleveland’s secretary of state, 
Richard Olney, informed Great Britain that the American “fi at is law” throughout 
the Western Hemisphere, by virtue of not only American enlightenment but also 
physical might—the republic’s capacity to make good on Monroe’s precepts.23 
This hypermuscular vision of the Monroe Doctrine would impel aspirants to 
sea power to avow openly their desire to dominate surrounding waters and lit-
toral regions. From a geographic standpoint, the Cleveland/Olney model would 
urge them to make good on their claims to regional supremacy, employing naval 
forces to project power throughout vast areas. No international dispute would be 
off limits that national leaders deemed a threat to their interests, and they would 
evince a standoffi sh attitude toward proposals for cooperation with external na-
val powers.
“Roosevelt.” Theodore Roosevelt took a preventive view of the Monroe Doctrine, 
framing “an international police power” that justifi ed American intervention in 
the affairs of weak American states when it appeared that Europeans might use 
naval force to collect debts owed their lenders—and, in the process, wrest naval 
stations from states along sea-lanes vital to U.S. shipping. TR’s interpretation of 
the Monroe Doctrine, as expressed in his 1904 “corollary” to it, called for a de-
fensive posture: Monroe’s principles applied when vital national interests were 
at stake, and the would-be dominant power could advance its good-government 
ideals. These principles would apply, however, within circumscribed regions of 
vital interest and be implemented with circumspection, using minimal force, 
and that in concert with other tools of national power. Cooperation with outside 
powers with no likely desire or capacity to infringe on the hegemon’s interests 
would be acceptable.24
What form such a doctrine will assume, and how vigorously New Delhi pros-
ecutes it, will depend on such factors as Indian history and traditions, the natures 
and magnitudes of the security challenges Indians perceive in the Indian Ocean, 
the vagaries of domestic politics, and the Indian Navy’s ability to make more than 
fi tful progress toward fi elding potent naval weapon systems.25 India will pursue 
its doctrine according to its needs and capabilities—just as each generation of 
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Americans reinterpreted the Monroe Doctrine to suit its own needs and material 
power.
AMERICAN VIEWS OF INDIAN SEA POWER
Curiously, given the importance they attach to the burgeoning U.S.-Indian re-
lationship and their concerted efforts to forge a seagoing partnership, American 
policy makers and maritime strategists have paid scant attention to the evolu-
tion of Indian sea power or the motives and aspirations prompting New Delhi’s 
seaward turn. One small example: the Pentagon publishes no Indian counterpart 
to its annual report The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, despite 
the growth of Indian power and ambition. To the contrary: American diplomats 
speak in glowing terms of a “natural strategic partnership” between “the world’s 
biggest” and “the world’s oldest” democracies, while the U.S. military has reached 
out to the Indian military on the tactical and operational levels—through, for 
example, the sixteen-year-old MALABAR series of combined maritime exercises.26 
Few in Washington have devoted much energy to what lies between high diplo-
macy and hands-on military-to-military cooperation, to analyzing the maritime 
component of Indian grand strategy.
True, the recently published U.S. Maritime Strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower, proclaims that “credible combat power will be continu-
ously postured in the Western Pacifi c and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean,” but its 
rationale for doing so is purely functional in nature: guarding American interests, 
assuring allies, deterring competitors, and so forth.27 The multinational context 
for this pronouncement—how Washington ought to manage relations with re-
gional maritime powers, such as India, on which the success of a cooperative 
maritime strategy ineluctably depends—is left unexplained. Why New Delhi has 
rebuffed such seemingly uncontroversial U.S.-led ventures as the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), a primarily maritime effort to combat the traffi c in ma-
teriel related to weapons of mass destruction, and Task Force 150, the multina-
tional naval squadron monitoring for terrorists fl eeing Afghanistan, will remain 
a mystery to American offi cials absent this larger context.28
Why the apparent complacency toward India on the part of U.S. offi cials? 
Several possible explanations come to mind. For one thing, the United States 
does not see India as a threat. The Clinton and Bush administrations have en-
listed New Delhi in a “Concert of Democracies,” and, as mentioned before, they 
view India as a natural strategic partner or ally. For another, other matters have 
dominated the bilateral relationship in recent years. The Bush administration 
lifted the sanctions imposed after the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests and 
negotiated an agreement providing for transfers of American nuclear technol-
ogy to the Indian commercial nuclear sector in exchange for partial international 
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supervision of Indian nuclear facilities. Legislative approval of this “123” agree-
ment remains uncertain, in large part because of questions as to whether new In-
dian nuclear tests would terminate the accord.29 Maritime cooperation has been 
subsumed in other issues. Also, and more to the point, India has been slow to 
publish a maritime strategy that American analysts can study. Its Maritime Doc-
trine appeared in 2004, but a full-fl edged maritime military strategy appeared 
only in 2007—meaning that India watchers in the United States have had little 
time to parse its meaning and its implications for U.S.-Indian collaboration at 
sea, let alone to publish and debate their fi ndings.
For now, absent signifi cant policy attention, any maritime-strategic partner-
ship will take place on the functional level, with “naval diplomacy” fi lling the void 
left by policy makers. How Washington will grapple with Indian skepticism to-
ward the PSI and other enterprises remains to be seen. If New Delhi does indeed 
embark on a Monroe Doctrine—especially one of the more militant variants 
identifi ed above—political supervision of U.S. naval diplomacy will be at a pre-
mium for Washington. Should the nuclear deal falter in Congress, for example, 
will that further affront the sensibilities of Indians intent on regional primacy? If 
so, with what impact on American mariners’ efforts to negotiate a good working 
relationship at sea? The opportunity to craft a close strategic partnership with 
New Delhi could be a short-lived one as Indian power grows, especially if Indian 
leaders take an ominous view of their nation’s geopolitical surroundings or if 
irritants to U.S.-Indian relations begin to accumulate.
CHINESE VIEWS OF INDIAN SEA POWER
If American analysts seem blasé about the intentions and capabilities of their 
prospective strategic partner, many Chinese analysts depict the basic motives be-
hind India’s maritime ambitions in starkly geopolitical terms. Indeed, their as-
sumptions and arguments are unmistakably Mahanian. Zhang Ming of Modern 
Ships asserts, “The Indian subcontinent is akin to a massive triangle reaching into 
the heart of the Indian Ocean, benefi ting any from there who seeks to control 
the Indian Ocean.”30 In an article casting suspicion on Indian naval intentions, 
the author states, “Geostrategically speaking, the Indian Ocean is a link of com-
munication and oil transportation between the Pacifi c and Atlantic Oceans and 
India is just like a giant and never-sinking aircraft carrier and the most impor-
tant strategic point guarding the Indian Ocean.”31 The reference to an unsinkable
aircraft carrier was clearly meant to trigger an emotional reaction, given that for 
many Chinese the phrase is most closely associated with Taiwan.
Intriguingly, some have invoked Mahanian language, wrongly attributed to 
Mahan himself, to describe the value of the Indian Ocean to New Delhi. One 
Chinese commentator quotes (without citation) Mahan as asserting, “Whoever 
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controls the Indian Ocean will dominate India and the coastal states of the Indian 
Ocean as well as control the massive area between the Mediterranean and the 
Pacifi c Ocean.”32 In a more expansive reformulation, two articles cite Mahan as 
declaring, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean controls Asia. The Indian Ocean 
is the gateway to the world’s seven seas. The destiny of the world in the 21st cen-
tury will be determined by the Indian Ocean.”33 (As noted before, a very similar, 
and likewise apocryphal, Mahan quotation has made the rounds in India—even 
fi nding its way into the offi cial Maritime Military Strategy.) Faulty attribution 
notwithstanding, the Chinese are clearly drawn to Mahanian notions of sea pow-
er when forecasting how India will approach its maritime environs.
Zhao Bole, a professor of South Asian studies at Sichuan University, places 
these claims in a more concrete geopolitical context. Argues Zhao, four key geo-
strategic factors have underwritten India’s rise. First, India and its surrounding 
areas boast a wealth of natural resources. Second, India is by far the most power-
ful country in the Indian Ocean region. Third, the physical distance separating 
the United States from India affords New Delhi ample geopolitical space for ma-
neuver. Fourth, India borders economically dynamic regions such as the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states and China. Zhao quotes Nehru 
and K. M. Panikkar to prove that Indian politicians and strategists have long rec-
ognized these geopolitical advantages and that they have consistently evinced the 
belief that India’s destiny is inextricably tied to the Indian Ocean.34 However, due 
to India’s insistence on taking a third way during the Cold War superpower com-
petition, New Delhi was content to focus on its own subcontinental affairs.
In the 1990s, though, Zhao argues, India sought to shake off its nonaligned 
posture by increasing its geopolitical activism in Southeast Asia under the guise 
of its “Look East” policy. According to Zhao Gancheng, New Delhi leveraged 
its unique geographic position to make Southeast Asia—an intensely maritime 
theater—a “breakthrough point” (突破口), particularly in the economic realm. 
In the twenty-fi rst century, Zhao argues, the Look East policy has assumed sig-
nifi cant strategic dimensions, suggesting that India has entered a new phase 
intimately tied to its great-power ambitions. While acknowledging that the un-
derlying strategic logic pushing India beyond the subcontinent is compelling, 
Zhao worries that Indian prominence among the ASEAN states could tempt the 
United States to view India as a potential counterweight to China.35
To Chinese observers, these broader geopolitical forces seem to conform to the 
more outward-looking Indian maritime strategy on exhibit in recent years, and 
they tend to confi rm Chinese suspicions of an expansive and ambitious pattern 
to India’s naval outlook. Zhang Xiaolin and Qu Yutao divide the evolution of 
Indian maritime strategy, particularly with regard to its geographic scope, into 
three distinct phases: 
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Offshore defense (• 近海防御) (from independence to the late 1960s)
Area control (• 区域控制) (from the early 1970s to the early 1990s)
Open-ocean extension (• 远海延伸) (from the mid-1990s to the present).36 
During the fi rst stage, the navy was confi ned to the east and west coasts of 
India and parts of the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal in support of ground and 
air operations ashore. The second phase called for a far more assertive control 
of the Indian Ocean. Indian strategists, in this view, divided the Indian Ocean 
into three concentric rings of operational control. First, India needed to impose 
“complete or absolute control” over three hundred nautical miles of water out 
from India’s coastline to defend the homeland, the exclusive economic zone, and 
offshore islands. Second, the navy had to exert “moderate control” over an ocean 
belt extending some three to six hundred nautical miles from Indian coasts in or-
der to secure its sea lines of communications and provide situational awareness. 
Finally, the navy needed to exercise “soft control,” power projection and deterrent 
capabilities, beyond seven hundred nautical miles from Indian shores.37 
Chinese analysts differ over the extent of Indian naval ambitions in the twenty-
fi rst century. But they concur that India will not restrict its seafaring endeavors to 
the Indian Ocean indefi nitely. Most discern a clear transition from a combination 
of offshore defense and area control to a blue-water offensive posture. One com-
mentator postulates that India will develop the capacity to prevent and imple-
ment its own naval blockades against the choke points at Suez, Hormuz, and 
Malacca.38 Unsurprisingly, the prospect that India might seek to blockade Ma-
lacca against China has attracted substantial attention. One Chinese analyst, us-
ing language that would have been instantly recognizable to Mahan, describes the 
244 islands that constitute the Andaman-Nicobar archipelago as a “metal chain” 
(铁链) that could lock tight the western exit of the Malacca Strait.39 Zhang Ming 
further argues that “once India commands the Indian Ocean, it will not be satis-
fi ed with its position and will continuously seek to extend its infl uence, and its 
eastward strategy will have a particular impact on China.”40 The author concludes 
that “India is perhaps China’s most realistic strategic adversary.”41 
While they pay considerable attention to the potential Indian threat to the 
Malacca Strait, Chinese observers also believe the Indian sea services are intent 
on
Achieving sea control from the northern Arabian Sea to the South China Sea• 
Developing the ability to conduct SLOC defense and combat operations in • 
the areas above
Maintaining absolute superiority over all littoral states in the Indian Ocean• 
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Building the capacity for strategic deterrence against outside naval powers• 42 
Amassing long-range power-projection capabilities suffi cient to reach and • 
control an enemy’s coastal waters in times of confl ict
Fielding a credible, sea-based, second-strike retaliatory nuclear capability• 
Developing the overall capacity to “enter east” (• 东进) into the South China 
Sea and the Pacifi c, “exit west” (西出) through the Red Sea and Suez Canal 
into the Mediterranean, and “go south” (南下) toward the Cape of Good 
Hope and the Atlantic.43
Clearly, the Chinese foresee the emergence of a far more forward-leaning In-
dian Navy that in time could make its presence felt in China’s own littoral realm. 
Moreover, the Chinese uniformly believe that New Delhi has embarked on an 
ambitious modernization program to achieve these sweeping aims. Interestingly, 
some have pointed to America’s apparent lack of alarm at India’s already power-
ful navy. This quietude, they say, stands in sharp contrast to incessant U.S. con-
cerns over the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), representing a blatant 
double standard.44 In any event, China’s assessments of Indian capabilities and its 
emerging body of work tracking India’s technological and doctrinal advances are 
indeed impressive. For instance, Modern Navy, the PLAN’s monthly periodical, 
published a ten-month series on the Indian Navy beginning in November 2005. 
Subjects of the articles ranged widely, from platforms and weaponry to basing 
and port infrastructure.45 Not surprisingly, given the decades-long debate within 
China surrounding its own carrier acquisition plans, India’s aircraft carriers have 
attracted by far the most attention.46
A number of Chinese analysts, however, hold far less alarming, if not sanguine, 
views of India’s rise. The former Chinese ambassador to India, Cheng Ruisheng, 
argues that policy makers in Beijing and New Delhi have increasingly abandoned 
their antiquated, zero-sum security outlooks. Indeed, Cheng exudes confi dence 
that improving U.S.-Indian ties and Sino-Indian relations are not mutually ex-
clusive, and thus he holds out hope for a balanced and stable strategic triangle in 
the region.47 Some Chinese speculate that India’s burgeoning friendships with a 
variety of extraregional powers, including the United States and Japan, are de-
signed to widen India’s room for maneuver in an increasingly multipolar world 
without forcing it to choose sides. As Yang Hui asserts, “India’s actions smack of 
‘fence-sitting.’ This is a new version of non-alignment.”48 On balance, then, stra-
tegic continuity might prevail over the potentially destabilizing forces of change.
Even those projecting major changes in the regional confi guration of power 
seem confi dent that India’s rise will neither upend stability nor lead automati-
cally to strategic advantages for New Delhi. To be sure, a small minority in China 
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believes that an increased Indian presence in the Indian Ocean would generate 
great-power “contradictions” that could in time lead New Delhi to displace the 
United States as the regional hegemon, consistent with more forceful concep-
tions of an Indian Monroe Doctrine.49 But a far more common view maintains 
that growing Indian sea power will likely compel Washington and other powers 
in Asia to challenge or counterbalance New Delhi’s position in the Indian Ocean 
region.50 Structural constraints will tend to act against Indian efforts to wield 
infl uence beyond the Indian Ocean. Zhao Gancheng, for example, argues that 
China’s fi rmly established position in Southeast Asia and India’s relative unfamil-
iarity with the region will prevent New Delhi from reaping maximum gains from 
its Look East policy.51 
On the strictly military and technological levels, some Chinese analysts believe 
that Indian naval aspirations have far outstripped the nation’s concrete capacity 
to fulfi ll them. Noting that increases in the defense budget have consistently out-
paced the annual growth rate of India’s gross domestic product, Li Yonghua of 
Naval and Merchant Ships derides India’s ambition for an oceangoing naval fl eet 
as a “python swallowing an elephant” (蟒蛇吞象).52 Similarly, Zhang Ming iden-
tifi es three major defi ciencies that cast doubt on India’s ability to develop a fl eet 
for blue-water combat missions. First, India’s current comprehensive national 
power simply cannot sustain a “global navy” and the panoply of capabilities that 
such a force demands. Second, India’s long-standing dependence on foreign tech-
nology and relatively backward industrial base will severely retard advances in 
indigenous programs—especially plans for domestically built next-generation 
aircraft carriers. Finally, existing Indian Navy surface combatants are unequal 
in both quantitative and qualitative terms to the demands of long-range fl eet 
operations. In particular, insuffi ciently robust air-defense constitutes the “most 
fatal problem” for future Indian carrier task forces.53 Interestingly, key aspects of 
Zhang’s critique apply equally to the PLAN today.
This brief survey of Chinese perspectives suggests that defi nitive conclusions 
about the future of Indian sea power would be premature. On the one hand, 
evocative uses of Mahanian language and worst-case extrapolations of Indian 
maritime ambitions certainly represent a sizable geopolitically minded school of 
thought in China. On the other, the Chinese acknowledge that India may not be 
able to surmount for years to come the geopolitical and technological constraints 
it confronts. Such mixed feelings further suggest that Sino-Indian maritime com-
petition in the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea is not fated. Neither side has 
the credible capacity—yet—to reach into the other’s nautical backyard. At the 
same time, the broader geostrategic climate at the moment favors cooperation. 
There should be ample time—until either side acquires naval forces able to infl u-
ence events beyond its own maritime domain, and as long as New Delhi’s and 
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Beijing’s extraregional aims remain largely aspirational—to shape mutual threat 
perceptions through cooperative efforts. 
AN UNCERTAIN GEOMETRY
This initial inquiry into the maritime geometry of the Indian Ocean region sug-
gests that conditions are auspicious for shaping a mutually benefi cial maritime 
relationship among India, China, and the United States. For now, New Delhi 
seems at once sanguine about its maritime surroundings and conscious that it 
lacks the wherewithal to make good on a muscular Monroe Doctrine. While in 
principle India asserts regional primacy, much as James Monroe’s America did, 
it remains content to work with the predominant naval power, the United States, 
in the cause of maritime security in South Asia. If nothing else, this is a matter 
of expediency.
It is worth noting, however, that there is little prospect that India will join the 
United States to contain Chinese ambitions in the Indian Ocean as Japan joined 
the United States to contain Soviet ambitions. India’s independent streak, codifi ed 
in its policy of nonalignment, predisposes New Delhi against such an arrange-
ment. Nor does India resemble Cold War–era Japan, dependent on an outside 
power to defend it against an immediate, nearby threat to maritime security, and 
indeed national survival. The geographic conformation of Japan’s threat environ-
ment signifi cantly heightened the urgency of a highly alert strategic posture. The 
Japanese archipelago closely envelops Vladivostok, home to the Soviet Union’s 
Pacifi c Fleet and the base from which commerce-raiding cruisers had harassed 
Japanese trade and military logistics during the Russo-Japanese War. Tokyo had 
to develop the capacity to monitor Soviet hunter-killer submarines lurking in 
the Sea of Japan and to repel a massive amphibious invasion against Hokkaido. 
India, by contrast, enjoys two great oceanic buffers—the eastern Indian Ocean 
and the South China Sea—vis-à-vis China. As a simple illustration, several thou-
sand nautical miles separate the fl eet headquarters of China’s South Sea Fleet, 
located in Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province, from Vishakhapatnam, the eastern 
naval command of the Indian Navy. Geography alone, then, constitutes a major 
disincentive for New Delhi to enlist prematurely in an anti-China coalition.
For its part, Washington has not yet dedicated serious attention and energy 
to analyzing the future of Indian sea power or the likely confi guration of great-
power relations in the Indian Ocean. It remains hopeful that a durable strategic 
partnership with New Delhi will take shape. Should the three sea powers man-
age to draw in other powers with little interest in infringing on India’s Monroe 
Doctrine or capacity to do so—say, Australia, an Indian Ocean nation in its own 
right, or Japan, which depends on Indian Ocean sea-lanes for energy security—
the regional geometry could become quite complex. But the participation of such 
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powers might also reduce the propensity for competition among the three verti-
ces of the Sino-Indian-U.S. triangle. A wider arrangement, then, warrants study 
in American strategic circles.
Also, as we have seen, China views India’s maritime rise with equanimity for 
now, doubting both New Delhi’s capacity and its will to pose a threat to Chinese 
interests in the region. American hopes and Chinese complacency may not add 
up to an era of good feelings in South Asia, but they may form the basis for coop-
erative relations in the near to middle term.
But this inquiry also suggests that the opportunity to fashion a tripartite sea-
going entente may not endure for long. If India succeeds in building powerful 
naval forces, it may—like Cleveland’s or Roosevelt’s America—set out to make 
the Indian Ocean an Indian preserve in fact as well as in principle. If so, China 
would be apt to take a more wary view of Indian naval ambitions, which would 
seem to menace Chinese economic, energy, and security interests in South Asia. 
Its hopes for a strategic partnership dashed, the United States might reevaluate its 
assumptions about the viability of a consortium of English-speaking democra-
cies. This too would work against a cooperative strategic triangle.
Maritime security cooperation, then, is by no means foreordained. A host 
of wild cards could impel New Delhi toward a more forceful security doctrine. 
Should, say, the United States use the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf to stage 
strikes against Iranian nuclear sites, New Delhi might see the need to expand 
its regional primacy at America’s expense. A failure of the U.S.-Indian civilian 
nuclear cooperation accord would have an unpredictable, if indirect, impact 
on the bilateral relationship, fraying Indian patience and potentially loosening 
this “side” of the strategic triangle. Similarly, if China began deploying ballistic-
missile submarines to the Indian Ocean, India might redouble its maritime efforts, 
working assiduously on antisubmarine warfare and its own undersea nuclear de-
terrent. Competition, not cooperation, could come to characterize the strategic 
triangle—perhaps giving rise to some other, less benign regional geometry.
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REFLECTIONS ON FUTURE WAR
Mackubin Thomas Owens
Part of preparing for war is to understand it. What is the nature of war? Whatis the character of war? Will war in the future be like war in the past? These
are critical questions that today’s military professional must attempt to answer.
Unfortunately, our track record is not very good. To envision the future is to
“look through a glass darkly.” A case in point is the debate that took place a de-
cade ago in the wake of the Cold War’s end and Operation DESERT STORM, the
first Gulf War, of 1991.
BACK TO THE FUTURE: THINKING ABOUT WAR DURING
THE 1990S
During the 1990s, some argued that the age of war had finally come to an end.1
These “international optimists” claimed that the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the subsequent globalization and increasing interdependence of the inter-
national system had converged with the recognition of the destructiveness of
modern war to render the idea of large-scale, interstate conflict more or less un-
thinkable. They contended that while small-scale strife remained a possibility, it
could be curbed by means of preventive diplomacy and cooperative structures
based on liberal principles. This view prevailed during much of the Clinton
administration.
Others argued that the future would not be that
different from the past, that indeed the causes of war
remained the same as during the time of Thucydides
—“fear, honor, and interest”—and that therefore
“bad times [would] return.”2 For example, Colin Gray
predicted then, and continues to argue today, that the
future security environment will feature the
Mackubin Thomas Owens is Associate Dean of Aca-
demics for Electives and Directed Research and profes-
sor of national security affairs at the Naval War College
in Newport, Rhode Island. He served as a member of the
“Future of War” panel of the 2007 Defense Science
Board Summer Study. He is also the newly designated
editor of Orbis, the quarterly journal of the Foreign Pol-
icy Research Institute (FPRI).
Naval War College Review, Summer 2008, Vol. 61, No. 3
67
War College: Summer 2008 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008
reemergence of great-power politics, regional nuclear wars, and traditional ter-
ritorial conflict.3
Still others contended that while conflict was still possible, it would differ
from war in the past. This view took two forms. On the one hand were the tech-
nological optimists, who believed that the United States could maintain its domi-
nant position in the international order by exploiting the “revolution in military
affairs” (RMA). On the other were the technological pessimists, who rejected the
idea of a technological El Dorado, a “golden city of guaranteed strategic riches.”4
The rapid coalition victory over Saddam Hussein that drove Iraqi forces out
of Kuwait led some influential defense experts to argue that emerging technolo-
gies and the RMA had the potential to transform the very nature of war. One of
the most prominent advocates of this position was Admiral William Owens, vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1994 to 1996, who contended that
these emerging technologies and “information dominance” would eliminate
“friction” and the “fog of war,” providing the commander and his subordinates
nearly perfect “situational awareness,” thereby promising “the capacity to use
military force without the same risks as before.”5 Owens argued that “technology
could enable U.S. military forces in the future to lift the ‘fog of war.’ . . .
[B]attlefield dominant awareness—the ability to see and understand everything
on the battlefield—might be possible.”6 Furthermore, “if you see the battlefield,
you will win the war.”7
A publication of the National Defense University fleshed out this claim. “In
short,” it said, “we will move from a situation in which decision making takes
place under uncertainty, or in the presence of incomplete and erroneous infor-
mation, to a situation in which decisions are made with nearly ‘perfect’ informa-
tion.”8 The chief of staff of the Air Force at the time echoed this view, saying, “In
the first part of the 21st century, you will be able to find, fix or track, and tar-
get—in near real-time—anything of consequence that moves or is located on
the face of the Earth. Quite frankly, I can tell you we can do most of that today.
We just can’t do it in real-time.”9
Those who made this argument were essentially arguing that the classic
Clausewitzian trinity of primordial violence, chance and probability, and the
subordination of war to policy had been superseded by a new technological trin-
ity: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies; advanced
command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems; and preci-
sion strike munitions. During the 1990s, the technological optimists prevailed.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rapid U.S. victory in the first Gulf War
gave rise to an era of strategic optimism. Analysts concluded that because of its
edge in emerging technologies, especially information technologies, the posi-
tion of the United States in the world was unassailable for the foreseeable future.
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At the same time, there was no “peer competitor” on the horizon capable of re-
placing the Soviet Union as an existential threat.
This apparent national security situation led U.S. planners in many cases to
adopt simplified—if not simplistic—defense-planning assumptions:
• Challenges to U.S. security would arise primarily from regional powers and
involve regional/theater contingencies featuring conventional major com-
bat operations (MCOs).
• These likely adversaries would be smaller, less capable versions of the
USSR.
• The American monopoly in strike, information technology, and stealth
would constitute a barrier to entry for adversaries and would continue into
the foreseeable future.
These assumptions led to major changes in U.S. force structure, including the
“conventionalization” of the U.S. strategic bomber force and a shift in the focus
of space and C3I* programs from the strategic level to the operational/techno-
logical level. Planners assumed that since future wars would be short, “strategic
speed” had become critical. Thus joint planners stressed such concepts as “rapid
halt,” “rapid decisive operations,” and “shock and awe.” One consequence of this
perspective was a lack of focus on “phase V” operations: security, stabilization,
transformation, and reconstruction.
The technological pessimists, on the contrary, rejecting the prevailing opti-
mism, claimed that America’s technological edge would be of little use in dealing
with the most likely future security environment, one in which conflict charac-
terized by brutal, nasty, and merciless ethnic and religious warfare, large-scale
banditry and the reemergence of the “warlord,” and transnational crime and ter-
rorism would be the order of the day. They argued that the United States was ill
prepared for the most likely conflicts of the future. While preparing for the wars
it wished to fight—large-scale interstate wars for which it possessed unmatched
capabilities—it ignored the conflicts that it would have to fight, those forced on
it by the asymmetric strategies of future adversaries.10 Other rejected the claim
that information “dominance” is sufficient in and of itself to provide the win-
ning edge in future wars.11
In early 1996, Colonel (now Major General) Charles Dunlap, USAF, wrote a
remarkably prescient critique of the technology-as-panacea vision of future
war that then dominated the Pentagon.12 In his article, entitled “How We Lost
the High-Tech War of 2007: A Warning from the Future,” Dunlap imagines a
future speech by an enemy leader explaining how his movement had used
O W E N S 6 3
* Command, control, communications, and intelligence.
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“asymmetric” means to negate American technological superiority—indeed,
had used information technology itself against the United States: “Praise the
One Above, the microchip ended the educational and training advantage the
American military had enjoyed.”13
This enemy had also employed “information warfare” to defeat the United
States. “We were confident we could influence the American public and its
poll-sensitive decision-makers. . . . Thus it became part of our strategy to capital-
ize on television’s power to influence decision-makers by aiming to wage war in
the most brutal—and public—way.” In Dunlap’s telling, this enemy even pur-
posely detonates a nuclear device on its own holy city and then blames it on the
United States. In retaliation for this purported American atrocity—which, of
course, turns the international community against the United States—the en-
emy deliberately and viciously mutilates female POWs, subsequently returning
them to the United States as part of an information campaign. “In no way did we
try to hide what we did; to the contrary, we advertised it—using video clips on
the Internet—as a warning of things to come.”
In this fascinating excursion into the future, Dunlap imagines a number of
techniques that have become reality, now being employed by our enemies
against us in Iraq and elsewhere. “America too often assumed that the [RMA]
would favor technologically advanced nations like herself. She failed to consider
how enemies with values and philosophies utterly at odds with hers might con-
duct war in the information age. Despite what many technology-infatuated
strategists thought in 1995, cyberscience cannot eliminate the vicious cruelty in-
herent in human conflict.”
THINKING ABOUT FUTURE WAR
While the American experience in Iraq and other episodes of the “Long War”
have failed to validate the more extreme claims of the technological optimists
who largely dominated the debate in the 1990s, those claims continue to exert
substantial influence on the debate.14 Indeed, it seems clear that the vision of the
technological optimists essentially underpinned the efforts of President George
W. Bush’s first secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to “transform” the U.S.
military from a Cold War force to one that would be more responsive to the de-
mands of the post–Cold War security environment. But is this the correct vision
of future war, and should it constitute the primary guide for U.S. strategists and
force planners?
In attempting to answer this question, it is important to recognize that, as the
discussion above illustrates, planners do not have a stellar record when it comes
to predicting the future.15 Indeed, as Loren Thompson of Washington’s
Lexington Institute has observed, the United States has suffered a major strate-
gic surprise on the average of once a decade since 1940.
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In 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld issued The National Defense Strategy of the
United States of America, which breaks the challenges that the United States may
face in the future into four categories: traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and dis-
ruptive.16 The first is almost always associated with states employing armies, na-
vies, and air forces in long-established forms of military competition. The
second category describes the use of insurgency and other such approaches to
erode American influence, patience, and political will. The insurgent threat in
Iraq and Afghanistan is, of course, an example of irregular warfare.
The third category describes the troublesome nexus of transnational terror-
ism, proliferation, and problem states seeking weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). The fourth category is concerned with possible revolutionary technolo-
gies and technological breakthroughs—such as biotechnology; cyber operations;
space operations, including space-based weapons; or directed-energy weap-
ons—that can exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and counter current advantages.17
Critics of Defense Department investment categories argue that the Penta-
gon spends too much on systems for the arena in which the United States already
is dominant—traditional threats—and not enough on the others, especially the
irregular category. Critics observe that even as the war in Iraq was shifting to an
insurgency, the Department of Defense issued its Transformation Planning
Guidance (2003), a document that purported to provide a template for trans-
forming the Cold War military into
information age military forces [that] will be less platform-centric and more
network-centric. They will be able to distribute forces more widely by increasing in-
formation sharing via a secure network that provides actionable information at all
levels of command. This, in turn, will create conditions for increased speed of com-
mand and opportunities for self-coordination across the battlespace.
Critics claim that this proves that the Pentagon does in fact seek a technological
El Dorado.
A counterargument to the prevailing techno-centric view has been advanced
by those who espouse “fourth-generation warfare” (4GW).18 For instance, in
The Sling and the Stone, T. X. Hammes argues that the Pentagon’s emphasis on
high-tech warfare has prevented the U.S. military from adapting to a style of
warfare in which guerrillas and terrorists employ low-technology tactics to
counter American strengths and exploit American vulnerabilities.19
According to its advocates, the goal of fourth-generation warfare is to con-
vince the enemy that its strategic objectives are unachievable at acceptable cost.
The methodology of 4GW is to use all available networks—political, economic,
social, and military—to attack directly the will of the enemy. Hammes contends
that 4GW has been the most successful form of warfare of the last half-century,
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defeating the United States three times (Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia), the
Soviet Union/Russia twice (Afghanistan and Chechnya), and France twice
(Indochina and Algeria). Indeed, only 4GW, he argues, has succeeded against su-
perpowers. Despite this, discussion of what Hammes calls 4GW has been largely
absent from the debate within the Defense Department.
WHAT’S NEW?
As skeptics predicted and events such as 9/11 and Iraq have demonstrated, ad-
versaries have adapted to American power by adopting asymmetric responses to
U.S. advantages.20 The result has been the emergence of trends that undermine
the older planning assumptions and require a rethinking of the character of fu-
ture war.
Driving Forces and Areas of Future Military Competition
Several years ago, Peter Schwartz outlined a methodology for thinking about the
future.21 He suggested that planners can best understand the emerging security
environment by positing scenarios based on an assessment of driving forces, pre-
determined elements, and critical uncertainties. The first category—assessing fu-
ture trends—is really the key to the methodology.
What are the dominant emerging trends in the security environment? They
include—but are not limited to—the proliferation of militarily useful technol-
ogy; unlimited access to information technologies, including lightweight movie
cameras, cell phones, portable laptop computers, and satellite modems that en-
sure that everyone (including adversaries) has the capability to deliver images of
conflict in real time; and aspects of globalization that permit terrorists and other
armed groups to employ cheap means to achieve costly effects by exploiting the
vulnerabilities of advanced, especially liberal, societies.
Indeed, the changing cost equation may be the most consequential trend of
all. During the Cold War, the United States possessed a decided cost advantage in
its competition with the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration took advan-
tage of this by adopting an asymmetric and cost-incurring strategy to exploit the
mismatch between the large and growing American economy and the much
smaller Soviet economy. This cost-incurring strategy forced the USSR to expend
resources the Soviet economy could not afford. The combination of the U.S. de-
fense buildup, support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and such programs
as the Strategic Defense Initiative, which threatened to render obsolescent or even
obsolete the Soviet nuclear arsenal, was more than Moscow could withstand.22
As Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged in 2003, this advantage has dissipated.
“The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists’
cost of millions.”23 In fact, Rumsfeld understated the cost ratio. John Robb
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contends that on 9/11 “a $250,000 attack was converted into an event that cost
the United States over $80 billion (some estimates are as high as $500 billion).”24
Another important aspect of thinking about the future is making educated
guesses about the types of military competition that may take place in the fu-
ture. Examples include power projection versus antiaccess strategies, “hider”
versus “finder,” and precision strike versus active defense.25 We can also expect
greater competition in space and cyberspace. Indeed, adversaries will seek the
capability to launch difficult-to-detect electronic or information attacks from
great distances.
Another emerging military competition involves countering the threat of at-
tack on the homeland from either a large peer competitor or from terrorists who
are able to wield much greater destructive power than in the past. To deal with
the former, the United States must be prepared to counter “traditional”
threats—for example, ballistic- and cruise-missile attack, which may occur with
substantially less warning than was anticipated only a few years ago. Addressing
the latter requires the capability to counter terrorists or other armed groups who
may well gain access to chemical and biological weapons.
Changing Character (Not Nature) of War
As noted above, it was not unusual during the 1990s for planners to claim that
emerging technologies had changed “the very nature of war.” But it seems clear
that the nature of war—as best described by the Prussian “philosopher of war,”
Carl von Clausewitz—remains constant. Clausewitz reminds us that war is a vi-
olent clash between opposing wills, each seeking to prevail over the other. In war,
the will of one combatant is directed at an animate object that reacts, often in un-
anticipated ways. This cyclical interaction between opposing wills occurs in a
realm of chance and chaos. He also identified as the enduring characteristics of
war the persistence of “general friction” as a structural component of combat,
the seeming impossibility of eliminating uncertainty, and the critical impor-
tance of “moral factors.”26
On the other hand, the “character” of war is infinite. Thus a weaker adversary
can adopt various modalities of war to engage and defeat a stronger power. Suc-
cess in war has traditionally gone to the more adaptive side, the one that can bear
the costs of the conflict relative to what Clausewitz called “the value of the ob-
ject.” Accordingly, the record shows, the materially weaker side has prevailed in a
conflict in a surprisingly large number of instances—around 40 percent of the
time since World War II.27
As Philip Bobbitt has observed, for five centuries it has taken the resources of
a state to destroy another state. Only states could muster the huge revenues, con-
script the vast armies, and equip the divisions required to threaten the survival
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of other states. Indeed, meeting such threats created the modern state. In the
past, every state knew that its enemy would be drawn from a small class of
nearby potential adversaries with local interests. But because of globalization,
global reach, advances in international telecommunications, rapid computa-
tion, and methods of mass destruction, this is no longer true.28
The Emerging Security Environment
The present and still evolving security environment exhibits a number of char-
acteristics that affect the character of war and will most likely continue to do so
in the future. These include such phenomena as expanded global interdepen-
dence, which although seen as a boon to globalization, also permits terrorists
and other violent ideologues to inflict damage at very low cost and risk to them-
selves. In the words of Shamil Basayev, a Chechen commander and mastermind
of the Beslan massacre, “We are not bound by any circumstances, or to anybody,
and will continue to fight as convenient and advantageous to us and by our
rules.”29
Citing this passage, John Robb observes that “this new method of warfare . . .
offers guerrillas the means to bring a modern nation’s economy to its knees and
thereby undermine the legitimacy of the state sworn to protect it. Furthermore,
it can derail the key drivers of economic globalization: the flow of resources, in-
vestment, people, and security.” Those who adopt this form of warfare, says
Robb, are not really terrorists but global guerrillas, who represent “a broad-based
threat that far exceeds that offered by terrorists or the guerrillas of the past.”30
Such global guerrillas are able to exploit the dissonance caused by “spikey” eco-
nomic development and urbanization, the diffusion of and impact of technol-
ogy (especially information technology), and the dislocation caused by
globalization and demographic bulges. They are able to effect “systems disrup-
tion” in advanced economies, by causing “cascading” failures in the system: “If
attackers can disrupt the operations of the hubs of a scale-free infrastructure
network, the entire network can collapse in a cascade of failure.”31
Because of interdependence, furthermore, failures within a single network
can cause the failure of others. In a tightly interconnected infrastructure, not
only do the transportation network, the water network, and the fuel network de-
pend on the electricity network, but the electricity network depends on the fuel
and transportation. “Global guerrillas have proven to be increasingly adept at
using these interconnections to cause cross-networks of failure.”32
Categories of War: Multidimensional Conflict
The categorization of war—traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disrup-
tive—by the 2004 Defense Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review repre-
sents an advance in thinking about future war, but it implied that adversaries
6 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
74
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 18
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/18
would focus on only one category. War, however, properly understood, is always
multidimensional. In a past dominated by state-on-state warfare, the traditional
or conventional category was central, but combatants also pursued strategies to
exploit irregular capabilities, such as guerrilla warfare and insurgency, or dis-
ruptive—attempts to undermine an enemy’s public support for the war, by, say,
acts of terrorism. But a particular form of multidimensional warfare may consti-
tute the most demanding challenge to American planners in the future: “com-
plex irregular warfare” (CIW).33
One characteristic of CIW is the likelihood that future adversaries will be
“hybrids.” These hybrid threats will seek to raise the potential cost of U.S. mili-
tary action by adopting aspects of all of the warfare categories.34 An example of a
prototype hybrid is Hezbollah. During the 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah ex-
hibited both statelike capabilities—long-range missiles, antiship cruise missiles,
sophisticated antiarmor systems, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, and signals
intelligence—while still skillfully executing guerrilla warfare. Such a hybrid has
the potential to complicate future U.S. military planning and execution.
Hezbollah was able to stand up to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) because it was
able to adapt skillfully to the particular circumstances that it faced. For instance,
unlike U.S. forces, which must be prepared to fight in a variety of environments
and under various conditions, Hezbollah was able to tailor its forces specifically
to counter the IDF. Since Hezbollah did not have to organize for offensive opera-
tions, it was able to concentrate on defense in depth.
With decades of experience in low-intensity conflict with the IDF, Hezbollah under-
stood its enemy’s strengths and vulnerabilities. The IDF’s ground forces remain
structured for swift, conventional thrusts toward Damascus or Cairo. So Hezbollah
leaders didn’t attempt to build traditional brigades or battalions equipped with ar-
mored vehicles—the classic Arab error. Instead, they concentrated on stockpiling the
most sophisticated defensive weapons they could acquire, such as the Kornet, a lethal
late-generation Russian antitank missile, as well as a range of rockets, from long-
range, Iranian-made weapons to man-portable point-and-shoot Katyushas. Thanks
to the Katyushas, an Arab military force was able to create a substantial number of Is-
raeli refugees for the first time since 1948.
Hezbollah exhibited flexibility by fielding modular units and adopting
mission-type orders. It was effective in its innovative use of weapons. Although
most Hezbollah fighters did not seek death, the organization was willing to ac-
cept casualties. Hezbollah was perfectly willing to accept a loss ratio of about five
of its fighters to one IDF soldier. Hezbollah’s intelligence performance was sur-
prisingly effective. As Ralph Peters has observed, “Israel fought as a limping
stepchild of Clausewitz. Hezbollah fought as Sun Tzu’s fanatical son.”35
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As suggested above, the sort of hybrid threats generated by CIW and illus-
trated by Hezbollah may well constitute the most probable, most demanding,
and potentially most costly type of future conflict. Implications of wars against
hybrid threats include the likelihood that they will be extremely lethal and pro-
tracted and the prospect that since they will often take place in contested urban
zones (“feral cities”), they will be manpower intensive.36 They will be widely dis-
tributed by distance, complexity, and mission. In most cases, these hybrid
threats will seek to win the war of perceptions, waging a “conflict among the
people.” To prevail against such a threat requires “cultural intelligence” and ex-
ploitation of the “human terrain.”
The operational environment in such conflicts very likely will be character-
ized by close encounters between friendly forces and an enemy that seeks to blur
the distinctions between the conventional and the unconventional, between
combatants and noncombatants, between conflict and stability operations, and
between the physical and the psychological. After all, hybrid war is a competi-
tion for influence and legitimacy, in which perceptions are paramount. As the
current conflict in Iraq illustrates, in the battle for legitimacy religious identity
may trump or negate better governance and economic benefits.
In general, hybrid foes utilizing complex irregular warfare will attempt to ex-
ploit the political effects of a conflict, seeking to undermine the legitimacy of
U.S. military actions. Thus these enemies will try to leverage “lawfare,” the use of
the rules of warfare against the United States (while ignoring these rules them-
selves), by, for example, taking refuge among the civilian population in an at-
tempt to maximize civilian casualties.37 In turn, adversaries employing CIW will
take advantage of the fact that such casualties are magnified by the proliferation
of media assets on the battlefield. Again, CIW is above all a battle of perceptions.
As Lawrence Freedman has observed, “In irregular warfare, superiority in the
physical environment is of little value unless it can be translated into an advan-
tage in the information environment. . . . Our enemies have skillfully adapted to
fighting wars in today’s media age, but for the most part we, our country, our
government, has not.”38
Preempting Preemption
The best way to counter such threats is through preemption. To do so, the
United States needs to establish favorable conditions for access, including a
flexible forward-basing posture and an effective means to counter the asym-
metric antiaccess strategies that hybrid opponents are likely to adopt. Such
strategies would be designed to undermine the cornerstone of American
global military power: the ability to project and sustain substantial military
forces at great distances from the continental United States. In general, there
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are four points at which an adversary may attempt to derail U.S. power
projection.
First, as the United States is deciding to project power, an adversary may at-
tempt to deter it by threatening actions that would make the cost of power pro-
jection too high, perhaps attacking targets in the homeland in order to
undermine public support for an overseas intervention. Second, as the United
States is deploying its forces to ports and airfields, an adversary may attempt to
disrupt the deployment by terrorist attacks and sabotage of transportation
means and the like. Such attacks in both of these phases would force the United
States to use forces intended for power projection to defend against attacks at
home.
Third, as the United States is transporting its forces to the theater of action
and attempting to debark, an adversary will try to deny entry by military and po-
litical means—say, attacks and threats against allies in the region. Finally, as U.S.
forces establish a lodgment and begin offensive operations, an adversary will
seek to defeat them.
In the past, adversaries have focused their efforts on the last two points, denial
and defeat. But in the future, an adversary’s most cost-efficient actions may be to
deter and disrupt the projection of U.S. forces. This possibility is the result of an-
other emerging characteristic of future conflict, “360-degree warfare.” Past wars
have usually been characterized by the existence of “fronts” and secure “rear ar-
eas,” whether at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. Of course, airpower
provided a means of attacking the enemy’s rear, and long-range airpower and
missiles threatened to extend the ability to attack the rear to the homeland.
Nonetheless, actual attacks against the strategic rears of both sides were deterred
by the likelihood of mutual destruction.
Guerrillas, insurgents, terrorists, and other armed groups have long sought to
wage “war without fronts,” but the strategic emergence of true 360-degree war-
fare is a recent development. The 9/11 attack indicated that the ability of the
United States to deter attacks against its homeland is no longer assured. Iraq and
Afghanistan illustrate that our adversaries have adopted this approach at the op-
erational and tactical levels of war as well. Thus multidimensional war in the fu-
ture is likely to be characterized by distributed, weakly connected battlefields;
unavoidable urban battles and unavoidable collateral damage exploited by the
adversary’s strategic communication; and highly vulnerable rear areas. On such
battlefields, friends and enemies are commingled, and there is a constant battle
for the loyalty of the population. All of this is exacerbated by the proliferation of
militarily useful technology, including nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
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A Large Peer Competitor?
Some contend that the American intelligence community during the 1990s and
the early 2000s was so focused on the rise of China to great-power status that it
was blind to the threat that manifested itself on 11 September 2001. But has the
pendulum now swung too far to the other extreme? Are we now so fixated on
counterinsurgency and terrorism that we will not take the steps necessary to
counter the military of a “large peer competitor?”39
The leading candidate for the role of future peer competitor is China. Accord-
ing to the Department of Defense’s annual report to Congress on Chinese mili-
tary power,
much uncertainty surrounds the future course China’s leaders will set for their coun-
try, including in the area of China’s expanding military power and how that power
might be used. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive
transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its
territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity con-
flicts against high-tech adversaries—which China refers to as “local wars under con-
ditions of informatization.” China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance, at
present, remains limited but, as noted in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Re-
port, it “has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and
field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. mili-
tary advantages.”40
The report states that China’s economic growth has permitted it to accelerate
the pace and scope of its military transformation. “The expanding military ca-
pabilities of China’s armed forces are a major factor in changing East Asian mili-
tary balances; improvements in China’s strategic capabilities have ramifications
far beyond the Asia Pacific region.” China has enhanced its strategic strike capa-
bilities and pursued a robust counterspace program, “punctuated by the January
2007 successful test of a direct-ascent, antisatellite weapon.” Thus its continued
pursuit of area-denial and antiaccess strategies has expanded from “the tradi-
tional land, air, and sea dimensions of the modern battlefield to include space
and cyber-space.”
The case of China illustrates that hybrid warfare is not only a phenomenon
associated with the “low end” of the spectrum of conflict. There is no reason that
a future peer competitor would restrict military competition with the United
States to the “traditional” category alone. It would logically also try to confront
the United States asymmetrically in those areas where the United States is per-
ceived to be less capable than in the traditional category. The publication in
China several years ago of Unrestricted Warfare indicates the potential of hybrid
complex irregular warfare at the “upper end” of the spectrum of conflict.41
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THE FUTURE OF FUTURE WAR
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, any future adversary, whatever his pre-
ferred mode of warfare, will at a minimum attempt to employ all the dimensions
of warfare to counter critical U.S. military capabilities asymmetrically in such
areas as conventional warfare, force projection, C4ISR (including space opera-
tions), and precision strike.
In the area of irregular warfare, opponents will attempt to impose untenable
costs on the United States by using time-tested techniques against superior
force, threatening a protracted war of attrition to undermine domestic public
support, raising the level of violence and brutality, and expanding and escalating
the conflict by targeting the U.S. homeland and those of its key allies. In the area
of power projection, opponents will attempt to raise the cost of access by in-
creasing the risk to the United States of naval and air operations, by, in turn, ex-
panding the area of a “contested zone,” seeking to destroy high-value assets—for
instance, aircraft carriers—dissuading allies and partners from providing bases
and other forms of support to U.S. forces, and degrading the ability of the
United States to deploy forces into an area of interest.42
In the area of C4ISR, adversaries will attempt to “bring down the network” by
attacking American space assets, degrading information systems, disrupting
command and control, denying surveillance and reconnaissance, and deceiving
intelligence. In the area of precision strike, the enemy will seek to reduce
stand-off range, spoof guidance systems that enable precision attack, and dis-
perse targets, including into populated areas. All of these methods have already
been employed by adversaries; they represent manifestations of the changing
cost equation that will likely make it more difficult for the United States to use
military force in the future.43
The best way to think about the future is not to try to predict it but to project a
number of plausible alternative futures against which to test strategies and force
structures. To do so, planners must develop a representative—not exhaus-
tive—set of plausible contingencies that encompass the principal challenges the
military might encounter “over the planning horizon” (more than fifteen to
twenty years out). This approach is particularly relevant to the United States,
which, given its global responsibilities, must be prepared for a variety of contin-
gencies across the entire range of military operations.44
Andrew Krepinevich has suggested a useful methodology for addressing ar-
eas of future military competition—the reintroduction of the concept of “color
plans” reminiscent of those the United States employed during the interwar pe-
riod.45 His scenarios include
• China (disruptive peer) (Plan YELLOW)
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• North Korea (nuclear rogue) (Plan RED)
• Pakistan (failed nuclear state) (Plan GREEN)
• Radical Islam (Plan PURPLE)
• Global energy network defense (Plan BLACK)
• Global commons defense (Plan ORANGE)
• Nuclear/biological homeland attack (Plan BLUE).
These illustrative scenarios seek to identify a representative array of contin-
gencies encompassing the principal military challenges U.S. planners may con-
front over the planning horizon. As such, they presumably enable strategists and
force planners to hedge against uncertainty by testing concepts of operations
and force structures against plausible alternatives—not the most familiar ones
or the contingencies believed to be the most likely—permitting planners to as-
sess realistically the potential impact of a range of possible futures on relative
military effectiveness.46
General James Mattis, USMC, the new commander of U.S. Joint Forces Com-
mand, who also has responsibility for transformation, hit the nail on the head
when he remarked several years ago, “We are not likely to get the future right. We
just need to make sure we don’t get it too wrong.” One way to ensure that we do
not get the future “too wrong” is not to confuse the nature of war—which is im-
mutable—with the character of war—which is infinitely variable. In thinking
about future war, planners cannot afford to make this mistake.
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DEVELOPING THE NAVY’S OPERATIONAL LEADERS
A Critical Look
Commander Christopher D. Hayes, U.S. Navy
Everything starts and ends with leadership. Nothing else we accomplish,
no other priority we pursue, is of much consequence if we do not have
sound and effective leadership in place to enact it. We all have a respon-
sibility to develop our own leadership potential and that of the Sailors.
ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, CNO GUIDANCE FOR 2006
Admiral Mullen’s words accurately reflect the Navy’s traditional pronounce-ment on leadership. Yet for most of the past century the Navy has struggled
to define formally and institutionalize its development process for naval leaders.
Just as the Navy accepts that “everything starts and ends with leadership,” it
comfortably assumes that leadership “just happens,” as a natural derivative of
operational assignments. More than ninety studies, reviews, and boards have ex-
amined the Navy’s officer leadership, training, and education practices, in a con-
tinuing effort to produce an enduring and integrated system of officer
development.1 Nevertheless, the Navy has been unable to reconcile the symbi-
otic relationship among training, education, and experience, and this inability
has left it unprepared to meet the challenges inherent in the vision of the Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO) to “develop 21st century leaders.”2
The Navy’s concept of an officer’s development continuum traditionally
culminated in promotion to flag rank and the com-
mand of battle groups—the pinnacle of naval leader-
ship, exercised in a naval context.3 Today, operational
leadership at flag rank demands much more. Twenty-
first-century operational leadership is synonymous
with joint leadership. Further, as aptly stated by Admi-
ral Mullen, “The future of national and international
security relies on the interoperability and cooperation
among the services, the interagency, international
partners and non-government organizations. . . . But
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we are only as good as the contribution we make to the overall effort.”4 The
Navy’s greatest challenge, and one of Admiral Mullen’s enduring top three prior-
ities in his tenure as CNO, is to cultivate leaders prepared to meet the challenges
inherent in the twenty-first-century security environment.
Admiral Mullen articulated his vision of “joint officer development” in a pro-
fessional military education (PME) continuum designed to develop naval lead-
ers. The continuum defines distinct blocks of education broadly aligned with
officer career progression from pay grade O-1 to O-9.* The key elements of the
PME system are “leadership, professionalism, military studies including naval
and joint warfare, and national, maritime, and global security.”5 The CNO’s em-
phasis on formal officer development, coupled with alignment of the Navy’s
manpower, personnel, training, and education domains into an “MPTE Do-
main,” suggests that the Navy is primed to address the challenges at hand in a
meaningful way. However, as evidenced by the scores of similar initiatives over
the past thirty years, unless there is an enduring change in doctrine and Navy
culture, there is little prospect for success. The Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP),
like the CNO, has articulated a plan for producing leaders.6 However, if the dis-
parate organizations and processes responsible for essential portions of the
PME continuum are not aligned, the proposed programs will likely suffer the
same fate as the “Covenant Leadership,” “Leadership and Management Educa-
tion and Training,” and “Total Quality Leadership” of decades past. Leadership
development is inextricably wed to training and education. As the Navy moves
forward to execute its vision, leadership must be integrated into the PME curric-
ulum and not be left to languish on its own. Further, the Navy must focus on
intraservice officer development before it can fully realize effective operational
leadership in an interservice joint operating environment.
Unless tied to an integrated system linking assessment, career management,
and advancement selection criteria, initiatives to reform the Navy’s processes
will fall out of favor as the helm is passed to the next cohort of Navy leaders. Real,
enduring change is required to meet the challenges of twenty-first-century lead-
ership. Change of this magnitude requires systematic execution and incurs sig-
nificant risk. In the absence of execution, vision, no matter how well articulated
or intended, amounts to little more than grandiloquence.
OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP
The security environment of the twenty-first century presents new challenges
and places unprecedented demands on leadership. The complexity of the battle
space, the speed of change, and the cognitive demands of integrated information
7 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* The Navy’s officer pay grades are O-1, ensign; O-2, lieutenant (junior grade); O-3, lieutenant; O-4,
lieutenant commander; O-5, commander; O-6, captain; O-7, rear admiral (lower half); O-8, rear
admiral (upper half); O-9, vice admiral; and O-10, admiral.
84
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 18
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/18
networks all conspire to burden leadership in ways inconceivable less than a genera-
tion ago. In the wake of the Cold War, the lid has been lifted from long-simmering
regional tensions. The fluidity of asymmetric warfare and adaptive application of
technology have conspired to alter dramatically traditional notions of
state-to-state conflict. America’s strategic buffer zone has been largely elimi-
nated by the advent of globalization and the proliferation of affordable technol-
ogy. The role of the United States in the world is different than at any other point
in history.
Moreover, the roles that American forces are compelled to accept abroad are
increasingly complex, multicultural, joint, and interagency in nature. Even a
cursory review of recent engagements illustrates this point: combat operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan; missions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo; antipiracy
and maritime interdiction operations in the southwestern Pacific and Horn of
Africa; humanitarian relief operations in Indonesia and Pakistan; and noncom-
batant evacuation operations in the eastern Mediterranean. These operations
reflect a disparate array of nontraditional missions in complicated operating en-
vironments. All pose operational challenges that the Navy’s current system does
not adequately prepare its leaders to meet.
LEADERSHIP VERSUS OPERATIONAL COMPETENCY
The term operational leadership implicitly requires the confluence of two dis-
crete concepts. Operational leadership is leadership exercised at the opera-
tional level, requiring both leadership and operational competency. There is a
subtle but powerful distinction between the two. Operational competency re-
quires mastery of the tactical domain and a deft understanding of the strategic.
A recent working definition of operational leadership, tacitly endorsed by 107
flag and general officers with operational leadership experience, reads: “The
art of direct and indirect influence—both internal and external to the organi-
zation—based on a common vision that builds unity of effort while employing
tactical activities and capabilities to achieve strategic objectives.”7 In the
twenty-first-century context, as described by the Capstone Concept for Joint
Operations (CCJO), operational functions are inherently joint.8 Nonetheless,
the concept of jointness in itself has been described as inadequately reflecting
the complexity of current operations and those of the foreseeable future. The
term joint is evolving to imply “the integrated employment of . . . multina-
tional armed forces and interagency capabilities” and the conduct of opera-
tions in a “multi-Service, multi-agency, multi-national environment.”9
Leadership is expected to synthesize integration of actions so as to realize cu-
mulative effects greater than those achievable by the individual actors. Creat-
ing a comprehensive almanac of joint leader requirements is therefore a
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challenging endeavor, but it is under way in earnest across the services and
within joint institutions.
Ultimately, joint leaders must be prepared to engage and execute with agility
the innumerable and complex tasks demanded by the joint operational environ-
ment. They must be thoroughly competent in the execution of military affairs at
the operational level. More than that, they must be operationally competent
leaders. It is perhaps easier to focus on what a battle space looks like, who the ac-
tors are, and which sequence of tactical actions would best produce strategic ob-
jectives than on the seemingly pedantic concept of leadership.
Leadership is required regardless of the nature of the endeavor; whether at
the tactical, operational, or strategic level, leadership is the common essential in-
gredient. The uniqueness of each situational context seems to make it possible to
enumerate mechanically the demands of leadership as series of didactic compe-
tency lists. Who the leaders are and how they execute the art of leading are more
vexing subjects.
If cultivating operational leaders requires development of both operational
competency and leadership, however, the Navy’s current strategy for joint leader
development is misaligned. Admiral Mullen has declared, “The Navy’s PME
Continuum provides a systematic way to develop leaders.”10 This is accurate, to
the extent the proposed PME continuum depicts an institutional approach to
identifying opportunities for service and joint professional military education
in accordance with joint officer-development doctrine. However, the proposed
continuum attends to only one of the four required pillars—joint professional
military education (JPME).11 It falls short of fully realizing the need to develop
leaders, not just officers educated in joint operating concepts. It fails to demon-
strate the Navy’s comprehension that systematically developing leaders requires
systematically developing leadership.
JOINT OFFICER DEVELOPMENT AND THE CCJO
The 2005 Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act formally set in
motion a process to develop and execute a plan to manage both joint officer de-
velopment and joint professional military education. The August 2005 Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations
describes how future joint forces are expected to operate across the range of military
operations in 2012–2025 in support of strategic objectives. It applies to operations
around the globe conducted unilaterally or in conjunction with multinational mili-
tary partners and other government and non-government agencies. It envisions mili-
tary operations conducted within a national strategy that incorporates all
instruments of national power.12
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The CCJO and the subsequent Vision for Joint Officer Development (JOD) from
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) fully articulate the chairman’s
vision and proposed strategy to achieve the espoused goals. The chairman’s
guidance sets forth three broad domains of required joint leader competency:
“Strategically Minded,” “Critical Thinker,” and “Skilled Joint Warfighter.”13
These primary domains lay the groundwork for further exploration and de-
velopment by the individual services and the Joint Staff itself. In that connec-
tion, the Joint Staff J7* has solicited the assistance of a consulting firm, Caliber
Associates.14 Central to the chairman’s plan for creating joint leaders is a com-
mitment to measurement mechanisms that can support quantitative assessment
of critical competency-based education as an integral element in “a lifelong con-
tinuum of learning.”15 The JOD articulates four interdependent supporting pil-
lars: “Joint Individual Training,” “Joint Professional Military Education,” “Joint
Experience,” and “Self-Development.”16
Recognizing the inherent value of the individual services’ warfighting com-
petencies and the Title 10 responsibilities of the service chiefs, the JOD does
not expect service-specific officer development to be wholly subordinated to
development of joint officers. Rather, it stipulates that the services “adjust
their officer development models to fit the new JOD paradigm.”17 This re-
quires a full examination of a service’s officer-development continuum and re-
structuring as necessary to meet the challenges inherent in providing fully
qualified, competent, and capable joint officers. The architecture for achieving
educational requirements is established in CJCS Instruction 1800.01C, “Offi-
cer Professional Military Education Policy” (OPMEP). This comprehensive
document promulgates the policies, procedures, and responsibilities for exe-
cution and certification of the joint professional military education contin-
uum. It clearly establishes the tiers of education, scope, and focus of each
building block, as well as the specific learning objectives required at each stage
of the PME continuum.
Specifically focused on the educational institutions that constitute the PME
and JPME continua, the intent of the Officer Professional Military Education
Program is to foster the growth of organizational learning by regulating the “ed-
ucation needed to complement training, experience, and self-improvement to
produce the most professionally competent individual possible.”18 However, it
addresses hardly at all the fundamental leadership education required in sup-
port of professional development; the subject of leadership is introduced only
in appendix D to enclosure E, the service “Senior-Level Colleges (SLC) Joint
Learning Areas and Objectives” (JPME Phase I), in this context:
H A Y E S 8 1
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Learning Area 6—Joint Strategic Leader Development
a. Synthesize techniques for leading in a joint, interagency and multinational
environment.
b. Synthesize leadership skills necessary to sustain innovative, agile and ethical orga-
nizations in a joint, interagency and multinational environment.19
No leadership learning areas or objectives are prescribed among the
precommissioning, primary JPME, or service intermediate-level-college objec-
tives. The chairman’s Vision for Joint Officer Development is focused on O-6s
(colonels and Navy captains), the point in an officer’s career where joint and
individual-service development converge.20 It is appropriate that when leader-
ship is first introduced in a required learning area, the objectives are clearly di-
rected at the operational level, as those required of the “joint, interagency and
multinational environment.”21 It is implicit in the CCJO and JOD that leader-
ship and execution at the tactical level of military operations are inherently
service-oriented endeavors. At the grade of captain or colonel, service leader
competencies are assumed; therefore, the obligation to develop “techniques
for leading” and the “leadership skills necessary to sustain innovative, agile
and ethical organizations” is fundamentally that of the individual service.
Although not specifically required for certification through the OPMEP Pro-
cess of Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), the service colleges are expected
to provide leadership education to their students. Ironically, however, the ser-
vice institutions do not focus conspicuously on leadership education; the only
PAJE-certified institution with leadership education as a core element of its cur-
riculum is the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), a fundamentally
joint establishment within the National Defense University, in Washington, D.C.
ICAF instructs leadership as a core course in the syllabus. The stated mission of
ICAF’s Leadership and Information Strategy Department is to “educate and de-
velop leaders to bring strategic thinking skills and innovative approaches to the
challenges of transforming organizations and of formulating and resourcing
our future national security strategy.”22 Its syllabus is organized around twenty
modules, including a two-part capstone exercise (see figure 1). There is no com-
parable course or content at the Naval War College or anywhere else in the
Navy’s PME continuum. At the Naval War College, and apart from the Stockdale
Group Advanced Research Project, the newly established College of Naval Lead-
ership has no direct relationship with core courses and no formal role in leader-
ship education at the school. There is no compulsory leadership education in the
Naval War College’s curriculum; in fact, aside from one module of elective offer-
ings, there is no specific instruction in the subject. Each of the College’s three
core courses claims to provide leadership education as an integral part of its
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curriculum, but learning modules and objectives directed to that end are con-
spicuously absent.
DEFINING THE ROLE OF COMPETENCIES
The term competency means, simply, competence and, beyond that, “the state or
quality of being competent.” The definition of competent, in turn, is “properly or
well qualified; capable.” The difficulty of directly defining competency is multi-
plied in the context of a lack of common definition among the services. Not only
do the services claim their own definitions of competency, but they apparently
consider interchangeable a list of words: competency, skill, characteristic, trait,
ability, attitude, etc. Yet each of these has a slightly different connotation, and
each requires a unique apprenticeship.
The Navy has long relied on competencies as a tool to frame the discussion of
leadership development and subsequent attempts to engineer systematically a
process to implement it. Nearly a hundred years ago, early editions of the clas-
sic Command at Sea enumerated seven competencies under the heading of
H A Y E S 8 3
1. The Challenge of Strategic Leadership
2. Conceptual Capacity (Mental Models, Reframing and Systems Thinking)
3. Critical Thinking, Assessing Risk and Uncertainty
4. Creative Thinking and Innovation
5. Interpersonal Skills (Social Competence)
6. Managing Decision Making: Strategies for Consensus & Conflict Management
7. Strategic Negotiations
8. Interagency Decision Making Exercise
9. Transformational Leadership and Leading Organizational Change
10. Shaping the International Environment: Organizational Processes and Change
11. Shaping Organizational Culture
12. Leveraging Power and Politics in Organizations
13. Building and Leading Strategic Teams
14. Building and Communicating a Strategic Vision
15. Aligning Vision and Strategy
16. Leading Organizational Change
17. Building a Learning Organization
18. Establishing Organizational Ethics and Values
19. Capstone—Leading Transformation
20. Strategic Leader Challenges
FIGURE 1
ICAF SYLLABUS
Source: ICAF Strategic Leadership: Leading Transformation and Change in the Information Age, abbreviated syllabus.
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“Leadership Training.”23 The context and notions seem antiquated by today’s
standards, yet competency models generated within the past two decades draw
striking parallels to these same centuries-old ideals. According to the 1984 edi-
tion of Fundamentals of Naval Leadership, there are seven essential characteris-
tics of naval leaders. In 1979, the Navy’s Leadership and Management
Education Training (LMET) program proclaimed twenty-seven, but by 1992
that number had been revised to sixteen concurrent with the integration of the
Navy Leadership Development Program (NAVLEAD), discussed below. The
LMET/NAVLEAD curriculums were based on these competency lists and were
designed to introduce concepts that students would pursue on their own during
their careers.24 However, while incorporating the LMET/NAVLEAD curriculums
into the Surface Warfare Officer School syllabus, the surface community elected to
subdivide competencies based on rank and position; thus the division-officer
course taught ten competencies, the department-head course thirteen, and the
executive-officer and commanding-officer courses covered eleven, characteris-
tics deemed appropriate for senior leaders.25 In 1995, the Navy reexamined its
competency list in light of the operating environment and crafted yet another
compilation. Those competencies laid the groundwork for the Navy’s 1996 Offi-
cer Development Continuum.26
The Navy’s new continuum brought the establishment of the Center for Na-
val Leadership (CNL) in 2003. The CNL is responsible for generating the new
“Navy Leadership Competency Model.” According to the CNL, “a competency is
defined as a behavior or set of behaviors that describes excellent performance in
a particular work context. These characteristics are applied to provide clarifica-
tion of standards and expectations. In other words, a competency is what supe-
rior performers do more often, with better on the job results.”27 The new model
is built on twenty-five competencies organized into five “core” clusters. Despite
claims of “comprehensive research” devoted to this latest model, little is known
about the efforts or methodology that went into it; CNL staff members them-
selves point out a striking resemblance to the Office of Personnel Management’s
model for the Senior Executive Service.28 Further, the CNL’s courses do not teach
to these competencies directly and appear to be largely built upon a legacy sylla-
bus, that of Leadership and Management Education Training.29
The Navy is certainly not alone in embracing competency models as frame-
works for leadership development. Each service has its own lists of competen-
cies, each tracing its own heritage from inception through iterative evolution to
the current model. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations firmly establishes
competency modeling as the preferred paradigm for leader development. The
Vision for Joint Officer Development defines a competency as “the higher level of
assessing learning outcomes described by specific knowledge, skill, ability, and
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attitude (KSAA).”30 Further, the JOD describes joint leader competencies as the
“heart” of officer development. The CCJO directs that the joint officer-development
process produce “knowledgeable, empowered, innovative, and decisive leaders,
capable of leading the networked joint force to success in fluid and perhaps cha-
otic operating environments . . . [requiring] more comprehensive knowledge of
interagency and multinational cultures and capabilities.”31 This directive serves
as the genesis of the chairman’s commitment to “identify and inculcate a set of
joint leader competencies,” and it establishes the impetus for individual services
to align leadership development architecture based on competency modeling.
Caliber Associates’ work under the Joint Staff J7 produced a four-month
study to determine the competencies required for performance at the joint oper-
ational and strategic levels.32 The methodology included two concurrent, yet
distinct, efforts. One was a review of each service’s current leadership model and
existing literature on service and joint competency requirements. For the Army,
Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, the firm examined leadership doc-
trine and officer-development continua. For the Navy, possessing neither lead-
ership doctrine nor formal process, the researchers relied primarily on the most
recent version of the Navy Leadership Competency Model.33 The researchers
then expanded their study to the U.S. Joint Forces Command and Special Opera-
tions Command. Caliber Associates then looked for overlaps, correlated service
models and core values, and—this was the focus of the endeavor—identified
competencies that were distinctly joint, common to all services. The resulting
draft model was then refined in interviews with subject matter experts, who, re-
sponding to a standard interview protocol, made specific comments and recom-
mendations for improvement.34 The Caliber study, Identification of the
Competencies Required of Joint Force Leaders, was completed in February 2006
but has not been formally released or endorsed by the Joint Staff.
COMPETENCY MODELING
Competency modeling fits well with the military’s systematic approach to prob-
lem solving. By thoroughly examining the competencies required for any given
event, an analyst can, theoretically, design a system to produce them through
training and education. For the military, competency mapping supports a pre-
scriptive methodology for aligning education and training events with measur-
able results. But if there is value in defining competencies, there is a danger in
presuming that every nuance of a function can be reduced to a series of singular
descriptors, assigned to a training syllabus, and then mass-produced. Also, the
lack of a consistent definition of “competency” and the variety of terms and
descriptors mentioned above as used interchangeably with it suggest how
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problematic competency mapping would be as the primary driver in leadership
development.
The Vision for Joint Officer Development, as we have seen, speaks of “assessing
learning outcomes described by specific knowledge, skill, ability, and attitude,”
but it is difficult to see how methodology applicable to a specific skill would pro-
duce a desired attitude.35 In the Navy’s view, the new competency model applies
wholesale, across the service, regardless of rank, degree of authority, or level of
operation. “Leadership is leadership is leadership,” the thinking seems to
be—thus the competency model applies equally to every officer and every sailor,
all the time.36 Yet the Navy’s own historical use of competency models indicates
the contrary. The continuous, iterative review and updating of naval competen-
cies makes clear both the adaptive, evolutionary nature of leadership require-
ments and the difficulty of establishing an enduring, comprehensive list.
Computer modeling and learning technologies profess to make competency
mapping more reliable, measurable, and predictable; however, competencies
themselves represent only one approach to the development of leaders. It may be
more instructive to conduct a regressive review of naval competencies, identify-
ing enduring elements common to Navy culture. Relying on these core compe-
tencies, one might trace these core competencies through evolving models, in
the framework of then-current operational environments. Such a study would
likely validate enduring competencies and demonstrate the relationship be-
tween the value of competencies and a given situational context.
A 2004 article in the quarterly journal of the U.S. Army War College cautions,
“We should be very circumspect of our ability to identify an adequate, much less
complete, list of competencies applicable to a rapidly changing operational en-
vironment.”37 Its coauthors develop a thoughtful and sound argument against
sole reliance on competency modeling, aptly characterizing competency model-
ing as a measure of “single loop” learning and advocating instead “double loop”
learning within a “multiple lens strategy.”38
The argument for a multiple-lens strategy and against competency model-
ing illustrates a broader point—that elusiveness of a universally accepted
prescription for leadership or leader development. The sheer abundance and
variety of leadership theories point to the complexity of the subject. Defini-
tions of leadership and the means to develop it are so contentious because
leadership itself means different things, in different contexts, to different
people. Competency modeling identifies and maps desired end states but
does not point to the best methodology for cultivating the qualities they rep-
resent. Alone, competency modeling is inadequate to capture or teach the to-
tality of leadership. It is incumbent upon a profession in which everything
“starts and ends with leadership” to find a practical way to expose developing
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leaders to the full range of leadership resources available. A single solution is
not enough.
LEADERSHIP EDUCATION VERSUS EDUCATING LEADERS
There is a subtle difference between leadership education and educating leaders.
They are complementary, but they are not mutually inclusive. Leadership educa-
tion is a subordinate element of leadership development. Leadership education is
instruction in leadership theory, concepts, and models of action. It refers to
those elements of a leader’s development process designed and provided explic-
itly to inculcate knowledge in the domain of leadership-specific educational
material. The intent of this material is to give individuals an opportunity to ex-
amine and learn the various theories, models, concepts, and principles of leader-
ship and a comprehensive exposure to the enormous body of knowledge in the
field of leadership research. The objective of this education is to help leaders
evaluate their own styles, strengths, weaknesses, preferred situational ap-
proaches, etc., so they can develop their own highly personalized ways to exer-
cise the coveted art of leadership. Leadership education should be not
prescriptive but rather descriptive of the range and depth of material available to
help leaders realize their full potentials. Educating leaders, in contrast, includes
everything else. Together these endeavors arm individuals with the knowledge
and heuristics essential to leadership in unpredictable settings.
The Navy’s Center for Naval Leadership and the Industrial College of the
Armed Forces’ strategic leadership course are examples of leadership education.
Yet the difference between them in organizational approach is significant. In the
Navy’s vision of leadership development, leadership education is a stand-alone
process. In ICAF’s approach, leadership education is an integral part of a larger
effort to educate leaders through the joint officer development program and the
professional military education continuum. This is a fundamental tenet of Ma-
rine Corps, Air Force, and Army professional development continua. “The Ma-
rine Corps,” for example, “believes that it is critical to nest its leadership
development processes into its overall professional development continuum,
which, in turn, is nested in the institution’s mission, culture and core values.”39
THE CHALLENGE OF NAVY CULTURE
It might be argued that World War II was the single most significant crucible of
change for the U.S. Navy in its history. For the 150 years prior to World War II,
the Navy had been solidly fixed in a culture of sailors and ships at sea. However,
by the war’s close the future course of the Navy and naval culture had irrevers-
ibly changed. Battleships and surface gunnery engagements no longer repre-
sented the foundation of naval doctrine; aircraft carriers and aviation had
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emerged to challenge their dominance and tradition. The submarine force too
had become prominent, forming a triad of naval culture and power. At the same
time, advances in communication technology marked the beginning of a revo-
lution in maritime command and control. The close of the Second World War
marked for the Navy the end both of a myopic concept of independent opera-
tional command at sea and of a singular core competence of dominance on the
sea’s surface.
“A ship at sea is a distant world in herself and in consideration of the pro-
tracted and distant operations of the fleet units the Navy must place great power,
responsibility and trust in the hands of those leaders chosen for command. . . .
This is the most difficult and demanding assignment in the Navy.”40 These
words, redolent of a romanticized and somewhat antiquated notion of inde-
pendent command at sea, convey a cultural ethos still prevalent in today’s sur-
face community and still very much ingrained in the Navy’s subcultures. Over
the intervening decades, while the world evolved around it, the service has per-
petuated a uniquely naval culture anchored in the notion that commanders on,
above, or below the sea are bastions of independence and immune to the pre-
scriptions of doctrine. But all the while, technology and emergent rival subcul-
tures have been insidiously and permanently eroding this fundamental precept
of naval service.
The early years of the Cold War marked a subtle but profound shift, the be-
ginning of divergence from a cohesive culture based on the traditional role of
the surface combatant. That core competency now had to assimilate growing
distinctions among the surface, subsurface, and aviation communities. The en-
suing six decades entrenched these subcultures within the Navy; evolution in
and attendant demands of technology, in turn, divided subcultures into
microcultures. The submarine force fractured, to some extent, between fast at-
tack and ballistic missile forces. Aviation witnessed a proliferation of
“stovepipes”: fixed-wing aviation divided into patrol, support, and tactical plat-
forms, the latter splitting further into attack (bomber) and fighter communities;
similar divisions evolved in the helicopter community, where, like the
fixed-wing divisions, splits occurred largely along aircraft-platform lines.
Throughout the Cold War, the Navy as a whole fractured and splintered among
technical and tactical competencies. Each new community evolved its own lan-
guage, its own operating doctrine, and its own personnel management priori-
ties. Even in the surface community, whose culture remained largely intact, the
pressures and influence of emerging technology and the growing complexity of
warfighting systems, sensors, and communications brought significant change
to perceptions of command at sea.
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At the height of World War II, the Navy had been fully integrated in joint
campaigns, supporting combined-force warfare on two oceans. Before that, in
the lull between world wars, the Navy placed a premium on leadership education
and development. As a result, with rare exceptions, its senior leaders in the Sec-
ond World War were all graduates of the Naval War College. However, technol-
ogy and the bipolarity of the Cold War eroded service-college education.
Rapidly increasing operational demands forced an emphasis on tactical compe-
tency and reinforced the divisions among subcultures. The aviation, surface
warfare, and submarine communities looked increasingly inward as they strug-
gled to master the sophisticated hardware that now defined both the fleet’s capa-
bility and their own respective credibilities. Navy leadership supported and in
many cases advocated this fixation.
That the Navy maintained a forward-deployed posture throughout the Cold
War further exacerbated the drift from an operational focus and a unifying
ship-centric heritage. So paramount were the perceived demands of operating
advanced aircraft, complicated surface combatants, and nuclear propulsion sys-
tems that the Navy abdicated its responsibility to institutionalize formal officer
development and prepare its leadership to meet the joint challenges of the future
operational environment. So compelling were the Navy’s cultural proclivities
and operational tempo that not even the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department
of Defense Reorganization Act could compel it to look beyond its insular, single-
service boundaries. Despite that congressional mandate to engage fully in joint
officer development, a full twenty years later only 20 percent of the Navy’s flag
officers were graduates of a senior service-college resident course.41 That 80 per-
cent of the Navy’s current flag officers are not service-college graduates speaks
directly to the relative value the Navy places on education, on one hand, and op-
erational assignment, on the other.
THE NAVY’S ENDURING TRANSFORMATION
We are holding you [the Naval Aviation Enterprise] up as the poster
child for the way things ought to be done. We are encouraged by the
progress that you are making.
ADMIRAL VERN CLARK, MAY 2005
The Navy’s recent transformational commitment to institutionalizing an “en-
terprise” framework perpetuates and solidifies the cultural alignments of the
service’s warfighting communities.42 “Our Vision is to create management and
personnel development solutions for the 21st century Naval Aviation Enterprise
workforce—our Total Force.”43 These words, from Naval Aviation Vision 2020,
emphasize the point. The aviation community enterprise, hailed as a standard
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for other communities to emulate, is directing its efforts almost exclusively to-
ward personnel and equipment readiness. The technical and tactical demands of
aviation are so burdensome that this approach is easily justifiable. The personnel
training requirements are proportionately extensive. It is logical for community
enterprises to manage the training elements specific to their communities.
However, leadership and the development continuum required to cultivate it
are not community specific and should not be subordinated to the agendas of
service subcultures. For too long the Navy focused on missions and leadership in
the context of each of its communities’ parochial views. Now, reacting to joint
requirements, the Navy is in danger of neglecting the fundamental processes
necessary to develop leaders. Before the Navy can realize its ambition to create
joint leaders, it must achieve competence in developing fully qualified naval
leaders. This requires a dimension of intraservice competence not present in the
current force and not achievable under the current vision.
New naval officers today, upon completing accession programs, enter their
community enterprises, where for the next fifteen to twenty years they have no
opportunity to interact in institutional training or educational experiences with
other naval officers (aside from the select minority who attend the Naval War
College or Command Leadership School). Until they reach the rank of captain,
naval officers are largely defined by their tactical and technical competencies.
Certainly, the demands and priorities of the individual communities justify
placing a premium on leadership within the context of the warfighting system.
The core culture and competency of officers, the ones they are rewarded for cul-
tivating, are linked first to their communities, only secondarily to the Navy. The
2001 Executive Review of Navy Training recognized the challenge the Navy’s cul-
tural stovepipes:
Training problems are cumbersome to deal with due to fragmentation at the OPNAV
level. . . . [T]he Fleet CINC(s), CNET, and the SYSCOMs all own and operate com-
mands that conduct training in major Fleet concentration areas. For the most part,
these commands act as independent agencies, each using its resources to conduct
training in support of its own mission. Although these training facilities are seldom
fully utilized, the Navy rarely looks across the different commands to accomplish
training missions.44
Admiral Walt Doran, USN (Ret.), addressing a joint assembly of students at
the Naval War College in 2007, characterized the priorities facing junior and
field-grade (generally O-4 through O-6) officers: “At the tactical level, your re-
sponsibility is to learn your craft. If you are a naval officer, you are expected to
learn how to fight your ship or fight your aircraft or fight your sub. As an Air
Force officer, you must know how to fight your jet. As a Marine or Army Officer,
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you must know how to lead your troops.”45 Admiral Doran’s comments were in-
tended to comment on the pressures placed on officers to master the tactical
skills of their respective services. Yet his comments illustrate a powerful differ-
ence in service cultures and competencies. At the tactical level, Air Force and
Navy officers are focused almost exclusively on their machines; Marine and
Army officers are focused on leadership—the fundamental expectation is that
every officer is a leader of soldiers or Marines. The common measure of officers’
value to their institutions is their astuteness in wielding the instrument of lead-
ership to accomplish the mission. The common, unifying competency of the
ground forces revolves around the individual weapon system manifested in the
solider. Leadership is the cornerstone of execution.
The commitment to professional excellence as soldiers and Marines is evi-
denced in the extensive continuum of training and educational opportunities
conspicuously woven into each officer’s career. Further, an extensive leadership
development continuum is not a distinct training domain but the foundation of
each training and education opportunity. A fundamental and revealing differ-
ence between the Navy’s leadership development system and that of the Army,
Air Force, and Marines is the relative cultural emphasis on integrated leadership
and professional military education. The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force
have made PME and leadership education integral parts of their career tracks.
Their cultures and career models support mandatory, recurrent schoolhouse ex-
periences. In this way they not only foster leadership development along with
tactical military development but provide forums that integrate officers of all
communities and nurture service competency. In the Navy there is no parallel
institutional experience. Aviators, surface warriors, and submariners all keep to
their own unique career paths, their individual priorities tied to the technical
and tactical demands of their community enterprises. Outside the “luck of the
draw” of individual operational assignments, the first intraservice institutional
opportunity occurs only when naval officers are eligible for resident war college
seats; even then, only a handful are afforded the opportunity to attend.
EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND LEADERSHIP
Training and education are distinct aspects of officer development. They are not
mutually exclusive, nor are they synonymous. Education, integrated with train-
ing, experience, and self-development, forms the basis of the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff vision for officer development. These same four ingredients
are essential to the cultivation of leadership. The Navy acknowledges the intrin-
sic value of education but falls into the trap of attempting to quantify its return
on education investment, by applying methodology more appropriate to mea-
suring training objectives. The Officer Professional Military Education Policy
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clearly makes a distinction between education and training: “In its purest form,
education fosters breadth of view, diverse perspectives and critical analysis, ab-
stract reasoning, comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, and innovative
thinking. . . . This contrasts with training, which focuses on the instruction of
personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific functions and tasks.”46
Plainly described, training attempts to achieve a measurable skill, and educa-
tion seeks to mature a way of thinking. The Navy’s tradition of lumping training
and education organizations into the same command structure makes it diffi-
cult to distinguish the unique requirements and outcomes of each endeavor.
Similarly, the Navy’s repeated attempts to correct perceived deficiencies in its
training and education system focus on blended solutions. A principal aim of
the Navy’s “revolution in training” has been to identify the competencies associ-
ated with each job in the Navy in order to refine and systematically engineer
measurable training programs to produce readiness. Education too is viewed in
this vein. The Commander, Naval Education and Training Command, discuss-
ing the implications of the “revolution in training” for fleet readiness, has em-
phasized the significance of cost savings, related in terms of time to competency.
According to Vice Admiral J. Kevin Moran,
With the prevalent time-is-money mentality in the Navy, getting sailors back to their
posts quickly is a key goal of the educational initiative. This means a minimal
amount of time in our part of the organization. Time spent in a classroom comes out
of . . . the individual’s account. . . . That’s a bundle of money. If I reduce the time to
train, I save the Navy money and can return that money to “big” Navy to do other
things with. Over the five years of the defense plan, I owe the CNO $2.2 billion back
out of those individuals’ accounts.47
It is difficult to imagine the Navy’s new business enterprise leaders justifying
the intrinsic value of education in terms of the obligation to “return money to
‘big’ Navy” (that is, in effect, to the Navy’s operational forces). In a fiscally con-
strained environment, valuing education above weapon systems and opera-
tional training may appear even more difficult. This is perhaps part of the reason
the Navy has been remiss in filling service-college seats, including at its own Na-
val War College. Although recent statistics indicate that joint professional mili-
tary education opportunities are on the rise, they also paint a bleak picture of the
Navy’s success to date in PME generally: as of May 2007, only 48 percent of Navy
officers in pay grades O-5 and O-6 had completed JPME Phase I, and only 21
percent were JPME II qualified.48 At the same time, there is currently no mecha-
nism to track in-residence attendance at service colleges, and community sup-
port of attendance at the resident courses has been traditionally weak.
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The faculty at the Marine Corps University pointed out that the Navy’s unwillingness
to fill their seats at their sister Service PME schools with credible officers from their
operational line communities undermines the educational experience of all the stu-
dents. Not only do the Navy officers not attain the PME, but their fellow officers in
the other Services miss an opportunity to gain insight into naval warfare at sea, under
the sea and in the air.49
To distinguish the source of JPME, a naval officer’s records must be individually
screened for entries under “Service Schools Attended.” Aside from cumbersome
record reviews or culls of registrars’ records, there is no qualification
discriminator, no quick reference, to determine which officers studied in resi-
dence and which earned JPME credit through distance-learning programs.50
The challenge for the Navy Personnel Command is even starker when it comes
to leadership education. Despite CNO-directed “mandatory attendance” in the
Navy’s leadership training courses, the Center for Naval Leadership struggles to
fill its seats, and the number of line officers attending is abysmally low—though
the curriculum has been cut in half, in a patent attempt to boost attendance.51
Further, a call to the Officer Assignments branch at the Navy Personnel Com-
mand would likely reveal that few officer detailers are aware of the existence of a
formal requirement to send officers to CNL-taught courses, or even of the CNL
itself.52 Moreover, there is currently neither oversight of the Navy’s leadership
continuum nor a mechanism to track or compel attendance. In the current sys-
tem, each community is left to determine for itself the value and usefulness of
leadership education and training.
THE NAVY’S VISION OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
Admiral Mullen’s predecessor as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern
Clark, identified the elements of a PME continuum, and in so doing he estab-
lished the Navy’s fundamental paradigm of officer professional development:53
PME = NPME + JPME + Leadership + Advanced Education.
As we have seen, professional military education is the cumulative result of
service-specific education (NPME), joint education (JPME), leadership devel-
opment (education), and graduate-level education. However, the Navy’s latest
model for PME development fails to reflect these fundamentals.
The Navy’s PME continuum is designed to achieve the goals established in the
CNO’s Guidance and the Vision for Joint Officer Development. According to Rear
Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, President of the Naval War College and executive agent
of the Navy’s PME continuum, “The Navy’s PME Continuum provides a succes-
sion of educational opportunities designed to prepare each individual for chal-
lenges at the tactical, operational, and then strategic levels of war. . . . The
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continuum’s key elements of PME are leadership, professionalism, military studies
including naval and joint warfare, and national, maritime, and global security.”54
Admiral Mullen expects the Navy to take the lead in development of joint leaders.
Accordingly, “the Navy will do so for its officers and senior enlisted through a mix of
Joint and Navy-specific Professional Military Education (PME), Joint and naval ex-
perience, and Joint and naval individual training. PME is at the heart of this process;
the schoolhouses are lynchpin to producing the effects that I seek.”55 However, when we
examine the Navy’s PME Continuum, we find that the foundational element of
Navy professional military training, “Primary PME,” is not tied to a schoolhouse
but rather is relegated to distance learning, through the Internet. Moreover,
there is no mechanism for leadership education or training. The Navy’s model
speaks to the joint education requirements established in the OPMEP but falls
well short of the intent of fully developing naval leaders.
RECURRING FAILURE TO ALIGN TRAINING AND EDUCATION
INSTITUTIONS
In October 2000, the formal Executive Review of Navy Training convened to ex-
amine the Navy’s training program—specifically, to align organizational struc-
ture more closely, incorporate best practices and technology used in the civil
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sector, and recommend a continuum based on lifelong learning and career pro-
fessional development.56 Many of the recommendations included in its report,
Revolution in Training: Executive Review of Navy Training, are identical to those
made almost a decade earlier by the Zero-Based Training and Education Review.
Completed in 1993, the Zero-Based Review argued that a central problem with
leadership training was a lack of standardization or central control, whereby in-
dividual communities were being allowed to define their own priorities and
methods for providing leadership training.57 Among its findings were the fol-
lowing references to the leadership continuum:
• A low proportion (38 percent) of Navy officers receiving NAVLEAD
(leadership) training, primarily surface and submarine officers at the
division- and department-head levels
• A nonsequential, nonprogressive, and disjointed education and training
continuum, resulting from differing perceptions about leadership
requirements across communities
• Absence of a single authority responsible for program management,
resources, and curriculum control
• Absence of an assessment system for individual/curriculum effectiveness
• Lack of subject-matter experts for the development of curriculum.58
Not only was the continuum inadequate, but the staffing of its institutional
elements reflected the low value assigned to education. Nonetheless, and despite
these findings and the Revolution in Training report, the same complaints and
problems are clearly evident today. In fact, according to Professor Richard Suttie
of the Naval War College, the Navy has been the beneficiary of nearly a hundred
such reviews since 1919, and 80 percent of their recommendations for corrective
action have been the same.59 The repetitiveness of these findings and the persis-
tence of the need for such reviews, each followed by a brief eruption of action,
indicates a doctrinal failure of the Navy’s system. The service’s approach has not
been adequately focused on identifying an enduring continuum.
THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE
A fundamental but missing ingredient is naval doctrine. It is a running joke in
the halls of the Naval War College that what little doctrine the Navy has it ig-
nores in favor of operational flexibility. The Navy does in fact have formal doc-
trinal manuals (known, straightforwardly, as Naval Doctrine Publications), a
series running from NDP 1, Naval Warfare, through NDP 6, Naval Command
and Control. However, these documents have not been updated since they were
first published over a decade ago. It is significant that NDP 3, Naval Operations,
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has yet to be published and that there is no doctrine addressing naval leadership
at all.
Moreover, even the formal naval doctrine that physically exists fails to achieve
the purpose declared in its own pages: “The success of an organized military
force is associated directly with the validity of its doctrine. Doctrine is the start-
ing point from which we develop solutions and options. . . . Doctrine is concep-
tual—a shared way of thinking. . . . To be useful, doctrine must be uniformly
known and understood.”60 There is no mechanism, formal or informal, to en-
sure that naval doctrine is known or understood. Unlike those of the other ser-
vices, which place a premium on indoctrinating members on the value and
content of doctrine, naval tradition eschews doctrine.
Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, Leadership and Force Development, care-
fully articulates the Air Force’s vision and priorities for leadership development.
The Chief of Staff makes clear in his foreword, “This document is the Air Force
statement of leadership principles and force development, enabled by education
and training, providing a framework for action ensuring our Airmen can be-
come effective leaders.”61 Similarly, in Marine Corps Warfare Publication 6-11,
Leading Marines, the first sentences of the Commandant’s foreword are, “The
most important responsibility in our Corps is leading Marines. If we expect Ma-
rines to lead and if we expect Marines to follow, we must provide the education
of the heart and of the mind to win on the battlefield and in the barracks, in war
and in peace.”62 For its part, Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership: Competent,
Confident, and Agile, is the Army’s “keystone field manual on leadership. It es-
tablishes leadership doctrine and fundamental principles for all officers. . . .
Leaders must be committed to lifelong learning to remain relevant and ready
during a career of service to the Nation.”63
These leadership doctrines establish the cornerstones of their respective ser-
vices’ entire concepts of leadership and leader development. Each formally rec-
ognizes the interdependent and essential ingredients of education and training.
In view of the considerable role doctrine has played in establishing and support-
ing the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force officer development continua, it is
indefensible that the Navy’s process continues to languish without a similar
guiding document. The Navy is the only service without leadership doctrine.
THE NAVY’S CURRENT LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT
COMPENDIUM
The Navy’s leadership-development philosophy is rooted in cultivation of lead-
ership competency through operational experience, anchored solidly in a fun-
damental cultural bias toward “on-the-job training.” As clearly evidenced in
survey data collected by the Naval War College’s Stockdale Group, experience
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and observation of others are the two most important factors in learning naval
leadership.64 This reliance on experiential leadership development, however, has
impeded commitment to institutionalized, dedicated leadership training and
education. For nearly a hundred years, the Navy has struggled to define its
method of formal leadership development meaningfully. A relatively recent at-
tempt, General Order 21 of 1958, laid down a unifying definition of naval lead-
ership and ordered commanding officers to inculcate leadership training in
their commands.65 This model of leadership development is further endorsed in
the classic commanding officer’s “bible,” Command at Sea. Under the heading of
“Leadership Training,” commanding officers are admonished to spearhead the
leadership training of their officers. The U.S. Naval Academy, they are told, is a
primary resource of leadership materials: “All USNA graduates have had exten-
sive grounding in leadership and can be used as instructors.”66 It further goes on
to describe seven readily identifiable categories (competencies) of leadership:
“Personal Characteristics, Moral Leadership, Gentlemanly Conduct, Personal
Relations with Seniors, Personal Relations with Juniors, Technique of Counsel-
ing, the Role of the Officer in Training.”67 Throughout, and consistent with the
traditional construct of the sea service, responsibility for officer leadership de-
velopment rests solely with the ship’s commanding officer.
The early 1970s witnessed the creation of a formal two-week course titled
Leadership Management Training. In 1974, Admiral Holloway, as Chief of Na-
val Operations, directed a formal review of all leadership training. Its recom-
mendations included a serious need for a system of leadership training. To
create one, the Navy solicited input from several civilian contractors, ultimately
selecting the competency-based approach proposed by McBer and Company.
McBer’s system built on a series of leadership courses, which evolved into the
Navy’s Leadership and Management Education Training program, already men-
tioned, in 1979.68 The LMET curriculum was initially structured around sixteen
leadership competencies grouped into five “skill areas.” A subsequent study con-
ducted by McBer distilled the model to thirteen core competencies organized in
three subareas: People, Relationships, and Activities.69 The courses were directed
variously at commanding officers, executive officers, department heads, divi-
sion officers, chief petty officers, and senior petty officers.70 The system was
transformed again in the early 1990s, with the addition of a one-week
NAVLEAD course.
In 1994, the Navy concluded another comprehensive review of the
LMET/NAVLEAD process and issued a press release announcing the establish-
ment of a formal continuum directed at the cultivation of leadership at every
level of the Navy, from entry through the grade of admiral:
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The Navy has recently approved the development and resourcing of a Navy Leader-
ship Education and Training Continuum which will provide sailors with a systematic
program of leadership training throughout their careers. The continuum . . . is de-
signed to provide formal, consistent and progressive training to all Navy members at
key points in their careers. Its goal is to prepare Navy leaders for the future by mak-
ing leadership training a continuous process.71
In a further demonstration of renewed commitment to a formal, institution-
alized process of leadership development, in 1997, CNO required formal leader-
ship training for all hands: “Attendance and successful completion of the
appropriate leadership training course (LTC) is MANDATORY for all hands at spe-
cific career milestones. Leadership training begins at accession training . . . and
continues with LTC attendance and other professional/military training
throughout a Sailor’s career.”72 The CNO’s order was a critical link between the
Navy’s new vision of a leadership continuum and its execution. One of its ulti-
mate results was creation of the Center for Naval Leadership, the Navy’s “center
of excellence” for leadership development.
Today, the CNL’s catalogue of leadership development courses lists six
officer-development courses. To date, however, only two are fully devel-
oped and being taught to the fleet at the CNL’s twenty-three sites. Moreover,
a decade after the establishment of a formal continuum and an infrastructure
to support it, little progress has been made in solidifying the process by
which personnel are assigned to attend. The Navy’s organizational hierarchy
further complicates implementation; in the absence of doctrine, or a gov-
erning manpower vision, embracing education, training, experience, and
self-development, there is no core continuum to guide naval leadership de-
velopment in an officer’s career. Each element in the current organization is
a snapshot, designed to provide just-in-time education in functional roles
about to be assumed.
There is in fact a glaring lack of a formal, institutionalized, and linked contin-
uum to cultivate leadership from accession through flag. The array of officer de-
velopment institutions existing today resembles a child’s building blocks strewn
across the playroom floor:
• Accessions: U.S. Naval Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps, Officer
Training Command
• Leadership training: Center for Naval Leadership
• PME: Naval War College (College of Command and Staff, College of Naval
Warfare)
• Graduate education: Naval Postgraduate School
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• Flag development: Executive Learning Officer/Flag University, in addition
to CAPSTONE, KEYSTONE, PINNACLE, and the Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander course
• Web-based training and education: Navy Knowledge Online (NKO),
including Primary PME.
This list does not include the myriad of technical schools and warfare-community
centers of excellence dedicated to the cultivation of tactical acumen. There are im-
plied relationships between many of the individual elements; however, the orga-
nizations listed do not fit into a structured model of officer development. They
are not aligned vertically or horizontally to integrate or coordinate curriculums.
Neither is there any alignment of funding, manpower resources, program man-
agement, or curriculum development, or, most importantly, any vehicle to direct
an officer’s path through the developmental process or reward progress. For ex-
ample, the Naval Education and Training Command, despite its title, does not
own the Navy’s three vanguard educational institutions—the Naval Academy,
Naval War College, and Naval Postgraduate School.
The services are accountable for rewarding excellence in achievement of pro-
fessional military education competencies; accordingly, they must be able to
track and assess each officer’s progression through the development process.
The Navy lacks the capability to do so. More broadly, its current process, includ-
ing Admiral Mullen’s vision for a PME continuum, cannot achieve the desired
outcomes. Unless the appropriate changes are effected, the Navy’s program will
undoubtedly continue to spiral in recurring cycles of Review, Recommend, Re-
act, Review, Recommend—and Repeat.
NAVY OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
In the spring of 1919, Captain (later Fleet Admiral) Ernest King was ordered to
Annapolis to reopen the Naval Postgraduate School. In August the following
year, the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings published “Report and Recommenda-
tions of a Board Appointed by the Bureau of Navigation, Regarding the Instruc-
tion and Training of Line Officers,” coauthored by King and two of his peers,
Captains Dudley Knox and W. S. Pye.73 The report of this group, commonly
known as the Knox-King-Pye Board, held that, it being “impractical and impos-
sible to equip an officer for the whole period of his Service with a working
knowledge of a multiplicity of arts, industries, and sciences, whose advance is
continuous and progressive, it [thus] becomes necessary to provide for his fur-
ther instruction and training at recurring periods.”74 The report defined the key
phases of a naval officer’s career as:
Inferior subordinate—division officer
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Superior subordinate—head of department
Commanding officer—command of a single ship
Flag officer—command of group of ships.75
Based on these phases, the board recommended four periods of officer instruc-
tion, beginning with the Naval Academy and ending with the Senior War Col-
lege at the rank of captain. Between these extremes the report recommended the
creation of a one-year “General Line Course” before accession to the “Superior
subordinate” phase, and establishment of a Junior War College to prepare lieu-
tenant commanders for command.76 The report went on to propose how these
courses might be best integrated into an officer’s career progression as a contin-
uum of learning and education.
These recommendations led to the establishment of the Junior War College
in 1923 and the General Line Course in 1927. The Knox-King-Pye group of 1919
was the first of the seventy-seven significant boards, task forces, and panels con-
vened that, as we have seen, the Navy has set to reexamine its officer develop-
ment and education system. The thrust of their cumulative recommendations
and conclusions is a formal continuum of professional military education,
aligned under an executive agent with both the power and resources to supervise
execution, compel compliance, and ensure enduring institutionalization within
Navy culture. Yet despite the best efforts of so many flag officers, PhD’s, and paid
consultants, and even Congress, the Navy’s PME continuum today is less credi-
ble and less meaningful than it was over three-quarters of a century ago.
MPTE ALIGNMENT
The CNO’s 2006 guidance announced the alignment and consolidation of man-
power, personnel, training, and education (MPTE) under the leadership of the
Navy’s Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral John Harvey. The MPTE business
strategy is to anticipate the fleet’s needs, identifying required personnel capabil-
ities and applying capabilities in an “agile, cost-effective manner.”77 As the head
of the Navy’s “MPTE Domain,” Vice Admiral Harvey is responsible for aligning
and integrating all Navy personnel management, training, and education pro-
grams, from recruiting through retirement. His strategy focuses prominently on
developing twenty-first-century leaders; though there is no mention of a strat-
egy for leadership development, one of its critical elements is formulation of a
“Navy Education Strategy.” Vice Admiral Harvey testified before Congress in
February 2007 that the Navy had studied career progression to lay the founda-
tion for the education strategy and that there would be a another study later in
2007.78
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According to MPTE’s “Strategic Vision and Priorities Brief,” the planned or-
ganizational architecture will emphasize measurable competency outcomes and
training measures of performance:
1.2 Competency Management. Define, describe and manage Navy’s work and
workforce by the observable, measurable pattern of knowledge, skills, abilities, be-
haviors and other characteristics an individual needs to perform successfully. . . .
4.3 Domain Performance Management. Be a performance-based organization that sets
clear expectations against measurable objectives, enables performance, institutes ac-
countability and rewards success.79
There is also a call for an “Education Strategy and Policy Alignment”; however,
there is no specific tasking or direction involving the Navy’s current educational
institutions. In any case, significant action is in abeyance pending the “exten-
sive data gathering, model building, and data analysis” involved in the planned
follow-on study.80
According to Vice Admiral Harvey, the priorities and focus areas identified in
CNP’s Guidance 2007 are aligned with the CNO’s guidance, “with special em-
phasis on taking ownership of CNO’s priority to Develop 21st Century Lead-
ers.”81 Despite this “special emphasis,” there is no obvious effort in or reference to
formal leadership development.82 The Navy’s leadership development contin-
uum is not among CNP’s six strategic goals, nor is it a task assigned in the MPTE
initiatives and objectives framework.
NECESSITY FOR CHANGE: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
The Navy acknowledges that it must change in order to adapt to the demands of
the twenty-first century. Nine major studies of the Navy’s training establishment
have generated five major reorganizations since 1971.83 The language in the most
recent comprehensive review, Revolution in Training, is evidence that the Navy
fully understands the comprehensive nature of the change now required. Further,
the report indicates, the Navy fully appreciates the necessary dynamics in organi-
zational and cultural change. Nonetheless, much of Revolution in Training is
merely a restatement of preceding reports.
As we have seen, the other services already have integrated processes to achieve
the goals the Navy still seeks. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps have docu-
ments that govern their leadership development paradigms, as well as mature
mechanisms to develop service competent, joint-qualified officers. There are im-
portant differences in the organizations and cultures, but the confluence of com-
petency rankings revealed in the Stockdale survey instrument clearly indicates
that leadership at the operational level is not service-centric. If the point is to pro-
duce the most capable operational leaders, perhaps the Navy should examine and
incorporate the best practices of its peers.
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Leadership Doctrine
The Navy must determine a path for leadership development, one that includes
leadership training and education, joint professional military education, and
Navy professional military education. Navy leadership and PME must be de-
fined in terms broader than the typically myopic focus of the “enterprises.”
Leadership development and the Navy’s education priorities must be articulated
in terms of Navy leadership development and not that of aviation, surface war-
fare, submarines, or the numerous other community associations. In the ab-
sence of leadership doctrine, each enterprise is left to chart its own course, set its
own career priorities and milestones, and establish its own concept of officer de-
velopment. The insular nature of each community dilutes the strength of the na-
val service as a whole. Naval leadership doctrine must be written to establish a
leadership development and education continuum that complements, but is not
subordinate to, the tactical training demands of the individual communities.
A General Line Officer Course
The current strategy to implement Primary PME through a seventy-hour
distance-learning, Web-based protocol is inadequate to equip naval officers for
the twenty-first century. As a fundamental building block of the CJCS Vision for
Joint Officer Development, Primary PME must be the bedrock of both leadership
and service competence. The JOD and the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
rely on the services’ ability to provide fully qualified colonels and captains. The
Navy has established institutional competence standards for naval officers only
within community specialties or subspecialties. It has yet, therefore, to perceive
intraservice competence as an essential stepping-stone to interservice compe-
tence—that is, to jointness.
At the same time, the Navy must address its largely defunct leadership devel-
opment continuum. To recall the words of Rear Admiral Shuford, “The contin-
uum’s key elements of PME are leadership, professionalism, military studies.”
The Navy now has an opportunity to integrate naval military education and
leadership-development courses into a comprehensive system of professional
development; such integration is an essential strength of leadership develop-
ment programs of the other services. Further, by bringing together officers from
across stovepipe boundaries in an academic environment, the Navy would be
better able to effect the essential cultural changes identified in the Revolution in
Training report.
The simple issuance of leadership doctrine is insufficient. The Navy rou-
tinely promulgates doctrinal papers—Naval Operating Concept for Joint Oper-
ations, . . . From the Sea, Forward . . . from the Sea, and Naval Operations Concept
2006 are all examples—but there is no adequate system to institutionalize such
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visions in the service culture. A resident General Line Officer’s course, imple-
mented as Primary PME, would afford officers a naval perspective, uncon-
strained by community or enterprise. It would inculcate cultural change, align
priorities, and develop leaders who are naval officers in the fullest sense, pre-
pared for the challenges and demands of joint service. A new paradigm is re-
quired to reestablish common naval culture; resident PME supports that
paradigm.
A Navy Education Command
Much effort has been expended to align the Navy’s disparate education pro-
grams, predicated on formulation of a coherent education strategy, alignment of
educational organizations, empowerment of an education enterprise, and as-
signment of a single cognizant executive agent. Ignoring the recurrent recom-
mendations, the Navy’s MPTE consolidation forces educational programs and
institutions to compete with manpower, personnel, and training priorities. For-
mal command relationships, resource allocations, and the roles and responsibil-
ities of individual educational institutions remain unresolved. In this morass,
the Center for Naval Leadership, the executive agent for leadership education
and training, is left to fend for itself.
The Navy recognizes education as a strategic investment, but if it is to realize a
return, it must accept that dividends realized from education cannot be assessed
against the metrics used for training. To achieve a meaningful transformation
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and the success that has escaped previous restructuring attempts, the Navy must
establish a “Navy Education Enterprise” on a par with the warfare enterprises.84
The Education Command/Marine Corps University has already achieved this
standing within the Marine Corps. Advanced education, Marine Corps PME,
JPME, and leadership development are all aligned, resourced, and empowered
within its architecture. Its mission statement directly reflects the Navy’s own
need—a command that would “develop, deliver, and evaluate professional mili-
tary education and training through resident and distance education programs to
prepare leaders to meet the challenges of the national security environment.”85
EVERYTHING STARTS AND ENDS WITH LEADERSHIP
As the youth progresses onward to mature manhood, he reaps a harvest
from experience, he gleans much knowledge from his studies, he learns
concisely what the laws of the seaman require, and the rules of the art
of war demand. . . . But who is there to tell him that toward the end of
your career you cannot pick up new tools and use them with the dexter-
ity of the expert unless you have spent a lifetime with them, tested the
temper of their steel, and made them a part of your life’s equipment
REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM PRATT, LEADERSHIP
In 1934, when Rear Admiral Pratt published these thoughts in the Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings, the Navy’s leadership development envisioned the four phases
of an officer’s career that had been listed in the Knox-King-Pye report of 1919.
Accordingly, the Navy recognized the requirement to prepare its officers in their
professional growth with respect to leadership and professional military educa-
tion at each of these critical stages. There have been tremendous contextual
changes since Rear Admiral Pratt’s article, but the same four stages of officer de-
velopment remain central to the Navy’s continuum of PME. The Navy PME
model institutionalized between the world wars has served the Navy and the na-
tion very well indeed, and it is congruent with the Vision for Joint Officer Devel-
opment, written three generations later.
The current focus on operational leadership and operational competencies is
appropriate, then, but only if the system of officer development it serves is other-
wise robust. But is it? On the cover of the 21 May 2007 Navy Times, above (and
overshadowing) a photograph of the Navy’s prospective fifth concurrently serv-
ing combatant commander, was an ominous “teaser”—“4 COs Fired in 4
Weeks.”86 By the following Monday morning, two more commanding officers
had been relieved.87
There is a leadership crisis in the Navy, but it is not at the operational level.
The real crisis exists at the tactical level, and it is a consequence of a misaligned,
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fragmented, and marginalized system of officer professional development. The
Navy’s recent attempts to transform officer development from the top down
have fallen well short. The Navy should direct its best efforts to institutionalize a
leadership and professional development continuum that focuses on the bulk of
its officer corps, not only the cohorts well into their careers. If “everything starts
and ends with leadership,” the Navy’s paradigm of leadership cultivation must
start at the beginning.
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ADMIRAL RICHARD G. COLBERT
Pioneer in Building Global Maritime Partnerships
John B. Hattendorf
Most people who serve in navies or devote their days to writing and thinkingabout naval power take almost for granted the concept that navies are an ex-
pression of national power and therefore, in modern terminology, reinforce na-
tionalism. We have become almost hypnotized by the idea that there is a
continuum from national policy to naval strategy and tactics. Indeed, that is one
powerful thought that lies at the foundation of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s writings
and Sir Julian Corbett’s analysis. Yet it is not the only way to view the matter.
Mahan and William S. Sims in the U.S. Navy of the early twentieth century had
thought about possibilities for an Anglo-American
maritime alliance. But there is an even older thought:
the idea that there is an essential commonality among
those who go down to the sea in ships. Richard Colbert
has been one of a very few senior admirals in the U.S.
Navy to champion this other view. At the first Interna-
tional Seapower Symposium, in 1969, an occasion that
brought together for the first time many heads of
free-world navies, Colbert outlined his own view:
The experience of this conference has strongly confirmed
what all of us already knew by instinct and experience:
that the common aspects of so many of the problems we
each face in operating at sea creates a strong fraternal
bond. This unites all of us in blue suits who share similar
professional concerns.
Professor Hattendorf, chairman of the Naval War Col-
lege’s Maritime History Department, has served since
1984 as the College’s Ernest J. King Professor of Mari-
time History. He earned his master’s degree in history
from Brown University in 1971 and his doctorate in war
history from the University of Oxford in 1979. From
1988 to 2003 he directed the Advanced Research De-
partment in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. He
is the author of numerous articles and author, coauthor,
editor, or coeditor of forty books on maritime history,
including The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime
Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (2004); U.S.
Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents,
Newport Paper 27 (2006); U.S. Naval Strategy in the
1970s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 30
(2007); and the prizewinning Oxford Encyclopedia of
Maritime History (2007).
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We recognize that there are political problems and interests which sometimes limit
our co-operation. But it is equally clear that the broad interests of the world commu-
nity we serve are enhanced by bringing our common perspective to bear on common
problems. Much can be done on a Navy-to-Navy basis.1
An acquaintance of Colbert’s in the Italian Navy defined the concept even
more sharply when he wrote, “Probably the underlying philosophy lies in the
idea of considering navies of the world as a social system to a degree separated or
divorced from the states they defend.”2 In other words, it is possible to discern a
kind of global brotherhood of naval officers, indoctrinated with a concept of in-
ternational naval cooperation and nurtured by close, personal relations.
In a sense it seems an idealistic concept, founded on a belief in peace and
friendship on a global scale that should be the basis for all human relations.3 Yet
at the same time, Colbert’s notion can be viewed as a realistic, pragmatic strategy
for the free world as the United States and its allies faced Soviet naval power.4 As
some of his contemporaries noted, Colbert was not a theoretician given to work-
ing out new concepts in abstract form, but once someone else had formed a con-
cept, he was superb at developing it further and bringing it to fruition.5 It is in
this sense that Colbert was accurately described in an honorary degree citation
as “Sailor-Statesman of the Navy, creator, innovator, educator.”6
In the thirty-six years of his naval career, Colbert slowly but increasingly be-
came interested in concepts and ideas relating to international naval coopera-
tion. By the time of his death in 1973 he had reached the rank of full admiral and
had truly earned the title that Admiral Elmo Zumwalt gave him: “Mr. Interna-
tional Navy.”7
EARLY CAREER
Colbert came from an unusual family background. He was born in Brownsville,
Pennsylvania, on 12 February 1915, the son of Charles F. Colbert, Jr., and Mary
Louis Benford Colbert. His father, a prominent leader in the coke, coal, and alloy
business, was president of the Pittsburgh Metallurgical Company. Colbert at-
tended Shady Side Academy, an established college preparatory school in Pitts-
burgh. During his years there he developed a passionate desire to become a naval
officer, despite his father’s fond hope that he would join the family business.
Young Colbert decided to test out his desire and, with his father’s help, obtained
a berth on board the steamship Robert Luckenbach for the summer of 1931, on a
voyage from New York to Seattle and back via the Panama Canal. It was an
eventful trip that gave Colbert the experience of a hurricane and of hard work
at sea. At the end of it, having firmly established his love for ships and the sea,
the sixteen-year-old boy wrote in his diary, “I can honestly say I have never
enjoyed a summer as much as this one.”8
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After proving himself at sea, the next hurdle was to obtain an appointment to
the Naval Academy following his graduation from school in June 1933. It was no
easy task. Starting more than a year in advance, his father began writing letters to
friends, business associates, local politicians, and his congressman asking their
help. Disappointingly, they all replied that no appointments were available that
had not already been promised to other, equally good candidates.9 Finally, in
desperation, a friend of the family and the chancellor of Syracuse University,
Charles W. Flint, wrote to President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt asking his assis-
tance. Roosevelt gave Flint the formula that eventually won the boy his
commission.
“The only chance for young Colbert,” Roosevelt wrote, “is to find some other
Congressman or Senator who has a vacancy and who would be willing to have
him move into the district or state in which the vacancy exists for the purpose of
establishing a residence there, even though it be a temporary one.”10 In the end,
Colbert did not have to look too far afield. Congressman Harry A. Estrep of
Pennsylvania’s Thirty-fifth District appointed Colbert to the U.S. Naval Acad-
emy in the class of 1937. This early incident is illuminating because it reveals the
Colbert family’s ease in approaching influential people, a skill that Richard
Colbert often used later in life.
Colbert was a Naval Academy midshipman from 1933 to 1937; his class
started with 440 and graduated 331. On graduation, he stood only 247 in the
class. He was neither a great scholar nor an athlete, but he clearly stood out as a
leader and as someone well trained in the social graces. He commanded the 3rd
Battalion of midshipmen in the first third of his senior year and again for the fi-
nal third of the year, when the best and most successful leaders of the class were
chosen. Throughout his academy years he was busy in extracurricular activities,
particularly social ones. On one occasion during the Midshipman’s Practice
Cruise in 1936, Colbert was selected from among the other midshipmen on
board the flagship USS Arkansas to receive distinguished civilian guests. “I seem
to be getting a name for being a Majordomo,” he wrote to his father.11 Indeed, he
served on the hop committee and the Christmas card committee, was codirector
of the musical clubs show, and finally, served as chairman of the most important
social event of his four years at Annapolis, the Ring Dance.12 Those experiences
and social training helped Colbert develop his approach and style, so important
later in his life.
While social events were prominent, one can find even in his midshipman
days the first traces of his interest in foreign affairs.13 He reflected this in a speech
he prepared for the academy’s public-speaking group, the Quarterdeck Society,
in January 1935. The prizewinning speech, entitled “The War Peril,” reflected for
the first time Colbert’s appreciation of foreign opinion. In his speech, he
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declared that there was one great overwhelming fear in Europe, the fear of a war
that, no matter where it started, would spread and destroy the Western world.
“America cannot afford to be indifferent to this universal opinion of Europe,”
Colbert concluded.14 It was a thought that echoed throughout his career.
Upon graduation from Annapolis in June 1937, Colbert went to his first sea
assignment, the commissioning crew of the new aircraft carrier USS Yorktown.
In 1939, he was reassigned, this time to the Asiatic Fleet, where he received or-
ders to the flush-deck four-piper USS Barker. Colbert served in Barker for five
years, rising from junior ensign to lieutenant commander and commanding of-
ficer. The ship saw duty in Southeast Asian and Australian waters as well as es-
cort duty in the Atlantic and as part of the carrier USS Core’s successful
hunter-killer group. His years in Barker brought him the first experience of co-
operation with other navies. In early 1942, Barker was one of the ships in
ABDA-FLOAT (American-British-Dutch-Australian), the Allied naval com-
mand under Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN, and later under Vice-Admiral C. E. L.
Helfrich, Royal Netherlands Navy. Barker served in the striking force along with
British, Dutch, and Australian ships in the unsuccessful attempts to intercept the
Japanese invasion fleet off Bali and Bangka Island in February 1942. The experi-
ence of those actions impressed Colbert, who was then the ship’s communica-
tions officer. Despite the current view of historians who see the Java Sea
campaign as a mismanaged affair, Colbert often discussed with his colleagues
how relatively smoothly he believed the ship-to-ship communications between
ships of different navies had functioned in that critical situation.15
Despite the defeat of the ABDA command, Colbert’s memory of his experi-
ence stayed with him and convinced him not only of the practicality of multina-
tional forces but also of the real advantage that multinational arrangements had
for securing the seas. Looking back in 1966, he argued against those who wished
to replace NATO with a series of bilateral treaties, saying that such treaties had
not worked in “slow-motion” wars such as the Second World War. They could
not be responsive to the complex, fast-moving events that could lead to nuclear
war. Thinking of the events leading up to the Second World War naval engage-
ments in the Dutch East Indies, Colbert commented that those were “desperate
times, and I saw this lesson first hand. It was a bitter lesson.”16 Through that ex-
perience, Colbert came to believe that there was greater potential for success
through the combined efforts of many nations than through following only the
individual interests of single nations.
From Barker, Colbert went on to command the destroyer Meade in both the
Atlantic and the Pacific, remaining in command until the end of the war. Pro-
moted to commander, Colbert was assigned after the war to the Bureau of Naval
Personnel, where he worked on plans for the postwar naval reserve. During that
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period, he also served as a social aide in the Truman White House. He kept up his
interest in foreign affairs through membership in the United Nations Club, but
in these years he had not settled down fully to concentrate on international
issues.
MATURATION OF A CONCEPT
The real turning point in Colbert’s career came in 1948, when he was selected as
aide and flag secretary to Admiral Richard L. Conolly, USN, Commander in
Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, based in London.
Commenting on his new orders, Colbert told a friend, “Am not sure whether I
like it or not. I guess I will find out.”17 He did like it, and Conolly’s ideas and ap-
proach came to have a marked influence on Colbert.
Conolly was a superb negotiator, and Colbert accompanied him in meetings
with naval leaders in most of the Western European and Mediterranean nations
and learned much from the way Conolly handled problems and dealt with other
leaders. One incident in particular seemed to summarize Conolly’s approach
and influenced Colbert’s way of thinking. During a cruise in the Mediterranean
on board his flagship in 1949, USS Columbus, Conolly arranged a tabletop war
game in which he posed the problem of an allied naval command in the Mediter-
ranean; it was one of the first steps in the arduous process of creating what
would become the NATO Mediterranean naval command. In order to examine
carefully the issue of whether the command headquarters should be afloat or
ashore and what forces should participate, Conolly gathered senior officers from
a number of countries. Each cooperated but clearly showed his national bias.
Conolly finished the exercise without solutions but made all who participated
feel that they were part of a team dealing with a common problem.18 That was a
theme basic to Richard Colbert’s way of thinking.
By all accounts, Colbert’s association with Conolly provided the basic in-
sight upon which Colbert built his later work. At the same time, there was a
parallel and personal development that helped to shape his international
outlook further. At a New Year’s ball in 1949, Colbert met Prudence Ann
Robertson, daughter of E. J. Robertson, the managing director of Lord
Beaverbrook’s newspapers the London Daily Express, the Evening Standard,
and two Scottish newspapers. A Canadian who had gone to live in London af-
ter the First World War, E. J. Robertson nurtured Colbert’s instinctive feeling
for international cooperation as the most viable means of achieving world
peace, and Colbert returned his interest with admiration and devotion. At
the end of Colbert’s tour of duty in London, he and Prudence Robertson were
married at St. Paul’s Church, Knightsbridge. Throughout their married life,
Colbert felt that England was his second home; at the same time, he learned
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from his wife how to be sensitive to differences in points of view between Eu-
ropeans and North Americans.19
COLBERT IN WASHINGTON
Leaving England in December 1950, Colbert accompanied Admiral Conolly to
his new position as President of the Naval War College, then Colbert moved on
to his own new assignment in the political-military affairs division of the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Shortly after Colbert’s arrival, the division received a new director, Rear Ad-
miral Bernard L. Austin. Colbert obviously liked the work in his new assignment
under Austin, much of which was dealing with foreign issues and with people of
other nationalities.20 During this period Admiral Austin became concerned with
the problem of providing instruction for naval officers from nations who
wanted training in the United States. There had already been a move to put ser-
vice education on a more systematized basis through the establishment of the
NATO Defense College in Paris, but this was not sufficient to meet all the de-
mand. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, there were many requests made to the
U.S. Navy for use of its service schools, but no regularized arrangements had
been made. In light of this, Austin directed Colbert to make a staff study of the
best way in which a course could be developed for foreign naval officers.21 This
work was the seed from which much would grow later in Colbert’s career.
While Colbert was at work on this and other projects, he came to the atten-
tion of Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. Sherman selected
Colbert to become his aide later in the year, undoubtedly on Admiral Conolly’s
recommendation. Before that could become a permanent assignment, however,
Sherman needed Colbert as an experienced and knowledgeable aide on tempo-
rary assignment with him for overseas trips. One important assignment came in
1950–51, when Sherman was a member of an interallied committee negotiating
how the new NATO military commands would be structured. After each negoti-
ating session, Sherman would relax with his aides and unwind by discussing the
events of the day. Through this method Sherman taught Colbert about national
sensitivities and current issues as well as successful methods of international
negotiation.22
In July 1951, another issue arose in which Admiral Sherman used Colbert’s
experience and expertise. Some years earlier, while with Admiral Conolly,
Colbert had been closely involved in the staff work leading to the U.S. proposal
for obtaining American naval-base rights in Spain. As early as 1948, Franco had
said that he would make bases available, but President Truman and the National
Security Council had initially rejected the proposal.23 Despite qualms about as-
sociating their country with fascist Spain, Sherman and Conolly, among others,
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believed that NATO’s southern flank would be vulnerable without friendly bases
in Spain. As the only member of the Joint Chiefs to take this view, Sherman
went ahead, having finally persuaded Truman that it was an important strate-
gic issue.24 With Colbert at his side, Sherman traveled to Spain for talks with
Franco, and afterward he filled in the details and the rationale behind all his
agreements in discussion with his aide. Continuing on from Spain to Naples for
further talks with European leaders, Admiral Sherman suddenly died of a heart
attack before he could prepare any written reports of his conversations. Colbert
was the U.S. naval officer with the most thorough knowledge of what Sherman
and Franco had agreed upon, and thereby Colbert became a direct link in the
chain that led to the U.S. Navy’s use of Rota, Spain, as a naval base.25
COLBERT AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Upon completion of his tour of duty in Washington, Commander Colbert re-
ported to the heavy cruiser USS Albany as executive officer. During his two years
on board, Albany served as flagship for Commander, Battleship-Cruiser Force,
Atlantic, and was deployed to the Mediterranean. Colbert distinguished himself
as an exceptionally capable administrator, a good shipmate;26 as one of his com-
manding officers recalled, he was “the best executive officer any ship had had (or
the good fortune to have).”27
Upon completion of his sea duty, Colbert had to choose between assign-
ment as either head of an academic section at the Naval Academy or a student
at the Naval War College. Seeking advice, Colbert wrote to his old boss, Admi-
ral Conolly, who was by then retired. Conolly gave him sound advice that was
to prove remarkably true. “In regard to the possibilities for duty,” Conolly
wrote, “I would say by all means take the Naval War College if you have the op-
portunity. . . . I have always considered it a turning point in a naval career.”28 In
the autumn of 1955, Colbert reported to the Naval War College as a student in
the naval warfare course. Recently promoted to captain, Colbert stayed on for
two more years as a staff member.
The background for Colbert’s new assignment stretched back to the early
1950s, when he had done his staff study on training foreign naval officers under
Admiral Austin in the political-military affairs branch. In 1955–56, the Presi-
dent of the Naval War College was Vice Admiral Lynde McCormick, who had
taken up the College presidency after having been the first Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Atlantic. In this role, McCormick had commanded several NATO exer-
cises, including MAINBRACE, the largest allied peacetime exercise up to that
time. These experiences taught McCormick the fundamental need for develop-
ing better understanding among NATO navies. His experience paralleled that of
Admiral Arleigh Burke.
H A T T E N D O R F 1 1 5
121
War College: Summer 2008 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008
During 1955, Burke’s first year as Chief of Naval Operations, he began to lay
the groundwork for closer coordination between the United States and other
NATO navies. At the same time, he saw the need for similar coordination with
friendly navies in Asia, Africa, and throughout the Americas. In addition, he
wanted to create a way in which naval officers from nations that had fought
against the United States during the Second World War could shed their unspo-
ken sense of inferiority following defeat and become full-fledged allies.
One of the options Burke saw was the chance to offer a year’s study at the Na-
val War College, modeled upon the lines of the curriculum already in place for
the first year of the naval warfare course. Burke made contact with the leaders of
several allied navies, who were generally enthusiastic about this idea. By the
spring of 1956, twenty-three navies had accepted Burke’s invitation, with Admi-
ral McCormick’s full cooperation in implementing the course at the Naval War
College.
At the time these plans were coming to fruition, Colbert was just finishing his
first year as a student in the naval warfare course. When Burke selected Colbert
to head up the new course, there was some jealousy on the part of others at the
College. But Burke had full confidence in Colbert, having known him while he
was in the political-military affairs division, where his office had been directly
across the hall from Burke’s.29
Colbert’s first task was to choose a name for the course. He was firmly op-
posed to the idea of using the word “foreign” in the name, wanting instead to se-
lect a name that would reflect a positive and mutual goal. After about a month,
he selected the name “Naval Command Course for Free World Naval Officers.”30
The purpose of the course was multifaceted. Basically it was to prepare offi-
cers for higher command responsibilities within their own navies while at the
same time familiarizing them with U.S. Navy doctrines, methods, and practices.
But its purpose was much broader than that, as Professor August Miller reflected
after his first year’s experience under Colbert’s direction:
At the Naval War College in an atmosphere of complete freedom of thought and ex-
pression, the foreign officers both symbolize and interpret their own navies and their
countries not only to Americans but to each other; and on the basis of this free in-
quiry it can be readily recognized that such an open exchange of ideas will help to al-
low friendly nations to cooperate with one another in maximum efficiency in time of
world stress.31
Colbert himself was well satisfied with the course and privately wrote to a
friend, “All goes well—almost too smoothly. The capability of the students is far
beyond our expectations—they really look like the ‘future CNO’s [Chiefs of Na-
val Operations] of the Free World’ as Admiral Burke describes them.”32
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Colbert took great pains with the course, designing an appropriate curricu-
lum and nurturing close personal contacts among the students. The social side
of the course was an essential element, and the Colberts spent a large sum of
their own money to ensure that all went well, not only with cocktail parties but
also with flowers for sick family members or small farewell gifts. For all of this,
Burke consistently gave Colbert full credit for the course’s success. As he wrote to
Colbert privately a decade later, “The idea was good, but a lot of good ideas come
a cropper, and this one did not, because of you. You were the man who started it
properly, who nursed it and nurtured it along the proper lines.”33
Yet in this period, Colbert’s ideas were very much in the process of develop-
ment. The experience of being the director of the Naval Command Course for its
first two classes very clearly became the foundation upon which his later career
was built. At this stage, however, he did not seem to have a clear vision of what
could practicably be done with the cooperation he was then nurturing.
EXPERIENCE IN INTERALLIED AND INTERAGENCY NAVAL
ASSIGNMENTS
After three years at the Naval War College, Colbert left for Washington, where he
was assigned to the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Long Range Plans and
Basic War Plans Branch. In 1960, Colbert became commanding officer of the
Sixth Fleet’s general stores ship USS Altair, based in Barcelona, Spain. This
proved a formative and influential phase of his career, which reinforced some of
his experience with the Naval Command Course. The ship spent much time at
sea in support of the operations of the Sixth Fleet and in developing an early ap-
proach to vertical replenishment at sea by helicopter; Colbert’s experimentation
with this new idea was a major contribution to its use and led to its becoming
standard for ships at sea. While engaged in these operations, Colbert was also in-
tensely concerned with his ship’s relationship to its home port and in developing
cooperation with the Spanish Navy. This, he thought, was a key element in the
alliance system.
When word reached him that the very small U.S. naval facility at Barcelona
might be abolished and the fleet supported by a more “cost-effective,” larger
base, Colbert objected strongly. His reasoning reflected his growing belief in the
importance of personal relationships across national and cultural boundaries.
He pointed out to his superiors that it was important for the U.S. Navy’s sailors
and their families to develop close relationships with the peoples of the coun-
tries in which their bases were located, through an appreciation and recognition
of their hosts’ customs and ways of life. Altair’s home port in Barcelona gave
such an opportunity. “It would appear,” Colbert wrote, “that every opportunity
should be grasped by the U.S. Navy to establish and maintain more small
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unobtrusive United States representation of this type in friendly countries,
rather than closing them and concentration at installations which already are
criticized as large and conspicuous overseas bases.”34
Colbert was selected for his major command while still in command of Altair.
He had asked for assignment to “a cruiser out of Boston,” and the Bureau of Na-
val Personnel had obliged by giving him command of the guided-missile heavy
cruiser USS Boston. Under Colbert’s command, Boston deployed to the Mediter-
ranean and, for a brief period, served as the flagship for Commander, Sixth Fleet.
Admiral David L. McDonald later recalled that “Colbert and his crew in the
Boston went out of their way to make their ship a most outstanding Flagship.”35
It was while in command of Boston that Colbert decided he wanted to develop
his experience further in political-military affairs. In 1962, Colbert became in-
terested in the possibility of obtaining one of the two military billets on the State
Department’s Policy Planning Council, then headed by Walt W. Rostow. The
council had been established in 1947 by Secretary of State (and General) George
C. Marshall to be a long-range planning and advisory staff whose task would be
to analyze major foreign policy problems. Among its functional responsibilities
the council was particularly charged with coordinating political-military policy
and interagency planning.
Rostow wanted to fill his military billets with the best-qualified officers. Be-
cause he did not want to accept just any officer that the Department of Defense
might assign, Rostow wanted to have a competition that would produce “real
Rhodes Scholarship type of thinking.” During this search, Rostow interviewed
Colbert in November 1962 and later received from him what Rostow described
as “a very moving letter.” Rostow later recalled that Colbert wanted to have the
experience that the Policy Planning Council assignment would give him, but
Colbert was aware that the Navy’s personnel bureau did not think it was good for
his career. However, Colbert persisted in applying, believing that military and
naval officers needed to have a deep knowledge of the problems of diplomacy. In
his letter to Rostow, Colbert remarked that at the Naval War College he had
been closely involved with officers from other countries and that the experi-
ence had had a marked effect on his attitude. Above all, he wanted to build
upon the sense of fraternity that he had experienced.36
In 1962, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul
H. Nitze was particularly interested in getting high-caliber military and naval
officers into other agencies of the government, particularly the State Depart-
ment. A dozen years earlier, Nitze had headed the Policy Planning Council and
knew well its importance and its role. The Navy had never sent an officer to the
Policy Planning Council, but Nitze’s assistant, Captain Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.,
USN, shared Nitze’s view and also wanted to see the Navy increase its influence.
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Both Zumwalt and Nitze believed that an assignment to the State Department
would be career broadening. Colbert too shared this belief, but the detailing offi-
cers in the Bureau of Naval Personnel consistently told him that such an assign-
ment would irreparably damage his career. Colbert’s ability obviously impressed
Rostow, while within the Department of Defense, Zumwalt as Nitze’s aide
“pulled the necessary levers” and got Colbert the assignment he wanted.37
Colbert’s work ranged widely and deeply in foreign policy issues during his two
years with the Policy Planning Council, including work on topics such as multilat-
eral forces, Vietnam, the Inter-American Military Force, a U.S.-Australian squad-
ron, and nuclear arrangements east of Suez in the face of a Chinese communist
nuclear threat.38 The Inter-American Military Force was an idea that specifically
reflected Colbert’s ideas; it was a subject on which he wrote a number of papers.
Colbert had in mind a force that, though primarily naval, included army and air
components. As he visualized it, the force would be of modest size, involving a
few thousand people drawn from seven or eight countries in Latin America,
with U.S. participation limited to no more that 15–20 percent of the total force.
In Colbert’s view “it would be important that the U.S. not be any more than just
a partner in the project.”39 Colbert envisaged that its primary mission would be
ocean surveillance and sea control, but it could also be a peacekeeping force,
thus providing a place for the participation of armies. An important aspect of
this force was its training; significantly, Colbert believed that it would be pro-
vided by the force itself at a base set up in some convenient place in Latin Amer-
ica. This would have an advantage in keeping the force’s training independent of
the United States and in limiting the number of officers who would be brought
into the United States for training.40
In 1964, at the end of his State Department duty, Colbert began to be involved
in developing the concept for the Multilateral Force, a concept that he believed
might be attractive to NATO countries whose navies had surface ships but no
aircraft carriers. Colbert believed it would form a much less costly alternative to
American nuclear submarines, by placing Polaris missiles in merchant ships,
manned by mixed NATO crews with joint responsibility among all NATO na-
tions for nuclear deterrence. This proposal, which implied that the nuclear na-
tions would delegate a certain amount of their sovereignty to an allied
committee, was never implemented.
The idea of mixed manning was tried out, however. Colbert was one of the
small group with Rostow that recommended to Secretary Nitze that the U.S.
Navy demonstrate the feasibility of manning a single ship with officers and men
from different nations. The short-term experiment was successfully carried out
by the USS Claude V. Ricketts in 1964–65.41
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Reflecting on their time together in the State Department, Colbert and his
colleague Colonel Robert N. Ginsburg, USAF, wrote:
To participate in the work of the Council . . . can be an exhilarating experience for
the military man who follows the path and precepts of George C. Marshall. For the
Council’s work is almost daily vindication of the dedicated military officers’ unut-
tered creed. It is not, he knows, the man that is important, nor is it the idea, nor the
military service or branch of government, nor the government itself. It is only the Re-
public and its perpetuation that really matter.42
While Colbert was off in the depths of the State Department, some of his fel-
low officers thought he had been forgotten by the Navy, but it was not so. In May
1964 he was one of five of his class selected for rear admiral. Also, to show the im-
portance of his work, the Navy promoted him while still on the Policy Planning
Council rather than waiting for him to assume his next naval command.
In June 1964, he reported as Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 6, based
at Charleston, South Carolina. The fifty or so ships under his command gave
him the responsibility, as one friend commented, equivalent to the commander
in chief of a smaller navy. A year later, Colbert became deputy chief of staff and
assistant chief of staff for policy, plans, and operations to the Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), Admiral Thomas H. Moorer.
Colbert’s first assignment after he reported to SACLANT was to establish the
Iberian-Atlantic Command. When Moorer became SACLANT in April 1965, he
had pointed out that NATO had agreed several years before to establish a com-
mand covering the sea approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar but that neither the
money nor the men necessary to carry this task out had been authorized. Moorer
told the NATO Military Committee that he wished either to have the directive
canceled or to receive the resources necessary to do the job. The committee
agreed to provide what was needed, and this task, in turn, was given to Colbert.
In short order, Colbert brought IBERLANT (Iberian-Atlantic Command) into
being. In Moorer’s words, “This action not only significantly enhanced the capa-
bility of NATO to deal with naval operations in the area, but also significantly in-
creased the morale, prestige and overall interest of the Portuguese allies. I give
Admiral Colbert all of the credit for this important move.”43
Simultaneously, Colbert began to develop a proposal to create a Standing Na-
val Force, Atlantic. For three years NATO had run an operation called
MATCHMAKER, in which ships of various allied navies joined in an exercise for a
six-month period. In late November 1966, Colbert, as a result of a discussion
with Admiral Moorer, prepared a concept paper that proposed a permanent
MATCHMAKER force that could serve as a naval contingency force for the Allied
Command, Atlantic.44 In May 1967, the NATO Defense Committee agreed in
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principle to establish a standing naval force, and this was approved in a ministe-
rial meeting in December 1967. The force was activated in January 1968. In
Colbert’s view, this was only the beginning. He had already written that
with this as a prototype conceivably we can follow suit with similar forces in time in
the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific, and very importantly
Latin America. As the Soviet Union continues to expand its sea power world wide, I
can think of no more pragmatic and meaningful counter to their activities than the
United States participating as partners with friendly countries in their various areas.45
In Colbert’s mind, the crisis that led up to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War
would have been the ideal proving ground for a multinational standing naval
force. “If a few of the maritime nations had formed a squadron of destroyers and
contested the closure of the Gulf of Aquaba—perhaps by escorting an Israeli
ship through—in support of the principle of freedom of the seas and Innocent
Passage, the situation there might have been pacified and the Arab-Israeli war,
such as it was, averted for a time or altogether.”46
PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
After the activation of the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, and its first visit to the
United States, in the spring of 1968, Colbert was unexpectedly selected to be
President of the Naval War College. Promoted to vice admiral in a sudden jump
over some ten of his classmates, Colbert was delighted to be returning to New-
port. “It is a dream come true—a dream that I would never have mentioned to
anyone, for fear of being precocious,” he remarked.47
As President of the Naval War College Colbert made a remarkable imprint on
the institution. He was largely responsible for implementing new plans to ex-
pand the scope of the College’s academic programs as well as to improve its
physical plant. Like other colleges, the Naval War College had several academic
chairs named for distinguished naval men in specific subject areas. Colbert con-
tinued the policy of that time by inviting distinguished civilian academics to
hold these positions for a short time. He also wanted to increase the number of
academic areas they represented.
In particular, Colbert took special interest in two of the civilian academic
chairs that had been proposed by his senior academic adviser, Professor Freder-
ick H. Hartmann. Colbert’s interest in these particular positions reflected his
deep-seated appreciation for different cultural outlooks. First he brought to fru-
ition the proposals to establish the Claude V. Ricketts Chair of Comparative Cul-
tures. He appointed an anthropologist, John M. Roberts of Cornell University, to
hold this chair in 1969–70.48 Second, and for similar reasons, he supported an
unsuccessful proposal to establish a chair in oriental studies. Explaining his
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view, Colbert wrote, “There are some leading contemporary thinkers who be-
lieve that the twenty-first century will be the Asian Century.” With this increased
awareness of the importance of the Far East in world power politics, economi-
cally, socially, and strategically, such a scholar “would be able to add perspective
to every point on the Asian scene where we as a nation have been and remain
very much involved.”49
Then, after expanding the civilian faculty, he and his staff established a
number of military chairs that were designed to extend the concept of the
civilian academic chairs and ensure that the best-qualified officers in each
area of professional naval interest were brought to the College as instruc-
tors in those areas.
In developing the curriculum, Colbert continued along the lines of his prede-
cessors, but he stressed the historical importance that the Naval War College had
placed on international law since its founding in 1884. In the pages of the Naval
War College Review, Colbert asked rhetorically, “Why should the Naval War Col-
lege alone amongst service colleges, place such emphasis on the study of interna-
tional law?” The answer was obvious to Colbert, for at sea, “international law is
the only law.” But also, “the inter-relationship of legal, political, economic and
social factors which are operative on a global scale and increasing significance of
our international commitments require a clear understanding of the rules gov-
erning the relations between states.”50
In the specific area of international naval cooperation, Colbert took four ma-
jor initiatives at the Naval War College. He established the first of several ex-
change visits between the presidents of the U.S. Naval War College and the Royal
Naval College, Greenwich, supplemented by a week-long visit of forty U.S. Naval
War College students to Greenwich in 1970.51 Second, he proposed the establish-
ment of a Naval Staff Course for middle-grade free-world naval officers, com-
plementing the Naval Command Course but at a lower level and emphasizing
the participation of smaller navies that did not have comparable educational fa-
cilities. Colbert particularly had in mind that this course would primarily de-
velop the professional and managerial skills for the student officers to use in
their own navies, emphasizing the naval decision-making process, naval plan-
ning, and the broad understanding of the roles of sea power. At the same time, it
could familiarize the students with the methods, practices, and doctrines of the
U.S. Navy while developing an international bond among the graduates.52
Third, Colbert built on the long-standing desire of the Naval Command
Course graduates to have a reunion in Newport, combining it with the success-
ful rise of so many of them to flag rank. He wished to use it as a means to create
at the senior flag-officer level “areas of mutual interest, co-ordination, and
co-operation that could pay substantial dividends for the future.”53 The result
N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W1 2 2
128
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 18
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/18
was the International Seapower Symposium of November 1969, the first in a se-
ries of meetings bringing together the chiefs of navies and other naval leaders to
discuss, in an academic setting, current naval issues of mutual concern.54 Out of
the conference came much constructive and valuable thinking that led to the de-
velopment of further regional discussions on the implication of Soviet maritime
expansion. But most important for Colbert, senior naval officers at the confer-
ence became aware of their common outlook. As Canadian vice admiral Harry
Porter wrote to Colbert after the meeting, “I have come away from it with an in-
creased realization of the brotherhood of the sea and comforting knowledge that
most naval officers share the same problems, the same aspirations, and the same
feelings about the importance of sea power on countries and mankind as a
whole.”55
The last of Colbert’s contributions at the Naval War College consisted of proj-
ects that he designed as practical contributions to promote international naval
cooperation. For example, he gave to the students in the Naval Command
Course the mission of designing a “Free World Frigate,” a modern, efficient, and
economical ship of frigate or corvette size. The basic idea in Colbert’s mind was
to have officers from a variety of friendly nations “design” a ship that could pro-
vide the basis for commonality and standardization in multinational naval
forces, such as the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic. Eventually he hoped to see a
squadron of such escort ships with the same hull design, using components for
many nations, each flying a different national flag. The resulting design found
support from key leaders in the United States such as Admirals Elmo
Zumwalt and Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., but nothing came of it. Colbert was deeply
disappointed that it seemed impossible to break down nationalistic barriers
in building warships.56
Colbert’s final effort at the Naval War College was developed from a point in
Zumwalt’s “Project SIXTY,” the action plan for his term as Chief of Naval Opera-
tions. Colbert created the detailed plan of action Zumwalt used to persuade al-
lied navies to improve and expand their antisubmarine warfare capabilities, the
better to counter the growing Soviet Navy.57
FINAL ASSIGNMENTS
In June 1971, Colbert left the Naval War College to become chief of staff to the
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. He was delighted with the prospect of
continuing his work with NATO. “It will be like ‘going home,’” he wrote.58 Tak-
ing a circuitous route from Newport to Norfolk, Virginia, Colbert prepared
himself for his new position and laid the groundwork for the second Interna-
tional Seapower Symposium in 1971 by visiting the chiefs of navies in Italy,
Greece, Turkey, Belgium, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Portugal. In
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this Colbert acted as Admiral Zumwalt’s personal representative as well as the
prospective SACLANT chief of staff.59
Later, at the SACLANT headquarters, Colbert was deeply involved in the daily
work of allied naval cooperation. A year later, he was promoted to admiral and
appointed Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe. During his fi-
nal years as a NATO officer, both in Norfolk and Naples, Italy, Colbert rounded
out his series of practical initiatives to support international cooperation by rec-
ommending additional multilateral naval forces for the Indian Ocean and the
Mediterranean. Recognizing too the deep expertise needed by naval officers who
work within alliances, Colbert drafted a proposal to establish a NATO postgrad-
uate school to train recently commissioned officers under the guidance of the
NATO international staff.60 Within the U.S. Navy, Colbert recommended that a
NATO career pattern be laid out for selected officers, who would then be fully
aware of NATO procedures, problems, and programs. His plan was rejected, but
too often, he believed, U.S. naval officers came to NATO on short tours of duty
without enough international experience, engrossed in the paths their careers
would take within the U.S. Navy and lacking much of the expertise, knowledge,
and sensitivity to alliance problems that extended experience would have
brought. “Techniques for dealing with foreign personnel require more thought-
fulness, understanding, and patience,” Colbert wrote, characteristically putting
the issue in terms of personal relationships. In an international setting, a tactless
remark displaying insensitivity to another viewpoint, he believed, was often far
more difficult to repair than it would be within a single nation’s staff.61
As Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe in 1972–73,
Colbert’s principal concern was to reduce the tension between Greece and Tur-
key. Under his leadership the Naval On-Call Force, Mediterranean was started
and expanded with the hope of developing it into a standing naval force using
Greek, Turkish, Italian, British, and U.S. ships. Colbert had more success in his
initiatives to develop cooperation between the French Navy and NATO, working
out a treaty allowing annual exercises. Through the combined efforts of Colbert
and French admiral Jean Guillou, a large Franco-American naval exercise took
place off the coast of the United States in 1973.62
During Colbert’s tenure as commander in chief he discovered that he had an
incurable case of cancer, but he remained at his post until a week before his
death, at the age of fifty-eight on 2 December 1973. As Admiral Giuseppe
Pighini, Commander, Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe under Colbert, put
it, he was “a man dedicated to his duty till the last breath of life.”63
Colbert’s highest duty, as he saw it, was clearly revealed in a letter he wrote to
Chaplain Henry Duncan, only a few months before he died:
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I am a realist and know that I am on borrowed time. I am convinced that the Lord
has decided to give me some extra time to do some things in this, my last command,
which might better insure a safer world. That is the gist of my prayers. All I ask is just
a bit more time to carry on and establish some concepts—multinational NATO
forces which will strengthen our Free World against what I am convinced is a desper-
ate threat, despite all the talk of detente.64
REFLECTIONS ON A CAREER
Richard Colbert’s entire naval career was developed around a gradually growing
and strengthening commitment to international naval cooperation. He never
worked out or developed his thoughts on this subject in any complete way, but as
one reflects on his various statements and the innovations he made during his
career, one can discern a philosophy that bears much of enduring value. It was a
philosophy grounded in a sense of the need for cooperation, close personal ties,
loyalty, camaraderie, and social grace in day-to-day life. He was a friendly, out-
going man with an understated style—a man who assumed that cordial cooper-
ative behavior was the best way to accomplish things.65 In the life of a career
naval officer, this meant leadership and personal responsibility. Colbert re-
flected these concepts in a letter he wrote near the end of his career to a young of-
ficer just taking up his first command. Referring specifically to Admiral
Zumwalt’s innovative reforms in the U.S. Navy, Colbert advised,
Old Navy or New, long hair or short, it seems to me what ultimately makes the dif-
ference in readiness and effectiveness is the sense of camaraderie and respect that
come from personal involvement and identification on the part of all hands. I fear
that a lot of Navy men never got the underpinning message behind many of the re-
cent innovations: the emphasis on personal responsibility.66
This point was an essential aspect of his philosophy, not only in shipboard
command but also in forming bonds with other countries and other navies. The
key was personal responsibility and, through it, personal relationships. In open-
ing the first International Seapower Symposium, he stressed “the pure profes-
sional naval competence which each of us can bring . . . [to] provide threads of a
cloth which might well be woven into a durable and serviceable fabric.”67
Colbert believed that the highest professional naval competence arises from
two equally important sources: practical experience and war college education.
“War colleges have always been the storehouses of the military arts,” Colbert
said, “but nowadays they must prepare officers to function outside the confines
of purely operational expertise, in an era of transition, of apparent detente, of
new structuring of international politics.”68
The international courses played an essential role in this. Colbert believed
that such courses stressed the “undiluted, the small, close, intimate nature” of
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the relationship built during a year’s study together.69 It was nothing that could
be mass produced but was created slowly and surely over time by a delicate for-
mula: a small group, one officer only from each country, interacting with the en-
tire group of carefully selected students and well-chosen staff, teaching a
curriculum that takes into account the foreign officers’ diverse backgrounds and
letting them develop together where they would not be overwhelmed or at a dis-
advantage as they came to understand something of life not only in a foreign
country but in one so very different from their own.70 The result of this, Colbert
found, was a created bond. “Once one has become part of that special fraternity,”
he wrote, “neither time nor distance can dissolve the unique ties it forms among
its members.”71
These kinds of ties were the basis, he believed, for the kind of partnership
among nations that was urgently needed in the modern world. After the Second
World War, the United States responded to the urgent and practical needs of its
allies with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and other forms of assis-
tance. But these led to domination. With full economic recovery from the war,
these policies were no longer appropriate. “Domination leads to dependence,”
Colbert believed, “while true ‘partnership’ encourages the independence, pride
and dignity of our sovereign allies.”72
Further developing this idea, Colbert saw that there was an alternative to
previous U.S. foreign policy, one that encouraged and supported regional co-
operation and partnership in various areas. The growth of Soviet maritime
power presented a challenging problem “which no one country is able to re-
solve itself.”73 In this situation, Colbert saw many advantages in a policy and
strategy founded on partnership among allied and friendly nations. This could
best be achieved through multilateral naval forces designed for major regions of
the globe. The advantages of such forces were clear to him: the cost, financially
and politically, was low, and they avoided the internal political dissent caused by
massive or overwhelming commitment by the United States, while at the same
time increasing the effectiveness of such a force by being the symbolic and real
expression of several nations united in a common effort. Moreover, the general
maritime interests of the free world could be served by multilateral naval forces,
which could give rationale and justification for navies in countries where these
interests were under attack.74 In all of this Colbert clearly perceived the forms of
naval expertise that regional and small navies provided that complemented the
expertise within larger navies concentrating on global-scale naval operations.
In a career intertwined with ideas of international, naval cooperation, Rich-
ard Colbert sought to achieve four important objectives.75 First, he believed that
naval officers were particularly competent in solving international problems.
For navies, the sea is the same good friend or cruel foe all over the world. Because
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of this, naval officers have naturally developed a similar way of thinking and can
easily discuss mutual problems, apart from national prejudices. With this in
mind, Colbert sought out successful senior naval officers as responsible repre-
sentatives of different free-world societies and tried to motivate them to learn
through each other’s perspectives the value of freedom. He did this in the Naval
Command Course by creating an academic environment of mutual respect and
candor where the American political system and way of life, and those of each
country represented, were openly discussed.76
Second, through the International Seapower Symposium he sought to estab-
lish a forum where the highest naval leaders could exchange with their profes-
sional peers knowledge, concepts, views, and opinions about naval technology,
tactics, strategy, and the importance of sea power. Through this he hoped to fos-
ter deeper understanding and appreciation of different national perspectives.77
Third, in all his proposals for international cooperation, he hoped to establish
among naval officers a deeper awareness of the need for mutual reliance as a key
element in every nation’s national interest.
Fourth, he sought to establish rapport across cultural boundaries and to de-
velop personal knowledge and understanding for different national views as ex-
pressed by naval officers. In doing this, Colbert wanted to create a group of
knowledgeable naval leaders who could ensure that the effectiveness of multina-
tional forces would not be jeopardized by any failure to understand one’s own
ally.
Although Richard Colbert was an officer in the U.S. Navy, his vision was
clearly wider than the ordinary officer’s. His vision has certainly touched the of-
ficers and men of all ships who have served in the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic;
the senior flag officers who have attended the International Seapower Symposia;
and the faculty and students of the Naval War College.
In all of his objectives, the unifying theme is the mutual experience of the na-
val profession, which reaches beyond cultures and nations to establish its own
fraternity. Few naval officers have seen this vision so clearly as Richard Colbert,
and few have done so much to foster it. Those who would follow in his wake
must share his notion that no measure of international leadership can replace
trust and understanding among allies and a sound appreciation of common
goals.78
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
THE EFFECT OF TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILES ON THE MARITIME
STRATEGY OF CHINA
Wang Wei
Translated by OS3 Danling Cacioppo, U.S. Navy
Weaponry and concepts (that is to say, combat theory, or more specifically, doc-
trine regarding the practical employment of some specific weapon) have en-
dured as themes of warfare throughout the history of mankind. From the
perspective of their development, there has always been an interactive relation-
ship between weaponry and combat theory. Lack of coordination in the devel-
opment of these two elements has led to a spiral in which one continually
supersedes the other. A weapon based on a completely new concept appears; it is
often not employed according to the commander’s original intentions, precipi-
tating a change in how it is used and a shift to alternative technological
improvements.
TENSION BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND
THE CHOICE OF DELIVERY PLATFORM
From the most fundamental point of view, every action on the battlefield can
be summed up as “the action and counteraction between capabilities—more
specifically, firepower—and information, between the opposing parties.” Un-
doubtedly, the birth of aviation weaponry and its massive use produced a revo-
lutionary impact on the patterns of modern warfare. The most prominent
manifestation of its “revolutionary” character is the fact that airpower pro-
vides commanders with a relatively easy method of penetrating physically the
enemy’s defensive system and delivering firepower—in abstract terms, of con-
ducting power projection.
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As aviation (and space) weaponry of all kinds developed, air-defense systems
evolved as well, from “barrage balloons” to surface-to-air missiles, from point
air defense to area air defense, all the way up to today’s out-of-area interception
technology. From a historical perspective, and in terms of the interaction be-
tween offensive and defensive systems, changes in “delivery methods” of fire-
power can be understood as simply the continuous evolution of the
cost-effectiveness ratio. During World War II, vast numbers of bombers, “Flying
Fortresses,” covered the sky over strategic nodes of the Axis powers. During the
Korean War, bombers confronted newly developed jet-propelled interceptor air-
craft, and the high cost-effectiveness of this mode of delivery became difficult to
sustain. Until the Vietnam War, the United States possessed absolute air superi-
ority; then, however, facing surface-to-air missiles, it often exchanged the mis-
sions of tactical aircraft and heavy bombers, employing F-105 fighter-bombers
to attack targets deep within enemy territory while relying on B-52 strategic
bombers for support missions on the battlefield and against forward positions.
During the Persian Gulf War, coalition strikes against deep targets were all un-
dertaken by tactical aircraft—for example, by the F-117A stealth fighter, which
carries only two laser-guided bombs. It is important to note that since the Ko-
rean War, the majority of wars involving great powers like the United States have
been of medium or low intensity, so their combat systems have been used in rela-
tively benign environments.
Cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, both of which appeared in the final
stage of World War II, possess even stronger capabilities than existing types of
tactical aircraft for penetration of the enemy’s defensive space, and at an even
better cost-effectiveness ratio. Ballistic missiles, given the same tactical param-
eters, offer more outstanding penetration capability and cost-effectiveness
than cruise missiles.
One of the reasons that numerous third-world countries favor tactical ballis-
tic missiles is that because of their limitations, they are generally at a significant
disadvantage in confrontations with great powers. Under such circumstances,
how to guarantee penetration of the enemy’s defense space is the first problem to
be solved. By means of ballistic missiles, an actor inferior in combat aircraft
can deliver firepower against a dominant actor. From the economic point of
view, developing an effective air force is very complex and requires a long ges-
tation period. A substantial deterrent using tactical ballistic missiles takes far
fewer resources; it is a “short-term investment” that can produce instant re-
sults. The effect is similar to that of crossbows against knights in medieval Eu-
rope—and today, as with the “Law Forbidding Crossbows,” developed Western
countries impose tight restrictions on tactical missiles and related technology.
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TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILES UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
LAND-BASED SEA CONTROL
Simply put, the emergence of tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) has enabled
weaker parties to offset to a certain extent the effectiveness of the expensive air
combat systems of stronger opponents at a relatively low cost. However, the
TBM alone cannot fundamentally change the superior and inferior positions of
the two sides. During the Persian Gulf War, coalition air forces flew more than
112,000 sorties, dropping 225,500 bombs; during the Kosovo war, NATO forces
flew thirty-five thousand sorties and dropped twenty-five thousand bombs;
during the war in Afghanistan, U.S., British, and other allied forces dropped a to-
tal of about 17,400 bombs. From the perspective of the cost-effectiveness ratio, it
is hard to imagine that TBMs could deliver firepower on the same scale. But the
weapon often makes a significant difference for the weak forces of a small coun-
try against the integrated combat systems of a great power.
At the tactical level, the value of medium- and short-range TBMs—presently
one of China’s principal means of delivering long-range firepower—lies in their
ability to penetrate enemy defense systems without placing high demands on the
tactical environment. When we broaden our discussion to encompass the strate-
gic level, however, the value of tactical missiles must be restated in this way: they
provide China with more maneuvering space for military and political strategic
operations on its eastern, maritime flank.
First, let us examine the Taiwan Strait. At the most comprehensive level,
China’s Taiwan strategy is at present one of building up reserves rather than
preparation. The core of this effort consists in strategic resource accumulation
and geopolitical positioning. The specific goals are to avoid a situation in which
the Taiwanese authorities go too far toward independence and to curtail gradu-
ally their political room for maneuver, thus laying the foundation for future
unification.
To maintain the current trend of stability in the strait area, it is necessary for
the central government to maintain a certain amount of military pressure
against separatist forces, in addition to various political and diplomatic mea-
sures, to deter behavior that “crosses the line or oversteps the boundary.” Thus,
TBMs offer the mainland strategy toward Taiwan a third option, aside from
all-out use of force or reliance on nonmilitary means. That third choice, “attack-
ing without entering,” represents a critical military way of exerting pressure on
Taiwan. It creates greater decision-making space for the mainland with respect
to Taiwan, while compressing the available space for the Taiwanese regime and
greatly reducing its options. Put more concretely, ballistic missiles provide the
tools by which a “quasi-war” scenario can be made feasible. First, the tactical
missile’s strong penetration capability can guarantee a high probability of
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success without a large-scale, high-intensity attack on the island itself, even
against a fairly intact air-defense system. After all, the effectiveness gap between
missile and antimissile technologies is much greater than that between aircraft
and air-defense technologies. With respect to long-range firepower, the two
sides of the Taiwan Strait are simply not comparable; the mainland occupies an
absolute and asymmetrically dominant position. Moreover, missiles essentially
preclude engagements between personnel, thus giving the mainland control of
military action as well as of corresponding political effects. An additional effect
comes into play on the political level. Over a long period of time, deployment of
medium- and short-range TBMs along the mainland coast has had a significant
psychological impact on the Taiwanese public. Variations in the number of mis-
siles deployed have become an indirect means of exerting influence upon the is-
land’s internal political situation.
In the longer term, should the mainland have no alternative but the use of
force in order to recover Taiwan, it will not be possible to neglect the possibility
of intervention by foreign militaries. Therefore, it will be necessary to undertake
strategic deployments in advance, in order to minimize the likelihood as well as
the intensity of any such intervention.
Unlike tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, or other such delivery platforms, bal-
listic missiles cannot be intercepted by the enemy’s air force. For an island na-
tion, such as Japan, the most practical method to increase the depth of defensive
space is deploying sea-based missile interceptor systems in coastal waters.
Against the threat of medium-range ballistic missiles from the Chinese main-
land, however, what is needed is not a few “Aegis” air-defense ships but a com-
plete naval combat system—just as China has developed a complete attack
system. The maneuver and deployment of tactical missiles on home territory
causes China few military or political problems, whereas, in addition to their re-
taliatory value, they pose a “clear and present threat” that keeps enemy naval de-
ployments in check.
From a broader, regional perspective, in fact, stabilization of the U.S.-Chinese
relationship depends to some extent on China’s deployment of long-range fire-
power, including TBMs. The three “island chains” form an important compo-
nent of U.S. national strategy in the western Pacific; they all serve to obstruct the
Chinese navy’s routes into the open ocean, thus restricting its scope of opera-
tions to a narrow area. From a purely military perspective, the ideal forward po-
sition of U.S. forces should be the “second island chain.” There they can avoid
direct contact with Chinese forces while relying on the superiority of U.S.
long-range striking power, thereby containing China more effectively. However,
it is quite obvious that the United States would not be able to pull back so far in
the short run—the Korean Peninsula, the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands, Taiwan,
1 3 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
142
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 18
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/18
and other regions of the “first island chain” are all in very unsettled phases in
their histories. In the absence of any strategic breathing space, were the United
States rashly to withdraw its forces from these places, chaos would surely ensue,
and effective control might well be forfeited.
Having in mind the technological disparities in any potential Sino-American
conflict, China’s primary concern with regard to long-range firepower delivery
must be the penetration capability of its delivery platforms against U.S. defense
systems, not cost-benefit calculations. If one again considers grand strategy, war,
from China’s point of view, would be an unfortunate instrument of last resort,
not one by which China can pursue interests beyond its fundamental interests;
therefore China’s understanding of cost-effectiveness would not be the same as
that of the United States. For that reason, the TBM plays the important role it
does: as long as China possesses sufficient capability for long-range firepower
delivery, in any outbreak of hostilities between China and the United States the
TBM would make the American bases spread out along the first island chain
“chopping blocks” for China’s firepower and increase the costs to the United
States of a war enormously. U.S. war calculations are made according to “cost ac-
counting”; in reality, however, American forces based along the first island chain
have become unwilling hostages in the strategic chess match between China and
the United States.
The result is that for a very long time, in the western Pacific and even else-
where, China and the United States have significantly lowered the chances of
conflict, though they view each other with great anxiety. Also, in an era of peace,
the island-chains containment strategy has in fact little practical effect in im-
peding China’s development—and for China at the present stage, nothing is
more important than a stable environment for development.
FUNDAMENTALS OF TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE STRIKES
AGAINST SEA TARGETS
Reports to the effect that “the Chinese armed forces are exploring ballistic mis-
sile attacks against aircraft carriers” have surfaced time and again in the media.
Therefore, it is necessary to explain in simple terms the technical aspects of this
question. This article does not seek to prove or predict anything; the author
wishes only to discuss the feasibility of TBM attacks against moving targets on
the surface of the ocean, from a nonspecialist perspective.
Suppose ballistic missiles are flying toward a formation of surface ships (let
us tentatively defer the question of whether the missiles will hit or not). Also
suppose that in response the vessels attempt to intercept them. Beyond doubt,
the probability of successful interception, even if not zero, will certainly be far
less than it would be of intercepting either aircraft or cruise missiles, since, as
W A N G W E I 1 3 7
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stated previously, the ballistic missile has a greater penetration capability against
area-defense systems.
The next question is whether ballistic missiles are capable of hitting moving
surface ships. The current conventional wisdom, on the Internet and in other
media outlets, generally holds that as ballistic missiles were originally designed
to attack fixed targets on land, moving targets on water greatly increase the tech-
nical difficulties. But in reality, it is hard to make a straightforward comparison.
First, the maximum speed of current large or medium-sized surface ships is
around thirty knots. Compared to that of ballistic missiles, which travel at many
times the speed of sound, up to Mach 10 and beyond, the mobility of surface
ships is very limited. At least, ballistic missiles striking targets at sea seems more
reasonable than ground-based missile-defense systems intercepting incoming
missiles. As the latter have achieved some important milestones, it can be as-
sumed that developing ballistic missiles for deployment against targets at sea
would require merely reintegration of specific technologies, not a quantum leap
in the overall technological level.
Second, surface targets on water contrast more sharply against their back-
ground and are much easier to locate than targets in complex terrain or “hard
targets” underground. Finally, compared with ground-based weapon systems
that can be deployed in a dispersed arrangement, surface ships are highly inte-
grated platforms, and this means that their survivability in combat is lower.
Thus, while it is difficult to imagine one or two conventionally armed guided
missiles paralyzing an air base, the same firepower delivered against an aircraft
carrier could easily cost it the ability to launch and recover aircraft. Admittedly,
from a systems perspective, evaluating the cost-effectiveness of ballistic missiles
used against surface ships, if technology permits it, will not be so clear-cut.
From an engineering standpoint, the key to ballistic missile strikes against
targets at sea lies, in the author’s opinion, in the preparation of the maritime bat-
tlefield. That is to say, a prerequisite of attacks against mobile targets is solving
such problems as precise reconnaissance and positioning, data exchange, etc.
Preparation of the maritime battlefield will require marine surveillance satel-
lites, electronic reconnaissance satellites, imaging reconnaissance satellites,
communication satellites, and other space-based systems; airborne early warn-
ing aircraft, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, and other airborne systems; and
shore-based over-the-horizon radars, underwater sonar arrays, and the like.
These systems must be viewed as a “public investment”—parts of a comprehen-
sive naval combat system.
Between the launch of a ballistic missile and impact, there is an interval dur-
ing which targeted vessels may attempt to escape. The flight of a ballistic missile
with a range of 1,500 kilometers, for example, takes eight to ten minutes; in that
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time a surface target, if its speed is thirty knots, can move about three nautical
miles. Therefore, to ensure that the ballistic missile hits its target, its trajectory
needs to be adjusted in flight. Certain ballistic missiles, such as the Russian SS-27
Topol-M, already employ various technologies to maneuver in space. These ma-
neuvers, however, are preprogrammed attempts to evade enemy interception;
they are not the type of course adjustment we are discussing here. However, ac-
cording to public reports, China’s “Shenzhou” spacecraft successfully carried
out orbital adjustments during its experimental flights. Therefore, we can as-
sume that for China there will be no technological bottlenecks in controlled ma-
neuvers for ballistic missiles in space.
Alternatively, midcourse-phase course-correction data can be fed to a missile
from an external source—what is known as command guidance. Or, the missile
can carry its own radar or other sensors to detect the target from high altitude
and provide trajectory-correction information.
Reentry-phase guidance, such as air rudders, microrocket motors, and other
terminal-phase guidance technologies, has been used since the “Pershing” mis-
sile developed during the Cold War era. TBMs currently in Chinese service also
use this kind of technology. Thus, it can be assumed that technical problems
with respect to the missile itself are not insurmountable. Moreover, it might be
possible, following reentry into the atmosphere, to reduce the speed of the war-
head in order to adjust its trajectory. Alternatively, multiple missiles may be em-
ployed in “precision firepower coverage” tactics against escape routes.
It is not the purpose of this article to solve engineering and technical prob-
lems. The above discussion is simply to make clear what follows, with regard to
naval combat systems—that a TBM maritime strike system will give the Chinese
military an asymmetrical means of firepower delivery in any future conflict at
sea. Developments in antimissile technology have reached such a point that bal-
listic missiles are no longer absolutely impossible to resist. But at the same time,
in any actual confrontation the unequal effectiveness of offensive and defensive
systems gives the ballistic missile an advantage. However, tactical ballistic mis-
siles cannot replace aircraft carriers, submarines, and other traditional naval
weapons. The major difference is like that between “special forces” and “regular
forces”—ballistic missiles can be used to destroy enemy forces at sea but not to
achieve absolute sea control, let alone to project maritime power.
Let us now return to the strategic level. The relative impacts of military sys-
tems on the outcome of a conflict generally become more obvious as the conflict
intensifies. Employing the J-7 aircraft or even the J-6 to counter F-14s and
FA-18s may not be a problem during peacetime, but in a life-or-death situation,
the qualitative discrepancies could bring disastrous consequences. If a TBM
combat system comes into existence, it will establish for China in any
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high-intensity confl ict in its coastal waters an asymmetry, in its favor, in the deliv-
ery of fi repower and so will remedy to some extent China’s qualitative inferiority 
in traditional naval platforms. Further, the existence of this asymmetry would set 
up for both sides a psychological “upper limit” on the scale of confl ict. This would 
enable both parties to return more easily “to rationality,” thereby creating more 
space for maneuver in the resolution of maritime confl icts.
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BOOK REVIEWS
TAIWAN: PROVINCE OR INDEPENDENT NATION?
Kagan, Richard C. Taiwan’s Statesman: Lee Teng-hui and Democracy in Asia. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 2007. 240pp. $30
Wachman, Alan M. Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity. Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford Univ. Press, 2007. 272pp. $65
An international issue at or near the top
of any list of potential nuclear conflicts
is the status of Taiwan. Beijing insists
the island is merely another Chinese
province, Taipei insists the island is an
independent nation, and officially
Washington stands with neither view
but insists on a peaceful resolution. The
two books under review here address
this important matter. Both authors,
Richard Kagan and Alan Wachman, are
experienced academics specializing in
China and able to access Chinese
sources. Their works join other schol-
arly efforts to explain the imbroglio
over Taiwan, including those by Rich-
ard Bush, Alan Romberg, and Nancy
Bernkopf Tucker.
The best thing about Taiwan’s States-
man is its price, which is remarkably
low for today’s market. However, it is
unfortunate that throughout the entire
text Kagan does not offer an objective
biography of Lee Teng-hui, the former
president of Taiwan. He has written in-
stead a hagiography that fails to justify
its presumption of Lee as an
internationally important “statesman”
or as a seminal figure in the develop-
ment of “democracy in Asia.” This is re-
grettable, given both the author’s
scholarly expertise and the importance
of Lee in late-twentieth-century Chi-
nese and American history. In addition,
Taiwan’s Statesman contains factual er-
rors, such as an assertion that President
Richard Nixon’s visit to China took
place in 1971 (rather than February
1972), as well as chronological confu-
sion, apparently caused by questionable
editing.
Kagan on several occasions describes
Lee as a George Washington–like figure.
His objectivity is problematic when de-
scribing the very difficult position in
which Taiwan found itself after 1979,
when the United States finally shifted
diplomatic recognition of “China” from
Taipei to Beijing. Kagan’s repetitive de-
scription of Lee’s “Zen and Christian
approach” does not support his conten-
tion of Lee as providing “a new model”
of democracy for Asia.
This book is best left on the shelf.
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A far more important work is Why Tai-
wan? by Alan Wachman, a professor at
Tufts University. He undertakes the dif-
ficult task of analyzing why this rela-
tively small island, approximately the
size of the combined land area of New
Jersey and Delaware, is so important to
China. How is it, Wachman poses, that
in the late seventeenth century the is-
land was viewed by China as “a place
beyond the seas . . . of no consequence
to us,” when in 2005 Beijing passed the
Anti-secession Law threatening the use
of military force to prevent Taiwan’s de
jure independence?
Relying on an impressive array of pri-
mary and secondary sources, Wachman
explains the change in China’s view
through historical background, legal
analysis, and examination of the cur-
rent state of relations and future possi-
bilities, all couched in both analytical
and theoretical terms. He succeeds in
this daunting task in just 164 pages,
leaving the reader wishing for more.
Wachman decides (correctly in my
view) that China’s current moderniza-
tion of its military was sparked by ob-
servation of U.S. prowess in the 1991
Persian Gulf War, heightened and ex-
panded as a result of the 1996 Taiwan
Strait crisis, and is primarily focused on
possible Taiwan scenarios, including
conflict with the United States. The au-
thor also suggests that the variation in
China’s view of the salience of Taiwan
has been due more to the island’s rela-
tive insignificance on the list of national
security concerns from the seventeenth
century through the first half of the
twentieth. China’s rulers were often
concerned with more important issues,
ranging from the Qing overthrow of the
Ming dynasty to Japan’s invasion of
China in the 1930s, to the Cold War
perturbations that forced Beijing’s at-
tention elsewhere.
Wachman’s thesis is that China’s pri-
mary concern about the island’s status
is geostrategic, although he discusses
domestic, political, ideological, and na-
tionalistic rationales, including an ex-
cursion into a theoretical construct of
national awareness. However, he fails to
mention the “century of humiliation,”
which is somewhat surprising, given the
Chinese propensity to dwell on it.
Wachman paints a convincing picture
of China’s worries about Taiwan’s his-
tory as an entrée for foreign invaders; as
recently as November 2007 Beijing ex-
pressed this concern.
One possible explanation for China’s
evolving consideration of Taiwan is that
the globalization phenomena of the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centu-
ries have simply made the island more
accessible and important to the main-
land. Geography does not change, per
se, but today’s technological and scien-
tific advances have certainly altered its
influence in certain political situations.
One criticism is that the author tends to
argue his points in a judicial manner;
“it is noteworthy,” “how odd it is,” and
“as the preceding chapter makes evi-
dent” are some examples. He has much
greater success convincing the reader
with sound geopolitical analyses of the
China-Taiwan situation than with word
parsing.
That said, Wachman does succeed in
demonstrating that many of China’s
current military strategists, both aca-
demics and military officers, view Tai-
wan’s importance in geostrategic terms,
seeing it as vital to their nation’s secu-
rity and as having serious implications
for national-security policy making in
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Beijing, and in Taipei and Washington
as well.
For China, that means not allowing the
island to become an independent state
widely recognized by the international
community of nations, but forcing or
drawing Taiwan into reunification with
the mainland. Beijing has frequently
stated its willingness to use military
force to prevent Taiwan’s independ-
ence, but Taipei seems to ignore it,
while Washington continues to tread a
tenuous line between the two. While
Wachman focuses on policy-making
motivation and attitudes in Beijing, he
makes a significant contribution to our




Hicks, Melinda M., and C. Belmont Keeney, eds.
Defending the Homeland: Historical Perspectives
on Radicalism, Terrorism, and State Responses.
Morgantown: West Virginia Univ. Press, 2007.
233pp. $27.50
Defending the Homeland is not about
homeland defense as defined by the De-
fense Department—the military defense
of U.S. territory from external attack.
Rather, what the editors provide is a
wide-ranging examination of, first, how
the United States has responded to a va-
riety of internal and external threats
over its history and, second, how soci-
etal reactions to terrorism may unin-
tentionally encourage the terrorist
mind-set. The volume comprises nine
academic essays from among those sub-
mitted to the 2005 Senator Rush D.
Holt History Conference at West Vir-
ginia University.
As Jeffrey H. Norwitz notes in his intro-
duction, “The greatest battle is to re-
main a nation of law in the face of a
ruthless enemy who would consider this
our weakness.” Illustrating the point,
Ellen Schrecker surveys our history
from the Alien and Sedition Acts to the
first “red scare” of World War I, while
coeditor Keeney tells the story of strikes
and labor violence in West Virginia
coalfields in the first three decades of
the twentieth century. The writers con-
clude that we are too easily willing to
suspend constitutional rights in the face
of sometimes-specious threats to the
nation. Even such a luminary as Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes accepted limi-
tations to freedom of speech in war-
time, saying, “When a nation is at war,
many things that might be said in time
of peace . . . will not be endured so long
as men fight . . . and no Court could re-
gard them as protected by any constitu-
tional right.”
The book’s second section examines the
factors that push activists toward radi-
calism and from radicalism ultimately
to killing in the name of social justice or
religious purity. For instance, according
to Jean Burger’s essay on the role of
women in revolutionary Russia, tsarist
Russia contributed to its own demise by
systematically eliminating any peaceful
means of bringing education, health,
and opportunity to the state’s peasants,
industrial workers, or women.
Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon points out
that not only is there a wide variety of
terrorisms but that the distinctions be-
tween terrorists and “people who use
violence and are not called terrorists”
grow ever thinner over time. We there-
fore need to take care that in the effort
to perfect homeland security we do not
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lose the body of tradition and law that
defines our homeland.
The editors cover an ambitious amount
of ground for such a slim volume, and
the space available does not permit a
variety of perspectives on each topic.
An examination into the U.S. govern-
ment’s reactions to racial and political
unrest at home after the McCarthy era,
for instance, would have been welcome.
However, the book’s essays seem se-
lected to provoke the reader to explore
their subjects more deeply, and the con-
tributions are uniformly well sup-
ported. The citations provide ample
direction for readers wishing to explore
on their own the issues presented.
RANDY L. UNGER
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Homeland Defense & American Security Affairs
Cann, John P. Brown Waters of Africa: Portuguese
Riverine Warfare, 1961–1974. St. Petersburg, Fla.:
Hailer, 2007. 248pp. $29.99
Counterinsurgency warfare is what used
to be called “colonial warfare.” Al-
though the association might make
some people uncomfortable—Ameri-
cans perhaps more than most, given
their aversion to colonialism—much of
the strategic intent and many of the tac-
tics, techniques, and procedures of
modern counterinsurgency derive di-
rectly from the colonial wars and police
actions of the past.
In some respects riverine warfare suf-
fers from the taint of colonialism more
than do other aspects of counterinsur-
gency, a prejudice that is currently rein-
forced by the apparent trend for
insurgents who worry the West to cen-
ter their operations in urban rather
than rural environments and to seek
sanctuary in the anonymity of cities
rather than remote countrysides. In
many parts of the world, however,
rivers remain the principal transport
routes, and their control remains of
fundamental importance to the success
or failure of insurgent movements.
The last great colonial empire in Africa
was Portuguese, and a history of the
riverine campaigns fought in its defense
between 1961 and 1974 is long overdue.
John P. Cann, a retired Marine Corps
University professor with a doctorate in
African counterinsurgency from King’s
College London, shows that the Portu-
guese took what they could from British
and, particularly, French experiences
and adapted it to suit their particular
circumstances and the often limited re-
sources at their disposal.
After placing the total effort in the stra-
tegic context of the Cold War, the his-
torical context of twentieth-century
Portuguese history, and the contempo-
raneous political context of the regime
of António de Oliveira Salazar, Cann
demonstrates how the Portuguese navy
and naval infantry, the fuzileiros, fought
an effective campaign in three diverse
theaters: on the rivers of Angola; on the
Rovuma River and Lake Niassa in Mo-
zambique; and among the estuaries,
deltas, and swamp forests of the West
African enclave of Bissau.
Cann recounts with balance and clarity
the lessons the Portuguese drew from
the experience. Insurgency is political
war where the center of gravity is the
population. Consequently, the naval
role differs very little from that of the
army. The essence is to develop and
maintain contact with the civilian pop-
ulation so close and regular that it often
amounts to “armed social work.”
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Presence—achieved by living, and con-
ducting river and foot patrols, among
local people to gain their trust and to
build sound knowledge about the en-
emy—is equally important, as is, at the
same time, keeping the insurgents off
balance through the use of deception
and irregular patrol patterns, a combi-
nation the Portuguese were able to
achieve because units were deployed in
two-year cycles.
The Portuguese also learned the impor-
tance of joint effort. Wherever the navy
and army disagreed and failed to oper-
ate together, which happened in Bissau
particularly, results were affected. Also,
that no campaign could be isolated
from the wider political context was a
lesson that became painfully apparent
following a militarily successful but po-
litically damaging raid on Conakry, the
capital of Guinea, to free hostages and
destroy insurgent sanctuaries.
In short, all practitioners and students
of riverine warfare will be grateful that
John P. Cann has written such an excel-
lent account.
MARTIN N. MURPHY
Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies
Shrivenham, England
Smith, Perry M., and Daniel M. Gerstein. Assign-
ment Pentagon: How to Excel in a Bureaucracy. 4th
ed. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007.
273pp. $22.95
For this, the fourth edition of his well
received book, Major General Perry M.
Smith, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), has added
a coauthor, Colonel Daniel M. Gerstein,
U.S. Army (Ret.). Colonel Gerstein
served for twenty-six years in combat,
peace, and humanitarian operations.
He also served in the Pentagon for al-
most ten years in senior advisory and
leadership roles.
This edition has been expanded into
sixteen chapters, each adding consider-
able value to the publication. One of
the more interesting and vital chapters
for properly grasping the workings of
“the building” is devoted to “under-
standing the process.” This chapter suc-
cinctly describes the Joint Strategic
Planning System (JSPS), the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS), and the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC). These enti-
ties are extremely complex by their very
natures, but it is vital to understand
how they all fit together for our na-
tion’s defense. The authors do a superb
job of simplifying these systems, giving
additional references for in-depth
understanding.
Smith and Gerstein also briefly address
military ethics, touching upon military
interaction with Congress and ethics
within the executive branch. Problems
are identified and solutions are sug-
gested, but it is beyond the scope and
intention of this book to address these
issues other than superficially. The
reader should already be educated re-
garding ethics and ethical behavior; this
chapter serves simply to remind us that
doing the “right thing” continues to be
difficult at times.
As with the earlier editions, the present
one addresses many day-to-day busi-
ness elements related to serving at the
Pentagon. The book allows the reader,
whether a newly assigned military
member or civilian, to obtain a prelimi-
nary understanding of the complex na-
ture of this intense mixture of military
and civilian bureaucracies.
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One of the primary values of this book
is that the views and perspectives shared
are not the authors’ alone but those of
many uniformed and civilian sources,
both inside and outside of the Defense
Department, as well. For example, two
of many fact-filled chapters address
working with defense contractors and
“the interagency.” Both these areas are
discussed in a way that allows the
reader to gain perspective that might
prove helpful when sitting across from
a contractor or an employee of the State
Department.
This work serves the reader very well,
providing knowledgeable insight into
the formal and informal processes of
this important element of national se-
curity and the Department of Defense.
The perspective and information con-
tained here is particularly important for
the military member or civilian as-




Ford, Daniel. Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and
His American Volunteers, 1941–1942. New York:
HarperCollins (Smithsonian Books), 2007.
384pp. $15.95
In this vivid and fact-filled historical ac-
count of aerial combat, Daniel Ford
completely updates and revises his 1991
work describing the extraordinary ac-
complishments of the pilots and sup-
port crews of the 1st American
Volunteer Group (AVG) in the earliest
days of World War II. Ford—a writer
for the Wall Street Journal, a recre-
ational pilot, and author of Incident at
Muc Wa (made into the Burt Lancaster
movie Go Tell the Spartans)—has used
recent American, British, and Japanese
sources to both improve and shorten
the original book. Famously known as
the “Flying Tigers,” the AVG was a
group of American volunteers recruited
by Claire Chennault from the aviation
ranks of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Ma-
rine Corps to help protect China and
key areas of Southeast Asia from unre-
lenting attack by the Japanese army air
force. In their Curtiss P-40 Tomahawks,
with their iconic shark’s teeth motif
painted on the noses, the Flying Tigers
flew combat missions from three days
after Pearl Harbor until July 1942, when
the unit was absorbed into the U.S.
Army Air Corps. During this seven-
month period, the AVG, never number-
ing at any one time more than about
seventy pilots and a roughly equal num-
ber of aircraft, inflicted disproportion-
ate damage on the Japanese (1:28 ratio
for aircrew losses). This deadly aerial
struggle kept the vital 750-mile supply
line from India across Burma and into
China open and operational for as long
as possible during the Japanese on-
slaught. The men of the AVG did this
while living in mostly deplorable condi-
tions, with at best erratic maintenance
and logistic support.
The author’s depictions of air combat
are especially gripping, often describing
individual pilots flying for both sides,
while providing ample technical infor-
mation on the types of aircraft in the
engagements. Of course the primary
characters are all here, from Chennault,
a chain-smoking, tough, and innovative
leader, to pilots Tex Hill, Eddie Rector,
and Greg Boyington (later of VMF-214
“Black Sheep” fame). Ford’s history is
serious, but it is also rich with stories
about this colorful and adventurous
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group, including the beautiful and mys-
terious Olga Greenlaw, wife of the
AVG’s executive officer.
While correcting some errors and omis-
sions, Ford stands his ground on the
most controversial viewpoint expressed
in his 1991 edition—that the Flying Ti-
gers’ claimed official record of 296
combat victories (including aircraft de-
stroyed on the ground) was greater than
what they actually achieved. Citing
comprehensive research into the histor-
ical records of all involved, Ford makes
a good case that because of the predict-
able stress, fear, and chaos involved in
vicious aerial combat, the AVG’s re-
ported victories were inflated over a
true figure likely closer to 115. Ford’s
book, then, is not a glorification of the
Flying Tigers, but its meticulous exami-
nation of their genuine and courageous
achievements pays them greater hom-
age than the numbers would, however
tallied. Ford closes his book with these
words: “More than sixty years ago, in
their incandescent youth, they were
heroes to a nation that needed heroes.
. . . All honor to them.” Indeed, and ac-
claim to Daniel Ford for his thorough
telling of an eventful war in the air, one
that should be remembered.
WILLIAM CALHOUN
Naval War College
Raman, B. The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory
Lane. New Delhi, India: Lancer, 2007. 288pp. $27
During the Cold War, views from the
“other side” proved endlessly fascinat-
ing to students of international affairs.
Books such as The Russians, by Hedrick
Smith, and the multiple memoirs of
Viktor Suvorov provided insights into
thought processes and value systems.
Most national-security professionals to-
day cannot afford the luxury of focus-
ing on one nation or topic. And as a
nation, the United States cannot afford
to ignore India.
The Kaoboys of R&AW is B. Raman’s in-
formal (and somewhat unfocused)
memoir of his time with India’s exter-
nal intelligence agency, the Research
and Analysis Wing (R&AW).
“Kaoboys” refers to the protégés of R.
M. Kao, the first director-general of the
organization. Raman was a professional
intelligence officer who spent much of
his career in operational assignments.
He spent twenty-six years in R&AW, re-
tiring as head of the agency’s counterter-
rorism unit. He later served in the In-
dian National Security Secretariat and is
currently the director of a think tank in
Chennai. Reading between the lines, he
likely worked in clandestine intelligence
collection, liaison, and paramilitary
roles. In some cases (such as discussing
security shortfalls in protecting Indira
Gandhi) he provides many details; how-
ever, in many instances details are no-
ticeable only for their absence.
While the book is valuable, most Amer-
ican readers will find it frustrating. It
was written for an Indian audience; the
reader without a background in Indian
politics since the 1950s will frequently
find it obscure. Likewise, those unfa-
miliar with South Asian geography
must occasionally stop reading to check
an atlas. The writing style is somewhat
folksy but different from the Anglo-
American equivalent. Also, it is not
strictly chronological. Unfortunately,
the memoir is not a representative ex-
ample of Raman’s work; he is a prolific
writer on international security issues,
his articles are well written and
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thoughtful, and his byline bears watch-
ing. The astute reader may conclude
that Raman was not well served by his
publisher.
Despite these obstacles, the book is
worth reading. Raman provides an in-
teresting view from India on critical
past and current U.S. policies, from our
long-term support for Pakistan to rela-
tions with China, to the current global
conflict on terrorism. He outlines sev-
eral instances of R&AW working with
the CIA to counter Chinese moves,
while at the same time claiming that the
CIA was working against India—some-
times with Pakistan, sometimes not.
While expressing a fondness for the
American people, Raman is definitely
no fan of the U.S. State Department.
Curiously, he displays no animosity for
the CIA, despite his claims that the
agency engineered a key defection and
conducted “psywar” campaigns against
India. But perhaps the lack of rancor is
explained by a story that Raman could
not tell.
JOHN R. ARPIN
Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Virginia
Bethencourt, Francisco, and Diogo Ramada
Curto, eds. Portuguese Oceanic Expansion,
1400–1800. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,
2007. 536pp. $34.95
Globalization, as a form of worldwide
economic expansion and global interac-
tion, can trace its origins back more
than five hundred years to the expan-
sion of Europe and to the first Euro-
pean maritime empire, established by
Portugal. From this beginning, the story
of globalization is traced through the
better-known eras of Spanish, Dutch,
French, and British maritime domi-
nance to our present modern phase of
more sophisticated global interaction.
Although the earlier maritime empires
were based on separate, competing
maritime economies rather than the
current ideal of a single global econ-
omy, these earlier examples of develop-
ment are important to understand in
terms of their limitations and successes.
Among these maritime empires, the
history of Portugal’s contribution has
been the least well known to the
anglophone world.
Two recent important anniversaries
have brought Portugal’s role to wider
attention. The first occurred in 1998 to
mark the five-hundredth anniversary of
Vasco da Gama’s pioneering voyage
around the Cape of Good Hope and
across the Indian Ocean in the first Eu-
ropean direct sea voyage to India. The
second was in 2000, commemorating
the five-hundredth anniversary of the
first landing in and subsequent coloni-
zation of Brazil by Portugal. In connec-
tion with these anniversaries, the John
Carter Brown Library at Brown Univer-
sity in Rhode Island became the locus
for a major attempt to make available
to English-language readers an up-to-
date and wide-ranging analysis of Por-
tugal’s early contribution to oceanic ex-
pansion. The fruit of that effort may be
found in this volume, providing a ma-
jor update of scholarly interpretations.
The chapters in this edited collection
cover a wide range of topics. The book’s
fourteen chapters, each by a different
author, are distributed into four parts.
The first part examines economics and
society, focusing on such themes as
markets, economic networks, costs, and
financial trends. The second deals with
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politics and institutions, looking at pat-
terns of settlement, political configura-
tions in relation to local powers, and
the role and structure of the Catholic
Church in the context of global expan-
sion. The third is devoted to the cul-
tural world, examining the interaction
of cultures and the creation of an impe-
rial and colonial culture, as well as the
wider world’s influences on the Portu-
guese language, literature, and the arts,
with the roles of science and technology
as a key element in oceanic expansion.
The fourth part, entitled “The Compar-
ative Dimension,” is a masterful single
chapter by Felipe Fernández-Armesto
that summarizes how “Portuguese ex-
pansion carried the ‘seeds of change’
that transformed so many environ-
ments and reversed the age-old pattern
of evolution.”
The naval readers of this journal may
relate most easily to the essay by mari-
time historian Francisco Contente
Domingues, “Science and Technology
in Portuguese Navigation: The Idea of
Experience in the Sixteenth Century.”
In his interesting historical analysis,
Domingues shows how the direct per-
sonal experience of Portuguese
mariners who navigated to other parts
of the globe had a major effect in dis-
mantling the preconceptions inherited
from the ancient classic writers. The di-
rect observations that mariners made
while voyaging on new seas and seeing
new stars, new lands, and new peoples
provided the basis for the idea that a new
era in the world had begun and, in the
sixteenth-century context, stimulated
much new learning. Thus, Domingues
shows the origins and rationale for the
mariner’s now long-standing penchant
for direct experience over book
learning.
The world of Portugal’s oceanic empire
is a distant one, distinctly foreign to
that of our own time. Yet despite the
vast differences and contrasts between
the Portuguese oceanic empire and our
own time, this volume allows a reader
to contemplate the very wide range of
issues that this early example of global
reach involved. Here one can find a
range of examples of justification, re-
form, critique, and resistance, inter-
mixed with and tied to the broad issues
of war and peace.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College
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IN MY VIEW
MARITIME DEFENSE, THEN AND NOW
Sir:
I was very interested to read Dr. Scott Truver’s recent article “Mines and Under-
water IEDs in U.S. Ports and Waterways” in the Winter 2008 edition of the Re-
view. I was all the more interested because of my own involvement with this issue
in the 1980s and early 1990s as part of the Navy’s previous Maritime Defense
Zone program along the U.S. East Coast. During that period, I was the mine war-
fare planning/operations–responsible Naval Reserve officer assigned to Mari-
time Defense Zone Sector 3, and later Sector New York. Our scope of
responsibilities included the ports of New York, New London, and Philadelphia,
and while the threat at that time was related to the Cold War and the possibilities
of Soviet Spetsnaz or saboteur attack on harbor shipping, many of the issues and
challenges remain the same today, with the threat of extremist terrorist attacks.
I basically agree with Dr. Truver’s key points and rationale but feel that not
much progress has been made in terms of providing effective, locally available
capabilities and resources since the time I was grappling with this issue “way
back when.” Part of the problem is the waxing and waning of the Navy’s focus on
mine warfare over the years, with changes in budgetary and resource allocations
to this challenge. The other part of the problem, though, is the geographic size of
our port areas, such as New York/New Jersey, the hydrography and tidal flow of a
port with a major freshwater river outflow, and the volume of commercial and
recreational ship and boat traffic that such a large port has. During my time we
knew that there was little that could be done proactively, that the best we could
hope for was a focused, reactive response with whatever resources were locally
available until more capable forces could be brought to bear from other loca-
tions. We did our best, therefore, to create a contingency plan of cooperation be-
tween the Navy (including locally available explosive-ordnance demolition
teams), Coast Guard, Army (e.g., Army dive teams), port authority, and local
law-enforcement and emergency-response organizations, trying to identify and
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utilize what few assets we had in the optimal manner. We were only partially
successful.
As an aside, not really detracting from the key messages being conveyed by
the author, I would like to point out the difficulty for a hostile swimmer of affix-
ing an explosive charge or limpet mine on the hull of the Staten Island Ferry
while it is discharging or loading passengers (see page 107 of Dr. Truver’s arti-
cle). If you have ever observed how ferry unloading/loading operations are per-
formed, you will note that the ferry crew leaves the propellers turning to hold the
ship into its berth, with quite a bit of resultant propeller wash churning the wa-
ter around the ferry in its slip. This results in an outflow of underwater currents
that would effectively deter anyone from attempting to swim up alongside the
hull. That is not to say that off-duty ferries in their layup slips wouldn’t be vul-
nerable to attack, since their propulsion machinery is secured, but in that in-
stance the explosive charge would likely have to be command detonated later,
while the ferry is in operation, in order to have the greatest terror impact. Also,
even though our nation has made great strides in cleaning up our waterways,
any local diver could tell you that underwater navigation around places like Up-
per or Lower New York Harbor or the Delaware River is problematic at best, even
for professionals.
My hope is that warning voices such as Dr. Truver’s will be heard and that
long-overdue resources sufficient in capability and availability will finally be
provided to our nation’s ports for their protection.
TIMOTHY R. DRING
Commander, U.S. Navy Reserve (Ret.)
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